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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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28 August 1985

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OAU BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR SETTLING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Dec 84-Jan 85 pp 3-19

[Article by Abdelhamid El Ouali, professor at the Casablanca School of Law]

[Text] This subject was the topic of the recent symposium sponsored by AMERI (Moroccan Association for International Studies and Research) in cooperation with the Department of Public Law of the Casablanca School of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences.

"It is difficult to imagine that (a) conflict could exist within one and the same norm.... If that were the case, one would have an act devoid of sense, and as a consequence... there would be an absence of any objectively valid norm" (Kelsen).

"Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other" (Pascal).

"...the researcher's objectivity is... sorely tested by this subject of boundaries" (Guichonnet and Raffestin).

Introduction

African territory is characterized by a double paradox: the economic, geographic, and ethnic absurdity of the spatial limits established by the colonizer and the legal absurdity of the OAU's basic principle for the settlement of territorial disputes¹: uti possidetis. Only the first of those two absurdities has given rise to a literature--abundant, it must be added, and also unanimous in noting the absurdity,² but diverging on the point of whether to retain or reject it.

Whether or not independent Africa should retain the spatial limits resulting from colonization is not the subject of our remarks here. It has been written that boundaries constitute one of those concepts which almost always engender the emotional reactions on which national and indeed nationalist passions feed.³ Our purpose here, on the other hand, is inspired by another passion that is more modest but equally stirring: knowledge of the truth in law, it being that knowledge alone which allows the establishment among peoples of relations based on shared law and equity.

In law as in other fields, knowledge of the truth presupposes above all that we do not blindly accept prenotions as our own. But those prenotions are often difficult to force from cover when one approaches the study of territorial questions, an issue on which emotion takes precedence over reason. So let us try to force reason to recover its preeminence by asking the question that is the subject of our paper: is *uti possidetis* a legal norm in international law? If not, is it at least a legal norm for the OAU? A number of authors--often Africanists--answer no to the first question and yes to the second. Others, noting the systematic primacy accorded *uti possidetis* by the OAU over other norms of international law, go so far as to claim that *uti possidetis* is "the most important principle in inter-African positive law."⁴ Still others, or often the same ones, being perfectly aware of the paradox constituted by *uti possidetis*, try to assimilate the latter with the principle of territorial integrity or that of the inviolability of frontiers, their purpose being to achieve recognition of its legal character.

When it is said that *uti possidetis* is a legal norm, are we not in the presence of a "false truth" or, let us dare to say it, a legal occultation? That is certainly the case if it can be shown, first, that *uti possidetis* is a legal absurdity, and, second, that it does not constitute a principle of international, universal, or regional law.

1. *Uti Possidetis* a Legal Absurdity

The "principle" of *uti possidetis* is an absurdity because analysis of its content shows that it rests on an intellectually unacceptable contradiction. To realize this, it is necessary to begin by recalling the definition given by international law to the principle of territorial integrity. That definition is a basic requirement, especially when one is faced with the study of territorial problems in Africa, where there is a tendency to confuse the principle of *uti possidetis* with the principle of territorial integrity.

A. Definition of the Principle of Territorial Integrity, or the Necessary Precondition for Determining the Content of the "Principle" of *Uti Possidetis*

As is known, the principle of territorial integrity as a legal principle is not open to dispute in international law. Constituting unquestionably a "positive norm of the first importance in contemporary international society,"⁵ it is one of the pillars of international law. Its proclamation is immemorial, having existed ever since political entities, primitive groups, or states began recognizing their respective sovereignties over distinct territorial areas. Its ratification is a matter of ritual and redundancy that are formally expressed in major international, legal, or political instruments: treaties both ancient⁶ and modern,⁷ basic universal⁸ or regional⁹ charters, international jurisprudence,¹⁰ resolutions by international organizations,¹¹ political declarations,¹² and so on.

But what does the principle of territorial integrity mean? The least one can say is that here we are in the presence of a legal oddity that reaches the level of a paradox: here we have a basic legal principle to which, at first glance, international law assigns no definition, whether precise or vague,

narrow or broad! Consult any doctrinal treatise on international law or any specialized study of the state, sovereignty, territory, boundaries, and so on. You will find it very hard to discover a definition of that principle in any of them. And you can repeat the same exercise with international conventions, international jurisprudence, international resolutions, and so on. Nevertheless, invocation of the principle is also a matter of ritual and repetition. But it is systematically achieved by the process of negation. For example, it is proclaimed, depending on the case in point, that the principle of territorial integrity prohibits the breaking up of a territory, the violation of a territory, or the use of force against a territory, and so on. Still, the fact that the process of negation is utilized in this way only proves that there is a certain idea of what the principle of territorial integrity must be.

As was said, definition of the principle of territorial integrity is a basic requirement as far as we are concerned. But the restraints imposed on the topics to be discussed at this symposium do not permit us to engage in a thorough analysis of all the elements that must enter into a definition of that principle. We will therefore be brief here, but without omitting what is essential. And our opinion is that what is essential and at the very core of the principle of territorial integrity is the concept of the existence of the state. In the field of doctrine, there have been attempts to reject the validity of such a concept by asserting "the impossible construction of the right of existence"¹³ on the ground that the state is not eternal: it appears, disappears, and is reborn. That notion, which is traditional, is incorrect because international law takes into account not only a state's spatial existence but also its temporal existence.¹⁴ It is true, one can theoretically assume, that from a historical standpoint reaching back to the origins of mankind, that right seems to have been absent from the constitution of the first stabilized human communities in territories where they exercised their distinct sovereignty. It was power alone, in its supreme nakedness, that was the first generator of political communities because "no principle presided over the distribution of land among men; it was historical facts which decided the allotment of land to a group of human beings."¹⁵ It is also power alone which is the stabilizing element in populations as potential nations through the "individualization and unification of the territory within boundaries."¹⁶ But power, because it tends toward the absolute,¹⁷ carries its own limit within itself--a double limit in this case because its effect is felt in two different spheres: one external and the other internal. It is permissible to ignore the second limit, which is basic in determining the concept of the existence of the state but whose analysis here is not immediately pertinent because it would take us some distance away from our objective, which is to show what constitutes the distinction between the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of *uti possidetis*. On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that we consider the first limit. And on that point, it is proper to recall that no power has ever succeeded in subduing all mankind.¹⁸ The power of a political entity, tribal group, state, or empire has always encountered, during its expansion in space, another power of the same type. It is therefore in the futility of indefinite expansion--and, therefore, of final victory--that international law appears: as law among groups or international law, both ancient and modern. Emerging from the balance of power, international law's first function is to codify the use of force before establishing the law of peace. This is so because use of force is seen

as the supreme means of guaranteeing the existence of the state. But the perpetuity of the state may presuppose--always with a view to or in the name of preserving the balance of power, whether real or imaginary--the disappearance or dismemberment of other states. Among other things, that is one of the basic aspects of European public law, which until the first half of the 20th century recognized in its law of war that a state's frontier could move with the footsteps of soldiers or that a state's territory could stretch and contract like an accordion.¹⁹ That was also the situation in the non-European world until 1945. As we know, the date just mentioned is important in international relations because for the first time, the international community recognized a ban on the use of force against territorial integrity. But does the ban on the use of force mean the disappearance of the supreme means of guaranteeing the existence of the state? We all know that that is not the case at all, and the UN Charter recognizes every state's right to safeguard its existence by the use of force in self-defense. So then, the law under the charter, as is true of the older law, retains the use of force as a final means of guaranteeing the existence of the state. The only thing new among those who adopted or later acceded to the UN Charter--and this was also true of the League of Nations Pact--was, first of all, the principle that "the use of self-defense to protect a state's right to territorial integrity must not be tantamount to a return to the state of anarchy preceding the charter and to admission that the members of the international community have a genuine right of self-protection. States no longer have authority in matters of war authorizing them to settle all their disputes" over territory by the use of force.²⁰ Also new was the principle that "it was peace and not an indefensible status quo that they had intended to protect by affirming the principle of respect for and preservation of territorial integrity. It was aggression that they had banned without prejudging the legitimacy of claims in any way while also leaving the way open for recourse to procedures for pacific settlement."²¹

The first conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that regardless of its nature, international law has always recognized the right of political entities to exist through the use of force. But it also recognizes their right to exist in their own territorial space. That is the second function of original international law in the framework of peace. The idea that every community has its own territory is the result both of sedentary life²² and of the imposition of spatial limits as the expression of the futility of seeking absolute power. The notion of spatial limits therefore plays an essential role in the formation of collective consciousness because it arouses the social group's attachment to its own territory. By individualizing territory, the boundary also individualizes and unifies the political community, whether primitive group or ancient or modern state. This is true because it is territory which, along with blood ties or the national tie, helps establish the solidarity and unity of the social group.²³ The social group then attains its political dimension, and from primitive group to modern state, it has constantly proclaimed the sacred character of the territory and its limits.²⁴ Contrary to what has been said by the proponents of a certain branch of colonial ethnography, those limits have been present throughout human history²⁵--ever since human communities, moved by the search for power, have found themselves confronting one another. In all areas of the earth where the search for power has given rise to confrontation between human communities, the boundary, whether zonal or linear, vague or

precise, has been a mountain, forest, river, desert, or something similar. Resulting in the beginning from the original use of force, a boundary is first of all confirmed by an oral or written peace treaty. But as time goes on, it may also become a part of collective memory. In this way, if we exclude the original *de facto* occupation that is later transformed into *de jure* occupation, the first two legal titles to territorial sovereignty appear. They merge to form only one if pact and memory join to designate the same boundary reality, or they are distinct and antagonistic if they cover two different boundary realities. This gives rise to the first challenges to the legal titles: pact and immemorial possession. It gives rise to the first means of resolving territorial disputes: negotiation or arbitration.²⁶ It is therefore up to each political community to give a clear indication in peacetime of the territory to which it is entitled by right. This brings us to a second conclusion: every political community, group, or state has the right to possess a territory whose foundation and limits are established in accordance with international law.

With the two conclusions thus drawn, and subject to conclusions to be drawn from an analysis of the limits of power in the internal sphere--an analysis that is not appropriate here--it is possible to determine what international law understands by the "principle of territorial integrity." Here is the definition which, in our opinion, reflects the situation in positive law: "The principle of territorial integrity is that principle which recognizes a state's right to sovereign existence in a territory of its own, the foundation and boundaries of which are established in accordance with international law."²⁷

The above definition of the principle of territorial sovereignty entails a certain number of consequences.²⁸ From among them, we will choose only those necessary for the flow of our analysis. Two basic elements can therefore be kept in mind. The first is that the delimitation of territory is an act of sovereignty²⁹ and, more particularly, the sovereignty of the bordering states.³⁰ The second is that conflicts over delimitation are resolved on the basis of legal titles recognized by international law.³¹ But recourse to the second element alone is more than enough to show what makes the principle of *uti possidetis* contradictory.

B. Contradictory Content of the Principle of *Uti Possidetis*

As we know, the principle of *uti possidetis* was borrowed by the Latin Americans from Roman law, in which the expression "*uti possidetis, ita possidetis*" ("as you hold, you may continue to hold") signifies continuation of the temporary status quo as regards the possession of property at dispute between two parties until the judge issues his final verdict recognizing the owner of the property.³² But when that principle was borrowed, "permanent status quo" was substituted for "temporary status quo," and *uti possidetis*, in the Latin American context, is understood as being the principle by which the former Spanish-Portuguese boundaries or the former Spanish administrative boundaries constitute the international boundaries of the new Latin American states. But what were the former colonial boundaries? That is the big difficulty that will always face the Latin American states because quite often, not only the former Spanish-Portuguese boundaries but also the former administrative boundaries had either

remained undefined,³³ were established imprecisely,³⁴ or, when they were defined, did not correspond to the de facto situation in 1810 and 1821, the two critical years selected by the Latin American states.³⁵ The difficulty is expressed essentially in the question: which boundaries are to be adopted? The de jure boundaries or the de facto boundaries? In other words, which principle is to apply: uti possidetis de jure or uti possidetis de facto? That demonstrates the principle's ambiguity, which will never be definitely decided one way or the other. But what constitutes that ambiguity which, in the final analysis, makes the principle of uti possidetis a contradictory principle and therefore strips it of any legal character? It is very simple: either the principle of uti possidetis calls for the recognition of legal titles--in which case we are in the presence of a situation that has always been governed by international law when two political entities, groups, or states agree, within a framework of equality established in peacetime, to have recourse to law to settle their territorial or boundary disputes--or, on the contrary, the principle of uti possidetis calls for the recognition of a de facto situation, which is none other than territorial occupation as a means of territorial acquisition, and that is the situation that prevails between conquerors and the conquered, if we exclude the rare situation of a territory genuinely without a master.³⁶ The contradiction which lies at the very core of the principle of uti possidetis therefore prohibits it from finding a place among legal principles or norms because in fact, "presented... in the form of uti possidetis juris, the American or 'colonial' principle is invalidated in its origin. It rests on a contradictory statement: uti possidetis juris refers to a title, not to the fact of possession. Presented... in the form of uti possidetis de facto, it is pleonastic in form and, in substance, is the same as the principle of occupation."³⁷ Being contradictory, uti possidetis can therefore not be considered a principle at all, much less a principle in international law.

2. Uti Possidetis not a Principle of International Law

The dominant approach to territorial problems in Africa pays particular attention to asserting that uti possidetis is sanctioned indirectly and directly by international law. In the first case, it proceeds by assimilating uti possidetis with the principle of territorial integrity and that of the inviolability of frontiers. In the second case, it proceeds by generalization based on experiences by states or continents, particularly in the Third World. But in fact, international law does not sanction uti possidetis in either the first or the second case.

A. Uti Possidetis not Sanctioned Indirectly by International Law

Unable to find an unequivocal legal basis for the principle of uti possidetis, some, if not most, of the authors who have dealt with territorial problems in Africa have tried, but in an absolutely peremptory manner, to assimilate uti possidetis with the principle of territorial integrity and that of the inviolability of frontiers, doing so in a process of general confusion that covers all three principles at once. Let us cite a few examples.

As early as 1964, Francois Borella had no hesitation in writing that "the OAU was called upon to interest itself in a whole series of boundary problems

between the African states. That is why the conference took pains to make the content³⁸ of article III, No 3 of the charter ('respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state') clear. Resolution AHG/16/1 'formally declares that all the member states pledge to respect the boundaries existing at the time when they acceded to independence.' That signified the triumph of the principle of the inheritance of boundaries, which is the principle of *uti possidetis*."³⁹

And Mohamed Bedjaoui wrote very curtly that "by providing an authentic interpretation⁴⁰ of the provisions in the OAU Charter relative to the principle of the inviolability of frontiers as far back as its summit meeting in Cairo in 1964, the conference of chiefs of state issued directives to the Council of Ministers and the ad hoc committee for seeking a solution to the Algerian-Moroccan conflict."⁴¹

We can also quote the reporters for the Algiers symposium of 1971 on the OAU. They said that the territorial status quo in Africa "finds its most striking manifestation in a principle included in the charter itself--that of the inviolability of frontiers, also known as *uti possidetis*."⁴²

Lastly, let us quote Romain Yukemtchouk along those same lines. He writes in cut-and-dried fashion that the African states proceeded to identify "the principle of territorial integrity with that of the inviolability of frontiers: those frontiers cannot be challenged from within or without. Justifiably, therefore, the young states see unconditional respect for their territorial integrity--and, therefore, the rigid preservation of the boundary status quo--as a basic condition for the exercise of their national sovereignty," and he immediately concludes as follows: "That brings us to an examination of the principle of *uti possidetis*."⁴³

In his thorough study of "equity and land frontiers," Prof D. Bardonnet admits that "it is impossible to assimilate it (*uti possidetis*) with the principle of the inviolability of frontiers or that of territorial integrity."⁴⁴ But to our knowledge, such a confusion of the three principles has never been subjected to systematic criticism. Only one author, J. de Pinho Campinos, has protested that confusion, although he did so in a peremptory fashion and, in turn, confused the principle of the inviolability of frontiers with that of territorial integrity. He deserves mention because he makes a certain distinction in international law that we come across later. He writes: "It seems to us that these principles are not identical. The principle of the inviolability of frontiers or of territorial integrity is a universal principle which, as a corollary to the maintenance of peace and of international security, concerns every state. On the other hand, the principle of *uti possidetis* is a principle that is of interest essentially to the states that emerged from decolonization--Latin American in the past and Afro-Asian at present."⁴⁵ But the question of what constitutes the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, identified here with the principle of territorial integrity, is never answered!

As can be seen, it has not been a waste of time to linger over the definition of the principle of territorial integrity or to recall the definition of *uti possidetis*. It remains now to provide a definition of the principle of the

inviolability of frontiers. But is there a definition in international law of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers? To our knowledge, there is none. Are the reasons the same as those that discouraged a definition of the principle of territorial integrity? Actually, if there is no definition, the reason is that there is no legal notion of the inviolability of frontiers. On the political level, to be sure, there is indeed such a notion--the one that also covers the ideology of "security in possession," which was first conceived by Metternich not to ensure Europe's tranquillity, as he liked to proclaim, but because "after achieving plans long pondered, winning over Napoleon, and pushing France back inside its former frontiers, he had succeeded in getting ratification in Vienna of Austria's most basic views. Having obtained a lavish share in the division of spoils, he aspired only to keep what had been acquired at the cost of so many struggles."⁴⁶ But the political notion of "security in possession" has never been transformed into a legal norm for the simple reason that European frontiers have continued to shift as in the past and because, more recently, when signing the League of Nations Pact or the UN Charter, the European states and the other states in the international community never acknowledged that the state of peace established by those two international instruments was equivalent to the recognition of a territorial status quo antagonistic to the legitimate claims of either side.

Some authors, either Africans⁴⁷ or Africanists,⁴⁸ have claimed that the inviolability of frontiers is sanctioned as a principle of international law by international judges. To back themselves up, they invoke a constant stream of jurisprudence reflected in the decision by the International Court of Justice [ICJ] in the case of the Preah Vihear Temple, which reads as follows: "Generally speaking, when two countries define a boundary between them, one of their main objectives is to reach a stable and permanent solution. That is impossible if the line thus established can be challenged at any time on the basis of proceedings that are constantly being reopened and if rectification can be requested every time an inaccuracy is discovered in relation to a provision in the basic treaty."⁴⁹ The same authors, or others, also invoke in support of their thesis the two Vienna conventions on the law of treaties.⁵⁰ The first (that of 1969) says in article 62, No 2: "A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary." The second (that of 1978), which deals with the succession of states in the field of treaties, says in article 11: "A succession of states does not, in itself, affect a boundary established by a treaty or the obligations and rights established by a treaty in regard to the regulation of a boundary."

Let us remember that those authors are confusing the principle of the inviolability of frontiers with that of *uti possidetis*. But by invoking the above-mentioned jurisprudence and the two Vienna conventions, they add another source of confusion which, paradoxically, can help us to clarify the distinction between the two principles in question if we accept, as pure conjecture for the moment, that the inviolability of frontiers is a notion in international law which does have some content. As regards the new confusion, it is concerned with the scope of the well-established principle in international law that when states want to resolve their boundary disputes, they must resolve them by seeking a stable and permanent solution because, as is recalled by Professor

Jennings, "Some other kinds of legal ordering need to be capable of a constant change to meet new needs of a developing society; but in a properly ordered society, territorial boundaries will be among the most stable of all institutions."⁵¹ In reality, the confusion affects the historical scope of the principle first of all. This is because the above-mentioned jurisprudence or the two Vienna conventions simply recall the constant behavior of states, which almost invariably insist on declaring in treaties settling boundary disputes or in the special arbitration agreements submitting those cases to the international judge that the solution they contemplate must be considered stable and permanent.⁵² It also affects the legal scope of the principle, because while international law proclaims that the solution must be stable and permanent, that solution is not perpetual, for one thing, and above all, it remains the joint work of the parties involved, being the result of mutual consent by the states concerned⁵³ that their consent be the initial step in a jurisdictional procedure or a later step in a negotiated procedure.

On the basis of those observations, it is now possible to establish, first of all, that which distinguishes the principle of *uti possidetis* from the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, and then to determine what international law might understand by the latter. The basic distinction between the principle of *uti possidetis* and the principle of the inviolability of frontiers is that the former is one means among many for settling boundary disputes, whereas the latter is the specific result of successful recourse to some means of settling boundary disputes that is recognized by international law. When one assimilates the principle of *uti possidetis* with the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, one is confusing the result with the means. As for the definition of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, if one wants to preserve a certain meaning for that principle within the limits of positive international law, it can only be the definition referring to the stable and permanent character of the solution to boundary disputes. In those conditions, one can therefore understand the principle of the inviolability of frontiers as being the principle according to which the solution of a boundary dispute is stable and permanent when the parties involved accept it by mutual agreement. Any other definition that would enlarge the scope of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, particularly by assimilating it with the principle of *uti possidetis*, would be contrary to international law. But even if, purely hypothetically, such an assimilation were theoretically possible, it would rest on an absurdity because international law does not recognize the reference "principle"--in this case, *uti possidetis*--as having any legal character.

B. *Uti Possidetis* not Sanctioned Directly by International Law

It is acknowledged without question that *uti possidetis* is not accepted either by general treaties, universal custom,⁵⁴ international jurisprudence,⁵⁵ or international practice.⁵⁶ This is so, it is said, because the principle is of interest only to the new states, which, for one thing, "have to do more than defend their territorial integrity against the expansionist aims of more powerful states. They must also protect it from the mutual territorial claims that threaten to trigger an uncontrollable chain reaction of upheavals."⁵⁷ And for another thing, they have to undertake "national construction on the basis of colonial fact."⁵⁸ Disregarding here the analysis of supposed or real motives

for advocating adoption of the principle, particularly in Africa, one can nevertheless ponder the validity of such a legal exclusiveness that would take in only the new states by asking whether the latter unquestionably recognize the legal character of the principle of *uti possidetis*.

Recognition of the legal character of the principle of *uti possidetis* is a question that has already been settled in the negative by the Latin American states, most of which consider it to be a discredited principle.⁵⁹ Any new analysis here to confirm such a truth would fall into the realm of tautology. But let us recall certain facts that are often forgotten. The first is that the Latin American states first adopted the principle jointly for the sole purpose of protesting Great Britain's occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1833, their rationale being that there were no longer any territories without masters in Latin America.⁶⁰ The second is that those same states have never adopted the principle jointly as a means of settling boundary disputes.⁶¹ The third is that only certain Latin American states ever adopted the principle either in their constitutions,⁶² in treaties resolving a boundary problem,⁶³ or in arbitration agreements.⁶⁴ The fourth is that those same states eventually abandoned the principle because of its ambiguity.⁶⁵ The fifth is that certain arbitration tribunals, although they were supposed to apply the principle in accordance with the arbitration agreement, wound up by discarding it⁶⁶ or reconciling it with equity.⁶⁷ The sixth is that no arbitration tribunal has ever taken it upon itself to apply the principle when the arbitration agreement said nothing about it. The seventh is that most boundary disputes have been settled not by recourse to the principle of *uti possidetis* but by application of the relevant rules of general international law.⁶⁸ The eighth is that most territorial boundaries of the Latin American states were established not by applying the principle of *uti possidetis* but as a consequence of bilateral negotiations based quite often on mutual concessions.⁶⁹ The ninth is that the principle has created more territorial conflicts than it has resolved.⁷⁰ Lastly, the only important positive effect that it may have had is that of contributing to the development of arbitration.⁷¹

Recognition of the legal character, not to mention that of any acceptance at all, of the principle of *uti possidetis*, whether legal or political in nature, is also resolved in a negative direction in Asia, where states not sharing the "same approach to boundary questions"⁷² resolve those questions strictly by applying the traditional rules of international law.⁷³

Lastly, we come to the question of recognition of the legal character of the principle of *uti possidetis* by African states. Here again, the question can only be answered in the negative. It is true that by adopting the Cairo Resolution of 21 July 1964, most of those states seem a priori to have been advocating application of the principle to boundary disputes. Still, supposing that resolution to be binding on a purely formal level, in the sense that it supposedly establishes a legal norm (which in fact is not the case here because no OAU organization has the power to enforce rules⁷⁴), it nevertheless rests on a basic contradiction from the material point of view. To bring out that contradiction clearly, let us recall the essential fragments of the resolution. Here they are:

"Recalling, moreover, that all the member states have pledged, under the terms of article VI of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, to respect scrupulously the principles set forth in article III, paragraph 3 of the said charter;

"1. Solemnly reaffirms total respect by all the member states of the OAU of the principles set forth in article III, paragraph 3 of the charter of the said organization;

"2. Solemnly declares that all the member states pledge to respect the boundaries existing at the time when they acceded to independence."

In that resolution, as can be seen, the African chiefs of state and heads of government affirmed their attachment both to the principle of territorial integrity and to respect for the boundaries existing when the African states became independent. But are those two principles reconcilable? They are absolutely if the intention in the resolution is to adopt the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, but not at all if the intention is to adopt the principle of *uti possidetis de facto*. In the first case, what is involved is a simple tautology because the principle of territorial integrity recognizes every state's right to make legitimate territorial claims, whereas in the second case, it is a matter of rejecting that same right and therefore the principle of territorial integrity, for which another right has been substituted: the right to occupy and acquire foreign territories. In the view of some authors, it is the second meaning of the principle which has been adopted in the African context, where it constitutes "a plea of nonadmissibility against any attempt to challenge the boundaries existing at the time of independence, regardless of the reasons invoked (historical rights, unjust or arbitrary boundaries, and so on)."⁷⁵ If that is the case, the resolution contradicts both the OAU Charter⁷⁶ and international law, which do not accept occupation as a means of acquiring territories under foreign sovereignty.⁷⁷ But has it not been claimed that occupation may correspond to effectiveness, which is a principle recognized by international law?⁷⁸ In fact, supporting such a view means forgetting that the principle of effectiveness is relevant in particular only in the absence of any challenge by the states concerned,⁷⁹ and such challenges have not been lacking in Africa, either through a declared rejection of the principle of *uti possidetis de facto*⁸⁰ or through the inability of the latter to achieve the objectives assigned to it--that is, the elimination of territorial claims⁸¹ and the building of the nation-state.⁸² Nevertheless, it has also been claimed that in Africa, the principle of *uti possidetis* "has triumphed in those conflicts where one of the parties rejected it: the weight of the political will of the greater number was decisive. Those challenging it--being faithful in that, at least in appearance, to the attitude of the entire continent during colonization--yielded to a continentwide attitude: a sort of holy alliance hostile to all challenges."⁸³

FOOTNOTES

1. Here we have in view both territorial disputes in the strict sense and boundary disputes.

2. One of the most edifying studies is that by Y. Person, "Black Africa and its Boundaries," RFEPA, August 1972, p 18.
3. J. Dabin, "L'Etat ou le politique: essai de definition" [The State or the Politician: an Attempt at Definition], Paris, Dalloz, 1957, p 30.
4. J. M. Bipoum-Woco, "Le droit international africain" [African International Law], Paris, LGDJ, 1970, p 128. See also Ibrahima Fall, "Contribution to the Study of the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination," thesis, Paris, 1972, p 357.
5. Nguyen Quoc Dinh, "Droit international public" [Public International Law], Paris, LGDG, 1980, second edition, p 356.
6. See, for example, the clause concerning respect for territorial integrity that was inserted in a number of treaties concluded between Greek cities and quoted by Tenekides, "Droit international et communautés dans la Grèce des cités" [International Law and Communities in the Greece of City-States], RCADI, 1956, Vol. 2, p 499.
7. For Morocco, see, for example, the Preamble to the Act of Algeciras of 1906. Also concerning Morocco in another connection, see the Declaration of 3 October 1904 by France and Spain relative to the integrity of the Moroccan Empire.
8. UN Charter, art 2, No 4.
9. Charter of Bogota, 1948, arts 1 and 9, UN Charter, art 3, No 3.
10. ICJ, case of the Corfu Straits, ICJ Reports, 1949, p 35 ("Among independent states, respect for territorial integrity is one of the basic foundations of international relations").
11. Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, No 6, concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and the resolution of 24 October 1970 concerning the principles of international law as they affect friendly relations and cooperation among states.
12. The principle of territorial integrity is one of the principles of peaceful coexistence adopted at the Bandung Conference. See also the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.
13. G. Scelle, "Manuel de droit international public" [Guide to Public International Law], Paris, Mont-Chrestien, 1948, p 92.
14. "The theory of the traditional state," writes Kelsen, "ignores the fact that the state exists not only in space but also in time and that if space must be considered an element of the state, the same is true of time, since states arise and disappear. And just as the existence of the state in space constitutes the scope of the state legal system's spatial validity, so the existence of the state in time constitutes the scope of that system's

temporal validity. And like the question of the state's territorial limits, the question of its temporal limits--that is, the question of when a state begins to exist and when it ceases to exist--is a matter of law, not one that can be resolved by one's knowledge of some natural reality. It is general international law... which determines the scope of the spatial and temporal validity of state legal systems, which delimits them in relation to each other, and which thus makes the coexistence of states in space and their succession in time legally possible." "Theorie pour du droit" [Theory for [copy missing] of the Law], translated by Charles Eisenman, Paris, Dalloz, 1962, p 382.

15. Ch. de Visscher, "Theories et realites en droit international public" [Theories and Realities in Public International Law], Paris, A. Pedone, 1970, fourth edition, p 227.
16. Ch. de Visscher, Ibid., p 222.
17. "The prime mover in a state's activity abroad," says J. Barthelemy, "is natural, spontaneous, and, so to speak, physiological. It is the tendency to grow. As Max Harden said, the cedar spreads its powerful branches and smothers the modest shrubs which tend to spring up around it. Consequently, the strength of a state is exercised as though by a law of nature, and there is no need to mingle considerations of morality or law with the acknowledgement of that physical phenomenon of growth." Paris, 1917, p 358.
18. See A. El Ouali, "The Transhistorical Existence of International Law. Some Notes for a Criticism of the Dominant Legal Ideology," RMDDED, 1982, No 2, pp 67 et seq.
19. See E. Nys, "The Acquisition of Territory and International Law," RDILC, 1904, No 2, pp 67 et seq.
20. J. Delivanis, "La legitime defense en droit international public" [Self-Defense in Public International Law], Paris, LGDJ, 1971, p 125.
21. Ch. de Visscher, "Theories et realites en droit international public," op. cit., p 222.
22. See A. O. Cukwurah, "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law," Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1967, p 13.
23. See S. B. Jones, "Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time," ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS, 1959, No 3, p 242.
24. See P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin, "Geographie des frontieres" [Boundary Geography], Paris, PUF, 1974, p 116.
25. See P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin, Ibid., p 15; Y. Person, "Black Africa and its Boundaries," RFEPA, August 1972, pp 19 et seq.

26. Arbitration is one of the oldest means of resolving territorial disputes. M. N. Tod observes that in the remotest antiquity, "by far the largest class of disputes submitted to arbitration in the ancient Greek world appears to have consisted of those which arose out of conflicting territorial claims." ("International Arbitration Amongst the Greeks," Oxford, 1913, p 53). See also most of the arbitration cases analyzed by A. Reader in "International Arbitration Among the Hellenes," Kristina, 1912.
27. One of the few authors who, to our knowledge, has recalled that the principle of territorial integrity is confused with the state's right to exist is M. Sibert. According to Sibert, the right to exist constitutes a basic right and perhaps the only basic right--the right to exist (with our reference to the principle of territorial integrity)--from which, as necessary corollaries, all the other rights classed as basic derive. Deriving from the right to exist, for example, are the right of self-preservation and the right to freedom. In turn, the right of self-preservation engenders the right to perfectibility, to defense, and to security. Deduced from the right to freedom is the right to sovereignty or independence, which in turn brings with it, within the state in question, the rights of legislation, jurisdiction, and property, and, outside the state, those of equality, mutual respect, and free trade. Under those different names and in various manifestations, it is the same right which is being exercised--the only truly "basic" one: the right to exist. See "Traite de droit international public" [Treatise on Public International Law], Paris, Dalloz, 1951, p 230.
28. See the preceding footnote.
29. A. O. Cukwurah recalls in this connection that "when neighboring states delimit their international boundary, what, in effect (they) proceed to do is fix the limit of their own sovereignty. They reciprocally recognize sovereignty on either side of the boundary line," and he concludes later that "inasmuch as the boundary of a state is prima facie evidence of the limit of its sovereignty, a fixed boundary will be relevant to the status of a state only as a corollary to its territorial sovereignty. The delimitation of international boundaries is itself an act of sovereignty." See "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law," op. cit., pp 29, 31.
30. See Ch. de Visscher, "Les effectivites du droit international public" [The Effectivities of Public International Law], Paris, A. Pedone, 1967, p 110.
31. See P. Reuter, "Droit international public" [Public International Law], Paris, PUF, Themis, 1975, fifth edition, p 168.
32. See A. O. Cukwurah, "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law," op. cit., p 113.
33. E. Ayala observes in this connection that several controversies over the delimitation of their respective colonies had arisen between Spain and Portugal and that those controversies had not been resolved when the said

colonies were emancipated. See "The Principle of Uti Possidetis and the Settlement of Territorial Questions in America," RDI, 1931, p 441.

34. As P. de Lapradelle recalls, Spanish administrative boundaries were in most cases potential boundaries marked off on rudimentary maps. See "The Boundary. A Study of International Law," thesis, Paris, 1928, p 79, note 1.
35. See E. Ayala, "The Principle of Uti Possidetis..." op. cit., p 443; P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin, "Geographie des frontieres," op. cit., pp 130 et seq.
36. See Ch. de Visscher, "Les effectivites du droit international public," op. cit., pp 102 et seq.
37. P. de Lapradelle, "La Frontiere," op. cit., pp 86-87.
38. Emphasis ours.
39. "African Regionalism in 1964," AFDI, 1964, p 625.
40. Emphasis ours.
41. "The Pacific Settlement of African Disputes," AFDI, 1972, p 95. See also, by the same author, ACDI, 1968, Vol. II, p 115.
42. M. Benouniche, Ouali Issad, and A. Laraba, "Introductory Sketch of the Institutional Approach" in "Problemes actuels de l'unite africaine" [Current Problems of African Unity], School of Law and Economic Sciences and Institute of Political Studies of the University of Algiers, Algiers, SNED, 1973, p 135.
43. "African Boundaries," RGDIP, 1970, p 51. The same confusion exists in J. M. Bipoum-Woom, "Le droit international public" [Public International Law], Paris, LGDJ, 1970, pp 127-128, S. Touval, "The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa," Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972, pp 90 et seq., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Les conflits de frontiere en Afrique" [Boundary Conflicts in Africa], Paris, Editions Techniques et Economiques, 1972, p 12, N. Bouaiti, "The Principle of the Inviolability of Frontiers in the Maghreb," DES dissertation, Paris, 1977, p 88. The list could be made even longer.
44. In "Miscellany Presented to P. Renter," Paris, A. Pedone, 1981, p 56.
45. "The Topicality of Uti Possidetis" in "La frontiere" [The Frontier], SFDI, Poitiers Symposium of 1979, Paris, A. Pedone, 1980, p 106.
46. Ch. Dupuis, "Le principe de l'equilibre et le concert europeen, de la paix de Westphalie a l'Acte d'Algeras" [The Principle of Equilibrium and the Concert of Europe, from the Peace of Westphalia to the Act of Algeras], Paris, Librairie Academique, 1909, p 153.

47. See, among others, N. Bouaita, "The Principle of the Inviolability of Frontiers in the Maghreb," *op. cit.*, pp 75 et seq.
48. Tran Van Minh, "Remarks on the Principle of the Inviolability of Frontiers" in "Peuples et Etats du Tiers-Monde face a l'ordre international" [Peoples and States of the Third World Facing the International Order], Paris, PUF, 1978, p 68.
49. ICJ Reports, 1962, p 34. This jurisprudence is not new (see the historical precedents analyzed by A. O. Cukwurah in "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes...", *op. cit.*, pp 123 et seq.). It is confirmed by the ICJ's decision in the Aegean Sea case dated 19 December 1978 (ICJ Reports, 1978, No 85) and by the arbitration tribunal's decision in the Beagle Channel case dated 18 April 1977 (ILM, 1978, No 18).
50. In this connection, M. Chemiller, Gendreau, and D. Rosenberg assert that the UN Charter (article 2, No 4) establishes the principle of the inviolability of frontiers. This clearly reveals their confusion of the said principle with the principle of territorial integrity. They write in particular that the principle of the inviolability of frontiers "has received confirmation in the texts of major contemporary conventions, both those attempting to organize international society (the UN Charter) and those marking the beginnings of a systematic codification of certain sectors of international law (the Vienna conventions of 1969 and 1978 on the law of treaties or on the succession of states with regard to treaties)." See "Encyclopedie juridique de l'Afrique" [Legal Encyclopedia of Africa], "National Space," Vol. 2, p 72.
51. "The Acquisition of Territory in International Law," Manchester University Press, 1963, p 70.
52. See the excellent historical analysis of this principle by A. O. Cukwurah, "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law," *op. cit.*, pp 119 et seq.
53. In this connection, A. O. Cukwurah aptly recalls the following: "But finality in this sense does not convey the same meaning as 'in perpetuity.' After all, in signing such boundary treaties, the parties do not constitute themselves insurers against further disagreement. In fact, one boundary settlement may well lead to a further disagreement. The term 'finality,' as applied here, rather expresses the consummation of an intention to secure a legal relationship with regard to common boundary, which is acceptable to both parties and unassailable by the wanton desires of either side. Stability should follow from such settlement." "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law," *op. cit.*, p 122.
54. R. Ago is totally mistaken about the legal validity of the principle when he states that "uti possidetis is not a principle in Latin American law, but a principle of general international law which has a double meaning. It involves respect for the administrative boundaries established by the former colonial power, the purpose being to avoid fratricidal struggles

immediately after decolonization. The new states of Africa, like those of Latin America, have referred to it. In addition, this principle involves respect for existing international boundaries, an example being those between a former colonial territory and states already free.

"This is *uti possidetis juris*--with the addition of the genitive--which is a Latin American principle. That principle had a contingent character. In 1810, it was a way of asserting that there was no territory in America without a master, the purpose being not to allow other powers to establish themselves in Spain's place." ACDCI, 1968, Vol. 1, pp 71-72.

55. Unless one erroneously assimilates *uti possidetis* with the inviolability of frontiers in the meaning that we assign to the latter.
56. A statement like that by Tran Van Minh, according to which "the principle of the preservation of boundaries existing at the time of independence (is) generally admitted in international practice" ("Remarks on the Principle of the Inviolability of Frontiers," op. cit., p 67) is completely erroneous. See the further development of this point in the text.
57. Tran Van Minh, "Remarks on the Inviolability of Frontiers," op. cit., p 57.
58. M. Benouniche, "Observations on Boundaries in Africa," DES dissertation, Algiers, 1967, p 74.
59. C. H. M. Waldock aptly recalls in this connection that "the doctrine of *uti possidetis* has proven to be so indefinite and ambiguous that it has become somewhat discredited even as a criterion for settling boundary disputes between Latin American states" ("Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies," BYBIL, 1948, p 325). See the same views as expressed in P. de Lapradelle's observations in "La frontiere," op. cit., p 86, E. Ayala in "The Principle of *Uti Possidetis* and the Settlement of Territorial Questions in America," op. cit., pp 440 et seq., and S. W. Roggs, "International Boundaries. A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems," New York, Columbia University Press, 1940, p 289.
60. See P. de Lapradelle, "La frontiere," op. cit., p 78. See also the arbitration award by the Swiss Federal Council on various boundary issues pending between Colombia and Venezuela, 22 March 1922, Berne, Neuchatel, 1922, pp 5 et seq.
61. The Lima Congress of 1848, contrary to what is sometimes stated, never proclaimed its absolute attachment to the principle of *uti possidetis*. For example, the declaration adopted by the congress--at which only a few Latin American states were represented--states that "the federal republics declare that they have a perfect right to retain the boundaries of their territories as those existed at the time of independence from Spain among the viceroyalties, captaincies-general, and presidencies that constituted the division of Spanish America. To delimit those frontiers where they are not delimited in a natural or precise manner, it would be useful for the governments concerned to appoint international commissions to explore the

terrain to the extent possible to determine the line separating the republics, based on the summits of mountains forming the *divortium aquarum*, the thalwegs of rivers, and other natural lines." Quoted by E. Ayala in "The Principle of Uti Possidetis and the Settlement of Territorial Questions in America," *op. cit.*, p 454.

62. This is the case with Colombia and Venezuela.
63. See L. D. M. Nelson, "The Arbitration of Boundary Disputes in Latin America," *NLLR*, 1973, pp 279 et seq.
64. See P. de Lapradelle, "La frontiere," *op. cit.*, p 77.
65. *Ibid.*, p 86.
66. See F. C. Fischer, "The Arbitration of the Guatemalan-Honduran Boundary," *ADIM*, 1933, pp 421 et seq., and P. de Lapradelle, "La frontiere," *op. cit.*, p 85.
67. See D. Bardonnet, "Equite et frontieres terrestres" [Equity and Land Boundaries], *op. cit.*, pp 64 et seq.
68. See E. Ayala, "The Principle of Uti Possidetis and the Settlement of Territorial Questions in America," *op. cit.*, p 442.
69. See P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin, "Geographie des frontieres," *op. cit.*, p 134.
70. See Cukwurah, "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law," *op. cit.*, p 134; E. Ayala, "The Principle of Uti Possidetis and the Settlement of Territorial Questions in America," *op. cit.*, p 454.
71. See the analysis by L. D. M. Nelson, "The Arbitration of Boundary Disputes in Latin America," *op. cit.*, pp 267 et seq.
72. See J. Dutheil de la Rochere, "Procedures for the Settlement of Boundary Disputes," "La frontiere," the above-mentioned symposium, p 135.
73. See the analysis by P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin, "Geographie des frontieres," *op. cit.*, pp 134 et seq. In this respect, the statements that the Asian states are also adopting the principle of *uti possidetis* appear completely peremptory. See the statements by Tran Van Minh, "Remarks on the Principle of the Inviolability of Frontiers," *op. cit.*, p 63, and J. Pinho Campinas, "The Topicality of Uti Possidetis," *op. cit.*, p 98.
74. See Oswald Ndeshyo, "The Application of the OAU's Acts by the Member States," the above-mentioned Algiers symposium, pp 226-227; F. Borella, "The Legal System of the OAU," *AFDI*, 1974, pp 239 et seq. This is why, aware that the said resolution is not binding in nature, the committee of experts charged with revising the OAU Charter is recommending the addition

to article 3 of paragraph 4, with this heading: "Respect for the Boundaries Existing at the Time of Their Accession to National Independence."

On this question, see A. Mjad, "State of Progress in Revising the Addis Ababa Charter," DES dissertation, Casablanca School of Law, n.d., p 92.

75. Tran Van Minh, "Encyclopedie juridique de l'Afrique," "Conflicts," Vol. 1, p 335.
76. One of whose basic principles calls for "eradicating all forms of colonialism from Africa" (art 2, par 1d).
77. Already true even before adoption of the right of decolonization as part of the UN Charter.

See A. Cenciere-Ferrandiere, "Essai historique et critique sur le mode d'occupation comme mode d'acquérir des territoires en droit international" [Historical and Critical Essay on the Occupation Method as a Means of Acquiring Territories in International Law], miscellany presented to the same author, 1940, pp 295 et seq.
78. Bouaita Nabil, "The Principle of the Inviolability of Frontiers in the Maghreb," op. cit., p 14.
79. See Ch. de Visscher, "Les effectivites du droit international public," Paris, A. Pedone, 1967, pp 102 et seq. It is hardly necessary to join this same author in recalling that "effectivity alone does not relieve the state of its international obligations. An act that is illicit internationally never constitutes a valid title in international law. This does not mean that the illicit act is to be considered nonexistent and, consequently, incapable forever of producing effects in law. Such effects, if the illicit act that gave rise to them ceases for a reasonable time, will have to be considered as having been effectively challenged.... Effectivity does not confer a valid title to the illicit act; in the prolonged absence of any resistance, some of its effects may eventually be recognized." Ibid., pp 24-25.
80. By Morocco and Somalia from the start, but also later by Kenya (see M. Benouniche, "Observations on Boundaries in Africa," DES dissertation, Algiers, School of Law and Economic Sciences, 1967, p 112), by Tanzania and Malawi (see A. Allott, "Boundaries in Africa: a Legal and Historical Survey," op. cit., p 202, note 24), and by Togo (see E. Jouve, "International Relations of the Third World and Law of Nations," op. cit., p 405), and others.
81. Uti possidetis de facto has not prevented the appearance of no fewer than 32 cases of territorial dispute! See the list drawn up by R. Waters in "African Boundary Problems," edited by Carl Gosta Windstrand, the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1969, pp 189 et seq. See also in the above-cited publication I. W. Zartman, "The Foreign and Military Politics of African Boundary Problems," pp 89 et seq.; P. Bouvier,

"A Problem of Political Sociology: the Boundaries of African States,"
REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE, 1972, pp 695 et seq.

82. See D. Boujori-Flecher, "Joys and Sorrows of Uti Possidetis," "The Inviolability of African Frontiers," RJPIC, 1981, pp 811 et seq.; Y. Person, "The State Against Identity," "Les espaces du prince" [The Spaces of Princes], Paris, PUF, 1977, pp 197 et seq.

83. M. Benouniche, "Observations on Boundaries in Africa," op. cit., p 115.

11798

CSO: 3419/449

ANGOLA

SITUATION OF RETURNING REFUGEES DESCRIBED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Jun 85 p 12

[Article by Luis Ferreira: "More Than 200 Return to Cabinda in First Quarter"]

[Text] Cabinda--The Provincial Social Affairs Office, through its registry stations located in Tando-Zinze, Beira Nova, Necuto and Miconje, has counted a total of 271 citizens reentering the country from the neighboring republics of Zaire and Congo, the provincial representative, Amelia de Fatima Correia, has informed JORNAL DO ANGOLA.

According to this provincial social affairs official, the registry and counting of returning citizens entering the country are effected in accordance with an order which basically calls for gathering all possible data on the individuals appearing at the frontier posts for reintegration into the social life of the nation.

This process, which entails both the registry of the names of those reentering and those of family members already in the country, as well as the notation of other data, such as skills and profession, former residences and places visited, helps the returning individuals subsequently in obtaining all of the documentation enabling them to move about freely.

The number of returnees, which our interlocutor said has dropped substantially in recent months, reached its peak during the period including 1983 and 1984 in the municipality of Buco-Zau, or rather on the frontier at Tando-Zinze and Necuto, where a total of 8,067 citizens entered from the Republic of Zaire.

Of this total for the past 2 years (1983-1984), 4,199 were children 12 years of age or under, while 3,898 were adults of both sexes, the majority of them senior citizens.

Our interlocutor also informed us that "our supervision of returning citizens includes three major phases, which could be described as repatriation, emergency aid and reintegration. The first phase, repatriation, involves preparation of the individuals for later return to the country, this effort being subsequently divided into stages."

Thus, according to the explanations given us, the prerepatriation phase involves a visit to establish the situation, a complete survey, drafting of the repatriation plan, and then also the minimal conditions necessary for welcoming the returning citizens must be established.

Amelia Correia further informed us that "there are programs for children, that is to say the returning children, the goal being the perfecting of an educational system for them, such as to make possible their education within the revolutionary process, as well as inculcating love of the fatherland in them."

Apart from this, the Provincial Office of the Secretary of State for Social Affairs is also responsible for caring for senior citizens, since this body has the duty of establishing facilities and conditions to guarantee the oldest of our citizens a satisfactory life.

Again in connection with support of the returning citizens, our interlocutor said that "the office must provide food and clothing for our compatriots returning to the country. To this end, we have the assistance of the municipal supervisors and activists in the municipalities and communities of the province, our duty being to assist the people until they can provide themselves with minimal living conditions."

The social affairs official for this province further assured us that the work of aid to the returnees, displaced persons, the physically handicapped and children's institutions has been improving in recent times. Moreover, as she explained, "a transit center is now about to be established in the Tando-Zinze area, which will make it possible to improve conditions for the citizens presenting themselves at this station, since to date we have had to operate there with tents sent to us from Luanda."

This Cabinda provincial official said in conclusion that "the office of the Secretariat of State for Social Affairs will in the coming months have the assistance of a vocational training workshop which is currently being established in the municipality of Cacongo. This workshop, which will make it possible for the returnees, but not them alone, to learn cabinet making, may be operating within a very short time."

5157

CSO: 3442/336

ANGOLA

MILITARY COMMANDER REPORTS ACTIVITIES IN HUAMBO, BIE

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 2 Jun 85 p 1

[Text] Major Eusebio Brito Ferreira, Deputy Commander of the Fourth Political and Military Region (Huambo and Bie provinces) reported to ANGOP that combat operations by Defense and Security Forces stationed in this region resulted in 400 counterrevolutionaries killed and 100 taken prisoner in the first 5 months of this year.

According to Maj Ferreira, in this same period, Defense and Security Forces liberated some 3,000 civilians in the jungle, where they were being held in inhumane conditions.

Large stores of weapons were also captured: arms and munitions of various types and calibers, explosives and other war materiel of South African origin, including documents.

Maj Ferreira added that in 1985, a critical year in the struggle against the puppet bands in the service of the minority racist regime of South Africa, the units and subunits under his command have been carrying on non-stop operations against the enemies of our people's democratic Revolution, inflicting crushing blows and liberating civilians forced to live in the jungle.

Maj Ferreira said that enemy activity is directed against cities with large agricultural and economic potential, Bailundo and Mungo in Huambo Province, in an attempt to disrupt agriculture and create a climate of insecurity and instability in those areas.

But the prompt and efficient response of the glorious Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola has had an effect, inflicting serious defeats of the puppet bands, which, unable to sustain an overt war with our people's revolutionary army, is aiming its weapons at civilians, indiscriminately massacring women, children and the elderly.

Another question put to Maj Ferreira concerned the operation of the Benguela Railway, the key to developing the east-central part of the country and thus a target of the enemy's sabotage operations.

"The puppet bands, enemies of the Angolan people and counterrevolutionaries in the service of imperialism and South Africa, continue their massacre of

civilians to destabilize our economy, holding back national reconstruction and the socioeconomic development of our country."

"However, in spite of certain sporadic activity (mining bridges and certain branch lines of the Benguela Railway), they have met a well-measured reply from our troops," said Maj Ferreira.

Under intensified combat activity waged by the Defense and Security Forces, a fact which not only translates into higher counterrevolutionary casualties, but also an increasing rate of desertion from their ranks, the puppet bands are now in a state of complete disarray, the military official concluded.

8844

CSO: 3442/344

ANGOLA

STUDENTS TO JOIN IN UIGE COFFEE HARVEST EFFORT

Luanda JORNAL DO ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Uige--The summer season has come, a time of hope for the farmers and the people, who have already been preparing for yet another harvest, because this is when the coffee matures.

The summer season, long awaited, is very welcome. And then there is need for only one more harvest, aided by the rains, before beginning again to cultivate cassava, peanuts, sweet potatoes, onions, etc. But during this season, the peasants are still free of this labor which greatly concerns them, eager as they are to exchange these products with their worker allies, who supply them with dried fish, salt, soap, etc. Because they alone are the forgers of the industries producing these goods which are also so necessary to the peasants for their lives. Meanwhile both gain, peasants and workers alike, when the products are processed, because they thus symbolize the alliance between the workers and the peasants which is the keystone of our revolution.

But during this period of the year, precisely during this summer season, this alliance will be strengthened, because a decision has been adopted by the party for execution by all, including the workers, who will go into the fields to gather the coffee, in order thus to make the broad mass movement in the rural sector a reality.

And this is the reality being experienced in Uige, and it will be further experienced in this summer season with the campaign to strip the red berries from these shrubs found here and there in the brush in Negage, Songo, Quimbele, Quitexe, and in all the areas where they cling to this or that young shrub (coffee tree), in order to strengthen our economy, the economy of all the people from Cabinda to Cunene.

It is true! And another thing, this season is typically characterized by cold, as well as fog, but they never killed anyone. Rather, on the contrary, these things bring people closer together. As was seen in the territorial enterprises of Uige Coffee 1 and 2 last year, when a group of students is together, there is generally comradeship, with the singing of repeated choruses of the traditional song for these campaigns: "We will harvest our coffee, the wealth of Angola." The cold diminishes to nothing when the basket sags with its load of red berries. Even when there is no sun, the cold

dissipates completely, and the frost deposited by the fog on the coffee trees begins to drip on curly heads, causing excitement and creating a pleasant aroma.

And the students plan to undertake this task again this year. Moreover, the youth sector which plans to win this contest proposes to do so as in earlier years by organizing the students in camps for the harvesting of coffee, with a major effect on the broad mass movement in the rural sector, in which the youth have been designated by the party as the galvanizing element. The summer is welcome, so that Uige can harvest the coffee of the people.

Party Activity

The provincial party committee coordinator for the productive area, Fernando Mafuila, recently visited the political sector in Kassexi for the purpose of promoting the mass movement in the rural sector.

Fernando Mafuila met with the officials of the peasant associations in that locality, exchanging impressions with them about the party decision to designate the political sector in Kassexi as a model unit in the work of carrying out the movement in the rural sector.

This party leader also learned of the difficulties experienced in the sector, in particular the shortage of goods of first necessity and industrial products.

5157

CSO: 3442/336

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

CAMPAIGN TO EXPOSE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES--Jose Simoes Thinana, provincial coordinator, informed ANGOP that the People's Security Brigade (BPV) Office for Namibe Province has set up 74 brigades composed of 1,413 men. In discussing activities of the mass organization, Mr Thinana said that they are concerned with an intense campaign to expose counterrevolutionary and anti-social elements, particularly speculators, whose activities are gaining ground. The BPV official added that the arrest and subsequent transfer to Defense and Security agencies of a ring specializing in planting explosives in public places was the most important service rendered by the organization. Mr Thinana explained that explosives were only planted in Namibe and Tombua. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 2 Jun 85 p 12] 8844

LIGHTHOUSES INOPERATIVE--Namibe--The operation of the maritime lighthouse system in Namibe is threatened with paralysis because of serious difficulties currently being experienced. JORNAL DE ANGOLA learned of this from National Merchant Marine and Port Director Filomeno Silva, during his recent visit to the province of Namibe. That official said, moreover, that the lighthouse situation is shameful, since the shortage of such resources as batteries, gas and transportation for the lighthouse keepers may lead to the lack of any illumination along the Namibe coast. This could make orientation difficult for ships and other vessels intending to load or unload at the commercial port of Namibe. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 6 Jun 85 p 3] 5157

CSO: 3442/336

BURKINA

PAI FACING CRISIS OF COMMUNICATION, BUREAUCRATISM

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 28 Jun 85 pp 4-7

[Article by N.B. Kabore: "Lessons of a Crisis: Where Is the PAI Leadership Headed?"]

[Text] The 13 May declaration by the rank and file members of the Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD) and the African Independence Party (PAI) entitled "We Choose To Break the Silence," in which they denounced the "diktat of the ruling officials," has elicited the following comment by our comrade reader.

It is often very difficult to restrain oneself and keep cool when one is convinced of being right, up against opponents who use every dishonest means possible to stifle the debate of ideas. The problem becomes even more complicated in politics when one has to face both daily revolutionary management of the state rule and lying, subjective attacks, which do not hesitate to criticize one's private life, etc. In a context of revolutionary struggle, there is a great temptation to want to use the repressive organizations of the revolutionary state to "lay low and eliminate" a counter-revolutionary tendency harbored by the revolutionary process itself. It is such a dilemma that the National Council of the Revolution (CNR) is facing with the counterrevolutionary practices of the "bosses and other war leaders" assembled within the leadership of the LIPAD-PAI.

Should we strike out blindly or undertake the debate of ideas while adhering to a just position of principle? The CNR has shown proof of political maturity by rejecting blind repression (without falling into complacency) while at the same time stepping up the political debate.

Were all the members of the LIPAD-PAI conscious revolutionaries, determined to bring down the CNR in order to sabotage the process underway in Burkina? Despite the justified anger of some members who could no longer tolerate these artificial tensions, demanding an end to them, the political leadership of our democratic and popular revolution limited itself to just positions of principle:

To assume its responsibilities in face of those who were performing acts of sabotage, not as members of LIPAD-PAI, but as saboteurs of the revolution. That is why revolutionary punishments were issued to remind certain people that the revolution is not a synonym for anarchy, for go where you will or do what you like. The revolutionary state exists to defend the revolutionary order and to suppress counterrevolution. That is just and necessary.

To make a clear and sharp distinction between politically aware leaders and the rank and file members who are simply being used, knowing nothing about the intrigues and plots hatched within a limited circle by the "bosses." These bosses block the structures, prevent democratic debate with the rank and file, and receive each one in private to influence him. "I have confidence in you, that is why I am telling you this, because the others are unreliable," etc.

After a year of public debate, some of it organized and some not, after a year of maturation and of individual and collective experience, what lessons can one draw for the struggle against rightist opportunism within the LIPAD-PAI?

Masses Seek To Understand

It must be recognized that thus far the debate of ideas and the confrontation of points of view on the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary process continues to be the monopoly of only a few among us, and primarily in the big cities. It is a minority among those who can read and write French who can follow and understand the substance of theoretical debate. The haste of certain "bosses" of the LIPAD-PAI in contacting their political friends in France and elsewhere, and their determination to make obtrusive statements in which they present themselves as "war leaders" capable of accomplishing anything in Burkina because they are very popular, has succeeded in deceiving many observers. One might believe that LIPAD is a monolithic bloc that is tight and "very well" organized in which the rank and file of members blindly follow their leaders in all and for all. Today, the facts have emerged to prove that we could not see the trees for the forest. Since 4 August 1983 the masses have been wanting to understand. They ask for general meetings and discussions in order to orient themselves correctly and participate conscientiously in the revolution. However, the leaders, accustomed to thinking and acting in the name of the masses but without the masses, do not want to share the decision-making power. Yet, among the principles gained on 4 August, there is also the right of expression, freedom to say loud and clear what one thinks about the general progress of the "country's affairs." Everywhere, including within the LIPAD-PAI and the CSB [expansion unknown], the members have understood this. Even the most backward members, those most subjugated by the leaders, are in the process of learning to think for themselves. They are looking at what the revolution is doing. They are comparing with what was being done 4 or 5 years ago. They are seeing the difference. They are benefiting materially and morally from the gains of the revolution. They are compelled to think and ask themselves questions by what is said and done at the general meetings of the Committees for Defense of the Revolution (CDR). They can no longer be content with running to the sessions of their "leaders" to swallow hollow and nonmobilizing speeches. This is what some "big revolutionaries" have not yet understood today.

And the gaining of awareness by the rank and file members is growing daily without these leaders' knowledge. Things have changed. All of them, those who are locked into false certainties, into rigid and stilted attitudes will more and more be bypassed by concrete realities that are changing and evolving a little more each day. It is only the LIPAD-PAI bosses who impotently persist in this gap in their statements, valid a few years ago, but outdated today. There are also the populist rabble-rouser leaders of the Upper Volta Revolutionary Communist Party (PCRVR), who no longer comprehend anything about the situation and are incapable of keeping quiet the members who are more and more asking concrete questions and demanding concrete answers, and no longer slogans that are "valid for every time and every place." The masses are learning in the school of life, because their daily existence gives them more cause to think than the statements of the bosses. Under these circumstances, it is normal that the members are more and more abandoning blind adherence, are committing themselves to the CDR's, are taking part in work of common benefit, and are supporting the revolutionary action of the CNR.

Patience and Assurance

The truth is like oil, which always ultimately rises to the surface. One cannot stifle truth for very long. It ends up impressing itself even on the blind. One must accept to defend truth with all the necessary patience. Not everyone can understand at the same time. Each member must understand that he also took some time to learn and understand. It took time to overcome the obstacles and the negative influence of the environment of relatives or friends who always tried to discourage one. It took time to resist and conquer certain negative habits, and certain naive or unrealistic beliefs. In short, the gaining of awareness is a process, and each member has his own rate of growth. We must all take that into account in the work of political explanation and mobilization in the CDR's. If there are extremely diehard opportunists and counterrevolutionaries, we must realize that they are always and everywhere a minority, and never are the masses "wholly reactionary." Above all, we must not forget these basic truths. There is this danger precisely because they are such simple truths that one forgets them easily. How many of us get worked up and label "counterrevolutionary" someone who does not comprehend as quickly as we would like? Yet, many of us, if we do take the time to think about our own political development, will realize that a few years ago we also would have reacted like those we today so easily call "counterrevolutionary."

No one can consciously work against his own interests. If he does so, it is unconsciously. It means that he does not yet understand. And certainly, among those elements who participated in the "taking of hostages" of Voltelec there are some who no doubt understand the negative impact of those anarchistic actions. Yesterday they sincerely believed that the revolution was anarchy and settlement of private accounts. Today, thanks to the discussions, debates and explanations (that is, a year later!), many have disciplined themselves and have understood that the revolution, any revolution, needs a single guiding center that coordinates and organizes the march together. All this has required time, and, if the impatient and sectarian had been leading the August revolution, they would have wanted to settle accounts on the spot, by throwing everyone in together without

distinction. Fortunately, the national general secretariat of the CDR and the CNR showed presence of mind and patience. At the time, some did not hesitate to charge the SGN [expansion unknown]-CDR and the CNR with showing leniency and of being accomplices, if not "pawns," of the LIPAD-PAI. However, the political leadership knew how to stand fast, and encouraged the debates about the issue. Each gave his opinion and judged liberally. The uncontrolled passions passed, and the substantive analyses began, and the sequel of the events has revealed, in theory and in practice, who were those really responsible for these actions. Time has made it possible to understand clearly that what certain leaders of LIPAD-PAI were seeking was monopoly of political power. They believed that the August revolution was their creature, and they used the rank and file members to create artificial tensions and to force the CNR's hand to leave to them the political leadership of the revolution. Indeed, they had to present themselves as genuine "war leaders" who could draw crowds to scare the CNR. In this period, alarmist reports were being sent beyond our borders. The radios and newspapers carried pretentious statements in which, though not stated directly, it was almost as if LIPAD-PAI had been the sole political force that prepared and carried out the revolution in Burkina. There was high praise for the "strength and popularity" of its "life leaders," as if to say to the CNR: "If you don't let the PAI lead you, you are lost." Today, the sirens have suddenly faded, and it is within LIPAD-PAI itself that voices are being raised to reveal very clearly the atmosphere of bureaucratic and obscurantist obstruction that the rank and file members are facing in the organization. Sincere LIPAD comrades are revolting and daring to go against the bureaucratic and obscurantist current of the feudal leaders that has prevailed over a decade of absolute and uncontested rule.

Today, we can well understand all the efforts and all the courage required for our comrades to liberate themselves (that is the word) from the scandal-mongering, gossip, stories, lies and fears of the leading officials.

Today, one can understand that the same ones who proclaimed that the "CDR's are not democratic," that such a decision of the CNR was "bureaucratic," were themselves the most bureaucratic and antidemocratic in Burkina. How could we imagine our major "longtime" militants not even consulting the rank and file in a general meeting to decide on such major decisions as the attitude toward the CNR, participation in the government, etc.? However, as revolutionaries say and experience has confirmed, wherever there is oppression and servile submission, there is necessarily resistance and struggle.

The victory over the sectarian, anarchistic and bureaucratic current within the LIPAD-PAI is becoming every broader, and this thanks to the public discussions. A few years ago (September 1978), a similar crisis broke out in the Voltan Communist Organization (OCV) and the General Union of Voltan Students (UGEV) and many honest people did not understand the substance of the issues raised. They were content to deplore division, splits, etc. Many observers lamented the tearing and weakening of the Upper Volta revolutionary movement. These were honest and sincere people who could not understand that everything is simultaneously its opposite. It was necessary to constantly criticize the unhealthy atmosphere, the hypocrisy, falseness and bureaucracy that impeded all normal democratic functioning of the OCV [expansion unknown] and the UGEV [General Union of Voltan Students] It was necessary to cite

examples such as the "physical differentiation" imposed on the members who were forbidden to say good morning to brothers, sisters and fathers. It was necessary to reveal the foolishness carried out by members pursued by the all-powerful executive committee of the UGEV and the AEFV [expansion unknown] to become divorced and to commit suicide in the Paris Metro. The "political commissars" of the executive committee were there playing policemen everywhere, forcing the members not to wear ear rings, except in the bus, where they were away from the condemning eyes.

The fear of telling the truth forced comrades to hide, to be hypocrites, to have a split personality, and to speak in a double language depending on environment. All this, without any general meeting for discussion and relying only on the "strategy of rumor and hallway gossip" to criticize or oppose individuals, etc.

It is necessary to recall this atmosphere and struggle to refresh the memory of those who at that time, within LIPAD-PAI, said: "These are matters only among Parisian students who only know how to theorize, far from the national realities."

The same causes are producing the same effects and what is happening today in LIPAD-PAI was more than predictable. All that was needed was for certain conditions of "temperature and pressure" to be present. The "bosses" and other leading officials can do nothing about it. It is a scientific law. However, bureaucrats are bureaucrats. They cannot draw the lessons, like the populist leadership of the OCV and the UGEV (it was one and the same thing as LIPAD and PAI), which immediately wanted to "settle the problem" by expulsions and police-type condemnations (publication of names of members opposing them in tracts and individual defamations), we see the "leading officials" of LIPAD-PAI beginning the same operation. However, like the "bosses" of the Upper Volta Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR) and the UGEV yesterday, they will necessarily be beaten, and even more quickly, because the masses are more and more aware of the past experiences of the Burkina revolutionary movement. Those who live through the tests of internal clarification of 1978 should also support the sincere comrades of LIPAD-PAI who are struggling today, "without paternalism, without the 'old veteran' complex," because the cause is the same.

The bureaucratization of LIPAD are trying to extend a hand to the debris of the . . . that they are unions created at random following 4 August (now . . . to their headquarters) who will be shields for the hypothetical "takeover" of which they all dream. Dreams, even reactionary, are allowed in Burkina. But as long as they stay dreams. Otherwise, it will not be without self-criticism letters written in haste and without the knowledge of other "comrades" that will save those who believe themselves more clever than their "friends" in the leadership of the PCR and LIPAD-PAI.

One day, all the facts and opportunistic actions, the dishonesties in declaring false diplomas to obtain positions, will be exposed in broad daylight. It is time for a reckoning. The most blind will see clearly one day.

The revolutionary movement in Burkina has a very rich history and one must gain inspiration from it in order to better understand "the fall of the Titans" that is underway in LIPAD-PAI and also the whole process of ideological, political, and organizational unification that is currently in progress among all the genuinely revolutionary groups and forces. The future awaits us and is being prepared today, in the discussion of ideas, the clarification, and the concrete revolutionary construction of Faso.

The reactionaries are afraid of shocks, while revolutionaries must learn the art of causing positive shocks and moving society forward. Without this, there will be no revolution. Courage, Comrades!

9920

CSO: 3419/463

BURUNDI

MODERNIZATION OF AGRICULTURE, BELGIAN AID DISCUSSED

Paris NORD SUD in French Jun 85 pp 21-23

[Article by Yvon Mors: "Primum Vivere: First Eat"]

[Text] Burundi remains very close to self-sufficient in terms of foodstuffs: agricultural imports are minimal (salt, sugar, flour) and reserved for urban areas. Even though land suitable for cultivation is virtually saturated and yields go up slowly. Let us not forget either that in the more or less long term overpopulation remains the big problem in the country. Hence, there are good reasons to examine more closely the multiple efforts accomplished to modernize agriculture and to improve its yield.

More than 95 percent of the population of Burundi is rural and lives off agriculture. However, only a little more than half of the land is suitable for intensive farming. Let us also note that agriculture represents 60 percent of the gross domestic product, 76 percent of employment and 90 percent of export goods.*

Under those circumstances, the prospects of agricultural development turn out to be fraught with enormous difficulties. It will be possible to solve them only if the available resources are mobilized and used in the most rational way possible. A challenge which Luc D'Haese, agricultural engineer and project chief, has the ambition to pick up with the help of a whole team.

Distrust To Overcome

"The native farmers are accustomed to not being understood and defend themselves by agreeing to all the orders received, but without always implementing them." This thought by Professor De Schlippe, formulated in 1957, summarizes well the basic attitude of Burundian farmers in the face of all kinds of injunctions, and the "without always implementing them" takes on a particularly ironic flavor when one knows their capacity for inertia as long as they are not convinced.

* Republic of Burundi. Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, 1983-1987.

This is a situation for which explanations can be found at several levels.*

First of all, from the historical perspective, the original concern of governments in colonial times was to develop profitable farming in tropical environments. It is only at a secondary level that they turned toward traditional food producing crops.

From the structural perspective, institutions were organized by sectors or by speculation and their research was inspired by European production techniques.

Refusal to take the traditional system seriously led the researchers to a lack of comprehension of the objectives of the farmers and of the constraints to which farming is subject.

Finally, from the technical perspective the innovations proposed to the farmers most often turned out later on not to be adapted to the material and technological conditions of the operation or did not always take into account the constraints imposed by the environment. It should also be noted that, until the last few years, the researchers did not show much interest in the use of the results of their research and that consequently they did not know about the problems encountered by the farmers when those results were implemented(!).

Not To Be Ignored Realities

Hence, the lessons drawn from the history of research-popularization in Burundi compel the new agricultural programs to take the following realities into account.

The rural population in certain natural regions of the country lives in an often very rough natural environment: poor soil, semi-arid zones, hilly terrain, weather irregularities, etcetera. The crop system adopted by the farmers of these regions is the result of the objectives and motivations of the farmers, as well as of the constraints imposed by the rigor of the environment. This system, which has proven itself for a long time, requires the attention of the researchers in order to draw basic information from it.

Contrary to modern agriculture, the concern of which is to maximize profits and yields, traditional agriculture seeks first of all to minimize the risks, to ensure subsistence and self-sufficiency in terms of food.

The system of exploitation one sees must be considered as a whole, consisting of several subsystems (economic, social, political and cultural) whose interactions are as numerous as they are complex.

Finally, it is difficult to get the people to change their production techniques, especially if one starts from an inadequate knowledge of the prevailing

* J. Wouters (1984): "Projet de participation à une étude intégrée multidisciplinaire des systèmes d'exploitation agricole" [Participatory Project in an Integrated Multidisciplinary Study of the Systems of Agricultural Exploitation], University of Burundi.

agricultural system, of the specific objectives of the farmer and of the interplay of constraints in which he finds himself.

Phase 1: Diagnosis

Starting from this series of observations, it is fascinating to follow Professor D'Haese in the field of his research.*

- Ijenda: Experimental Region

It involves a hill located in the province of Bujumbura. Its altitude varies from 2,000 to 2,200 meters. The climate is cool, with abundant rainfall.

The average annual temperature is 17 degrees Celsius. With a total population of 1,622 inhabitants in 1983 and an area of 810 hectares, Nyarashanga a Ijenda is among the most densely populated regions of the Mugamba (200 inhabitants per square kilometer). This population is divided over 311 households, or an average of 5.2 people per household.

- What System of Agricultural Exploitation?

In order to measure the variables and evolution of the traditional systems, Luc D'Haese's team examined the area closely. Five investigators paid a visit, every other day, to 60 family operations on the basis of observation criteria; in addition, in the area of each operation they studied specifically a "density square" of a typical surface from the perspective of harvest, trash, fertilizer. The farmers' welcome, their interest in the weighing and the questionnaires quite obviously demonstrate a new confidence in what is becoming a direct collaboration between scientist and small farmer.

"All those observations," explained the professor, "make it possible better to understand the conditions under which every 'rugo' functions (a rugo refers to a residential hut with, possibly, nearby, a stable and a loft, all of it surrounded by a bamboo fence: which does indicate a certain individualism on the part of the Burundians, even though solidarity within the family is very strong). The primary objective of the farmer is the long term survival of his family. To that effect, he will try to combine as best he can the resources at his disposal: physical labor, soil, and in some cases livestock. Hence, there are very varied forms of farming-breeding combinations."

* The Faculty of Agricultural Sciences at the University of Burundi, under the direction of its Department of Rural Social Economy and in collaboration with the Catholic University of Louvain, the State University of Ghent, and the Free University of Brussels, organized a "Multidisciplinary Study of the Agricultural Exploitation Systems in Burundi."

- Bottlenecks

To allow mentalities to evolve you have to locate the places where things are stuck, specifically: the difficulties the operators run into when they try to improve their agricultural production. The greatest problem in the region of Ijenda is the poor quality of the soil. How can its fertility be improved? The means are varied: a study of the soil to find the most effective type of fertilizer, the manufacturing of compost based on local ingredients, the use of selected seeds (we will come back to this), pulverization, etcetera.

But the farmers need to see to believe and to decide to change. Hence, the development of experimental fields which make it possible to compare the various yields. This method is used within each farmer's own field: a plot of beans grown from selected seeds. The result will create a conviction and desire to benefit also from an improved yield.

- Phases II, III and IV

In the Ijenda project* four phases are interrelated. The descriptive step* (we hope to have demonstrated it somewhat) consists of examining the prevailing agricultural production system in its overall context, of identifying the constraints on the one hand, the objectives and motivations on the other hand, as well as determining the potential flexibility of the system.

Phase II: Conception

It tries to identify the range of possible strategies to overcome the constraints. It consists of imagining improved systems to be applied in the environment, keeping in mind the knowledge accumulated at the diagnostic stage. The aim is to manage to introduce in the prevailing system a series of "controlled descriptions," called "command variables," in order to produce improvements. Various scenarios of intervention are analyzed at the level of the basic research units.

* J. Degand, L. D'Haese and P.F. Ndimira (1984): "Etude multidisciplinaire sur les Systemes d'Exploitations Agricole a Ijenda. Methodologie de l'Enquete -- Evaluation de la premiere annee d'enquetes et programme a venir" [Multidisciplinary Study of the Agricultural Production Systems at Ijenda. Methodology of Investigation -- Evaluation of the First Year of Investigations and Future Program]. University of Burundi, Bujumbura, 1984.

The budget of the Cooperation for the realization of this project is 4.8 million Belgian francs per year (not including the salary of the participants).

Phase III: Experimentation

In this process it constitutes the phase in which one must establish the solutions, make a choice and put some of them to the test in order to produce changes which are desirable and acceptable for the agricultural operation. The improved systems are tested at the level of the operation, even if it means correcting them and adapting them to the reality of farming by insisting on the ability of the farmer to control the new system proposed to him.

Phase IV: Popularization

This comes down to generalizing the amended agricultural operation system to a wider region than the experimentation site.

Finally, it is important to stress that the proposed outline is not a one way street; the knowledge accumulated at every stage may eventually force the researcher to return to the previous stage.

In a word, the Ijenda research seems particularly promising because of the manner in which it makes partners out of scientists and the men in the field: a remarkable development effort which takes into account both the potentialities of each and the local constraints.

Order in Belgium... And Wait!

There is no shortage of instructions from AGCD [expansion unknown]: for example, that a maximum of equipment be ordered from Belgium, and that is reasonable. Unfortunately, the least that can be said is that what follows leaves something to be desired. Judge for yourselves.

Orders of paper for an educational project in Ruanda have been on hold for 2 years.

In Burundi, for the Bututsi-South agricultural project:

- 1979-1980 orders: no news, nothing was ever received;
- 1978-1980 orders: (special tires), no news, never received;
- 1980-1981 orders: only received small equipment;
- 1981-1982 orders: no news, nothing was ever received.

There are also things which cannot be ordered in Belgium at all; for example, a few hectares of afforestation, 200 or 300 kilometers of anti-erosion ditches or houses ready for immediate occupancy.

A The Kisezi project, managed by ISABU [Institute of Agronomic Studies of Burundi], ended in June 1984... without having received a single gram of fertilizer, even though this element was vital to production. The same is true for the selected seeds project.

Experience shows that it takes a minimum of 2 years between the agreement made by Belgium and the arrival of the first funds and equipment, even the arrival of the participants themselves. Is it unthinkable to make provision, as is wisely suggested by Mr Renson, chief of the Cooperation mission in Burundi, in the 1 billion franc annual budget for about 10 to 20 million francs for an "emergency fund" making it possible to meet limited situations which run the risk of becoming catastrophic if one has to wait 2 years for the solution? The old proverb from back home is still true: "While the oats are growing, the horse dies."

8463

CSO: 3419/452

CAPE VERDE

PEREIRA AWARDED MOZAMBIQUE'S HIGHEST MEDAL

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Jun 85 p 32

[Text] President of the Republic of Cape Verde Aristides Maria Pereira, who is also president of the PAICV [African Independence Party of Cape Verde, was presented with the Eduardo Mondlane Order, First Degree, the highest award conferred by the People's Republic of Mozambique, yesterday.

During a ceremony held at the Ponta Vermelha Palace, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique Samora Machel, who is also president of the FRELIMO Party, presented the medal to the president of Cape Verde, after the reading by Secretary of the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly (AP) Marcelino dos Santos of the resolution conferring the highest Mozambican award on the Cape Verdian chief of state.

The AP resolution praised the historic achievements of President Aristides Pereira in the struggle for the emancipation of the African peoples, in which he continued the cause always defended by his comrade in struggle, the outstanding African leader Amilcar Cabral.

The resolution said:

"Among the leaders who have distinguished themselves in guiding their peoples, the figure of Aristides Maria Pereira, the man, the militant, the revolutionary and the servant of the people, stands out."

In expressing his thanks, Aristides Pereira, visibly much moved, said the following: "The decoration you have just conferred upon me is a great honor and imposes a heavy duty. But more than a distinction awarded to me personally, I am certain that you yourself and the People's Assembly wanted, through this gesture, to place the seal of Eduardo Mondlane on the fraternity which has always linked the people of Mozambique, the people of Cape Verde, Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral, the FRELIMO Party and the PAICV and all of those fighting for the freedom of the Mozambican and Cape Verdian fatherlands."

At a given point, the president of the Republic of Cape Verde said that "I am most grateful for this distinction, the full importance of which the people of Cape Verde will be able to understand."

The ceremony was attended by members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the FRELIMO Party, members of the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly and members of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Mozambique, as well as the members of the delegation from Cape Verde which accompanied President Aristides Pereira.

5157

CSO: 3442/345

IVORY COAST

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SITUATION ANALYZED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jul 85 pp 20, 21

[Article by Claude Wauthier: "Extensive Maneuvering to Succeed Houphouet-Boigny"]

[Text] Extensive maneuvering to succeed President Felix Houphouet-Boigny has begun in the Ivory Coast with a financial scandal that was undoubtedly meant to compromise a potential candidate, Emmanuel Dioulo, the deputy and the mayor of Abidjan, at a time when the country is slowly recovering from a crisis that seriously damaged the prestige he had won with his economic fast start.

The succession scenario is as follows: the naming by the congress of the single party, the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI), next October, of candidates for the presidency and vice presidency. Then the presidential elections, in which Houphouet-Boigny is certain to be represented.

This is the first time Ivorians will be asked to elect the regime's number two person, who will be in the president's shoes when the latter dies or decides to retire.

The Dioulo affair exploded last March. The deputy and Abidjan's mayor, who had won the president's good will by suggesting that the Ivorian capital be transferred to Yamoussoukro, the city of Mr Houphouet-Boigny's birth, is a very big businessman. Among other things, he was PDG [president and general manager] of COGEXIM (General Export-Import Company), which deals in cocoa and coffee. And then suddenly, when the affair had been simmering for some time, the National Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA), a state-run enterprise, revealed that COGEXIM owed it 19 billion CFA francs--plus 10 billion in exchange premiums--which it had been lent between 1980 and 1983, and brought an action against Emmanuel Dioulo's company. On 18 March, the Abidjan commercial court ordered COGEXIM to pay the BNDA 7 billion CFA francs, at the same time ordering a new expert appraisal, as the accounts of both firms appeared to be complicated. On 19 March, the PDCI political bureau said it considered the sentence too light and asked that Deputy Dioulo's parliamentary immunity be lifted.

Dioulo contested the 19 billion indebtedness and asserted that he was the victim of a machination woven by former officers of the BNDA and COGEXIM, perpetrators of misappropriations of funds which they were trying to conceal. On 25

March, the executive board of the National Assembly authorized the public prosecutor to start legal proceedings against Mr Dioulo, pending the lifting of the parliamentary immunity by the Assembly, which was not in session at that time.

Mr Dioulo did not wait for the decision: on 20 March, he secretly left the Ivory Coast and went to Europe via Ghana. Allowing the rumor to spread that he feared for his life, he counter-attacked immediately by taking as his attorney Mr Jacques Verges, and threatened to publish a white paper. Then it was learned that Mr Verges had gone to Abidjan on a chartered plane that was put at his disposal by Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema, and there met with President Houphouet-Boigny.

Just as suddenly, a desire for appeasement seemed to prevail in the Ivory Coast, where the press, which had been gloating over the affair, suddenly stopped mentioning the affair. The Dioulo trial, scheduled for 6 May, was put over until 15 June and then adjourned sine die, it seems.

What were the reasons for this unexpected respite? In the first place, the 18 March verdict revealed the popularity of the deputy and mayor of Abidjan. His followers interpreted it as a victory--because COGEXIM was ordered to pay only 7 billion instead of the 19 that had been claimed--and spread out through the city shouting "Dioulo has won". The CRS [expansion unknown] took part in the explosion of joy in the midst of a rather large crowd.

It was also learned that the Ivorian president's own wife, Therese, had put a portion of her fortune in Emmanuel Dioulo's companies, on the advice of the head of state himself. People were assured, that the scandal would be stifled because it was in danger of compromising another of the regime's lords, the president of the National Assembly, Konan Bedie, who had not been in favor of lifting the parliamentary immunity of the deputy and mayor Abidjan.

Does Emmanuel Dioulo have so much savoir-faire that he can appear to be a serious candidate to succeed President Houphouet-Boigny? First as a subprefect, he directed the Southwest (the Ivorian far west) Development Mission--, where he effectively conducted the building of the port of San Pedro, which was intended to relieve crowding at the port of Abidjan. He is a member of the royal family of the Ebries, the ethnic group of the Abidjan lagoon, which partly explains his popularity in the former capital. As for his financial activities, they go beyond the bounds of the Ivory Coast, with interests in a commercial bank, the Atlantic Bank, which is associated with various European banks.

At 48, he is the youngest of the pretenders to the Ivorian vice presidency, but since scandal became attached to his name, it is no longer permissible to say so in the Ivory Coast; one French journalist was very nearly expelled for doing so.

The "Baoule Tierce"

The politician who in the opinion of most people seems to have the requisite stature to succeed President Houphouet-Boigny is still Philippe Yace, the former president of the National Assembly. His relative disgrace in 1980 seems to

have assured him a certain popularity, at least with those who deem it necessary to break with the supremacy of the Baoules, the president's ethnic group. He belongs to a small coastal tribe. Mr Houphouet-Boigny will undoubtedly not propose him for the presidency, but he is clearly "being kept in reserve by the Republic".

Three Baoules--the "Baoule tierce", as they say in Abidjan--seem likely, on the other hand, to be chosen as vice president: Konan Bedie, who is favorably disposed toward the United States, where he was ambassador; Jean Konan Banny, the noted freemason and defense minister, who is careful to maintain good relations with the Betes, especially those in the army; and Camille Alliali, minister of state, who enjoys the support of the president's elder sister, Mamie Fatie, who is very influential with her brother and who is said to belong to the Rosicrucian sect, which has many members in the Ivory Coast.

Among the Betes--the second most important ethnic group, after the Baoules, in the southern half of the country--the most serious heir apparent seems to be Maurice Seri Gnoleba, the minister of state. Among the people of the North, it would be Balla Keita, the minister of national education, of Malinke origin through his father.

But these prognostications as advanced in the specialized press seem very fragile; it is clear that the president intends to maintain secrecy, and he no doubts takes delight in doing so. Rivalry between Baoules and Betes is still strong. The Betes still remember the 1970 massacres, in which hundreds, indeed thousands of them were shot down by the police in the course of a repression operation in Gagnoa, in the heart of Bete country, against the followers of an ambiguous personage--half-crazy, according to the authorities--, Kragbe Gnagbe, who had founded a Marxist-Leninist party and proclaimed himself commander in chief of the people's army of the "Republic of Eburnie".

The suspicion in which the Betes are still held was exposed to the daylight in the spring of 1982 at the time of the crisis brought on by the student agitation and the high-school teachers' strike led by Laurent Gbagbo--a Bete--, a professor of history at Abidjan University and leader of the Synares, the high-school teachers' union; since then he has sought refuge in France. The Bete generals and ministers, as Betes, then sent motions of support to President Houphouet-Boigny so that no one should be led to suppose there was "any connivance whatsoever" with the three Bete teachers--one of whom was Mr Gbagbo--believed to be leaders of the movement. The high-school teachers had gone on strike, and the students had followed in their footsteps, to protest the banning of Laurent Gbagbo's conference on the theme of "Democracy and Youth in the Ivory Coast". Hundreds of students were arrested and Abidjan University was closed*.

The operation of naming the successor to the head of state is starting in a difficult situation. In 1982, the decline in the price of cocoa and of coffee--of which the Ivory Coast first- and third-ranking producer, respectively, in the world--caused the economy to lose three fourths of its resources for export (350 billion CFA francs in 1982 compared to 1,500 in 1979); in 1983, the catastrophic drought caused the cocoa harvest to fall to 327,000 tons and the coffee harvest to 100,000 tons, and poorly controlled brush fires destroyed

*Laurent Gbagbo, who left his country secretly in 1982 to settle in France, in 1983 published in Editions de l'Harmattan a work entitled "Cote-d'Ivoire: pour une alternative democratique" (Ivory Coast: for a Democratic Alternative).

300,000 hectares of planting. The drying up of the dams and watering places caused significant losses in cattle.

The calamity also brought with it a significant reduction in the production of electricity--80 percent of which is of hydro-electric origin--and consequently in industrial production. It was necessary to buy, in great haste, four gas turbines at a total cost of 12 billion CFA francs to run the Vridi thermal power station, and to import more oil (the Ivory Coast only produces 1,200,000 tons per year, whereas its consumption is about 1,500,000 tons. Ivorian oil, which is extracted from offshore reservoirs on the Western part of the coast, is exploited by American companies.)

To these setbacks there soon came to be added the rise in the value of the dollar, which accordingly increased the foreign debt, 45 percent of which was payable in American currency.

But the president's Western friendships, in Washington in particular, enabled him to obtain loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to rearrange the schedule of payments to the Club de Paris.

At the end of 1983 the foreign debt was estimated at \$5.2, while the internal debt--the claims of private businesses on the administration, repayment of which had been deferred for the preceding 3 years--was approaching 80 to 100 billion CFA francs.

Taking into account new loans, the payment rescheduling authorized by the Club de Paris and the rise in the dollar, the total foreign debt in early 1985 went up to \$7 billion. Such was the price of the respite Abidjan found itself being granted.

It goes without saying that to obtain all of these facilities the Ivorian government, which had been under the thumb of the IMF since the early 1980s, had to set up a policy of austerity and of a "more severe" fight against corruption, which caused some gnashing of teeth.

The teachers, followed by the doctors and pharmacists in the hospitals, stopped working in the spring of 1983 to protest the end of the free housing for civil servants, a reaction that may have been all the stronger because the military had retained that advantage.

President Houphouet-Boigny, for his part, saw red. In a great speech, he accused the strikers of being manipulated by Libya and named as the principal culprit Mr Laurent Gbagbo, who until then had been virtually unknown outside of his own country and who was given at the same time an unhopd-for political stature. The charge was even less credible because Mr Gbagbo lives in rather Spartan fashion in Paris.

Another measure whose harshness was deeply felt was the decision, in late 1984, to bring the salaries of managers in companies of the parapublic sector--which are numerous in the Ivory Coast--into line with those of civil servants, which are clearly lower. After several months of futile negotiations, the 16,000 wage-earners in those companies went on strike in early June. Nearly 400 were

immediately dismissed. But the entire population was affected, not just the relatively privileged classes such as teachers and managers in state-run companies: per capita income fell from \$1,270 per year in 1980 to \$800 in 1984. In less than 4 years, 85,000 workers in construction and public works had to be laid-off because of the closing down of businesses.

In response to the conditions laid by the IMF, the government made broad budget cuts. For the 1985 budget, investment expenditures were reduced 65 percent, going from \$575 million the year before to \$187 million. Operating expenditures were diminished by 2.5 percent for the second consecutive year, and civil servants' wages were frozen for the third consecutive year.

Austerity and Anticorruption

It need not come as a surprise, under these circumstances, that the very wise official trade union, the Ivory Coast Workers' Union, seized the occasion of last 1 May to go to the head of state and present a list of grievances and demand that the wage freeze in effect since 1981 be lifted.

Another economy measure, which has the advantage that it makes it possible to offer positions to young Ivorians having degrees: the Ivory Coast in 1984 considerably reduced the number of its foreign experts, the great majority of whom came from France. First of all, by agreement with Paris, the number of French cooperants was trimmed. A thousand cooperants were affected, including 700 teachers. There were about 4,000 in 1980, but their number has been reduced by 5 percent annually since then. The Ivorian government was paying about 80 percent of the costs--salaries, housing, transportation, etc.--for these cooperants, and the savings realized by their departure is figured at some 200 million French francs. Then came the turn of the private experts belonging to large companies or recruited on an individual basis: in October 1984, 650 of them received their dismissal letters. They were costing on the average 50 million CFA francs per year.

It should be said--and this is rather remarkable--that this policy of rigor did not bring any political agitation with it: the single party did not falter, no organized force rose up to contest the regime. However, it was a good opportunity to emphasize the fragility of an extroverted economy, threatened with exhaustion of the soil due to aggressive deforestation, and too often in the hands of fearsome racketeers. Only the occasional distribution of tracts denouncing the PDCI and President Houphouet-Boigny were pointed out. The outside opposition is discreet. Laurent Gbagdo hardly gets himself talked about, no more than does the Ivorian Popular Front, which includes five opposition groups. The Ivorian students in France are still the most turbulent. In May, the magazine BLACK, which is published in Paris, was banned in the Ivory Coast for denouncing the infiltration methods of the Ivorian police among their number.

As for the fight against corruption, for the greater public its chief illustration is the Logemad scandal, involving the administrative housing department, several of whose officials, one Frenchman among them, were given heavy prison sentences in late 1984, after a trial in which the examining judge requested 18 months. The affair, which was fairly muddled, had to do with the renting of fictitious apartments, among other things.

For his part, the president made a spectacular gesture: his whole family, at the end of 1984, announced that they had given up all the interests they had acquired over the years in private commercial or industrial companies. No details were revealed, but this should constitute a handsome package, judging by the words of the president himself (in his speech in the spring of 1983 condemning the teachers' strike), when he said, "I have billions abroad, in Switzerland, but I also have them in the Ivory Coast, which proves that I have confidence in my own country."

In recent months, after three trying years, the atmosphere has seemed lighter: the rains have been abundant and world prices are showing a certain firmness. A new oil deposit has just been discovered, with the potential of producing 17,000 barrels a day. For the longer term, natural gas reserves are to be put into exploitation in a few years, with quantities expected to be considerable (150 billion cubic meters).

All is not yet settled, for all that, especially the future of the grand sugar plan launched in 1975. Two of the six plants that were built had to be closed in 1984, and maintaining the remaining plants is very expensive, as export prospects are limited in a particularly unstable market. One thing is certain, however: international aid has given the Ivory Coast the means to catch its breath.

The Israeli Temptation

Communism and Libya remain President Houphouet-Boigny's betes noires, which assures him an attentive hearing in Washington, especially by President Reagan.

In that context, the appearance of a leftist government in Burkina has only worried the Ivorian head of state, all the more so because a significant work force of Burkinabe origin (over 2 million) has settled in the Ivory Coast. Capt Thomas Sankara's government, in the months following his accession to power in August 1983, accused the Ivory Coast of harboring its opponents and mistreating its nationals. Relations became more acrimonious, especially at the time of the 11th summit of the West African Economic Community (CEAO) in Niamey at the end of October 1983, at which President Houphouet-Boigny managed to prevent Burkina from acceding to the annually rotating presidency of the organization, as would have happened had alphabetical order been followed. Although Ouagadougou rather quickly put a distance between itself and Tripoli, the feeling of uneasiness between the two capitals persisted until very recently. But in October 1984, the Ivory Coast let Capt Sankara assume the presidency of the CEAO.

Two other incidents that same year came to illustrate the bad climate in relations between the two countries. On the eve of Capt Sankara's arrival in Yamoussoukro on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Council of Friendship, an attack took place in the hotel suite he was to occupy. Then, in Abidjan, a Burkinabe restaurateur who was reputed to be hostile to Capt Sankara's regime was assassinated by an unidentified person suspected in the service of the captain. However, a new reconciliation between the two presidents has occurred.

However, if JEUNE AFRIQUE of 8 May can be believed, it is on a different problem, which is on more of an international scale, that the Ivorian president may be preparing to take a spectacular initiative: reestablishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Ivory Coast was the last black African state to break with Jerusalem in 1973. Since then, Zaire in 1982 and, shortly afterwards, Liberia, renewed relations with Israel. In fact, President Houphouet-Boigny has never ceased to maintain contact with the Hebrew leaders. Still according to JEUNE AFRIQUE, the Ivorian decision might bring with it a similar decision by Guinea (where the new regime has made overtures to Jerusalem), the Central African Republic (where Gen Kolingba has assumed responsibility for a rapprochement operation that had already been outlined by former President David Dacko), Togo (where Gen Eyadema is very close to President Mobutu) and perhaps Cameroon. All of these states, headed by the Ivory Coast, are maintaining better relations with the United States, for whom a chain of reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel would constitute a major success. All the more so because it is conceivable that Gabon and Kenya would lose no time in following the Ivory Coast's example.

However, the Ivorian operation would be at the very least delayed, according to rumors on the subject picked up during President Mobutu's visit to Israel in May. Even though in the Ivory Coast as in several black African countries, one considers that solidarity with the Arab countries has not yielded the financial bonanza that some people had hoped would come out of the 1973 break.

It is clearly less likely that the Ivory Coast will take an even riskier initiative by restarting the "dialogue" with South Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny was its most ardent booster in the 1970s and secretly received in Yamoussoukro, in 1974, the then South African prime minister, Johannes Vorster. The possibility of a new overture toward Pretoria was mentioned in July 1984, after the publication of an article rather favorable to South Africa in Abidjan's very unofficial daily FRATERNITE-MATIN. The Abidjan daily, however, hastened to state several days later that, although the head was still in favor of dialogue with Pretoria, he nevertheless continued to condemn apartheid and would regard the reforms announced by South Africa as patching up the facade.

As for relations with France, they are experiencing highs and lows. President Houphouet-Boigny took part in the Franco-African "minisummit" in Paris in October 1984 after the French government's decision to withdraw its troops from Chad, but he seems to have stayed away from the Bujumbura Franco-African summit at the end of 1984.

Nevertheless, an old friendship links the French and Ivorian presidents. In the 1950s, Mr Houphouet-Boigny, along with most of the deputies of the African Democratic Rally, terminated his membership in the communist parliamentary group in the National Assembly, to join Francois Mitterrand's Democratic and Socialist Resistance Union. The French colony in the Ivory Coast is one of the largest in black Africa (40,000, now slightly diminished), there is considerable French aid, with a special outlay granted in 1984, bringing it to nearly 2 billion French francs (for a net increase over previous years).

The Ivory Coast has a French military base and the balance of trade between the two countries is favorable to France. Roland Dumas went to Abidjan in January 1985, but it is hard to imagine that President Houphouet-Boigny confided the name of his heir apparent to the French foreign relations minister. That carefully-maintained mystery is not calculated to instill calm in the Ivorian political class, as the Dioulo affair proves. All the more, perhaps, because that affair broke several weeks after another scandal--which affects more than just the Ivory Coast--which is no less tremendous, the Diawara affair. Mohamed Diawara, who was incarcerated in Ouagadougou, is accused of being responsible for the disappearance of 6 billion CFA francs belonging to the CEA0; he had persuaded CEA0 officials to entrust the money to him so he could make it yield a profit. Mr Diawara is a former minister of the Ivorian plan who went into business and who for several years has been president of the Dakar Club, a private organization for economic discussion modeled on the Club of Rome.

Disaffection in the Army?

If these scandals are tarnishing somewhat the reputation of Ivorian leaders and businessmen, President Houphouet-Boigny nevertheless does not seem to be ready to proceed with drastic purges within the PDCI, where there are several men who are billionaires in CFA francs. It is even being whispered that he might negotiate the discreet return of Mr Dioulo.

He is also devoting himself to calming down the game between Baoules and Betes. In this connection, a spectacular gesture of reconciliation was accomplished early this year. In February, in fact, the head of state received in Yamoussoukro a delegation of Bete dignitaries, and a sister-city relationship between the Ivorian capital and the city of Gagnoa, the Bete metropolis, was decided upon.

There was undoubtedly some urgency, all the more so because the Betes, with the Senoufos, who are being more and more Islamized, and the Malinkes, who are longtime Muslims, form the majority in the army, the police and the gendarmerie. It is in the latter two ethnic groups, which populate the northern part of the Ivory Coast, that Col Qadhdhafi would seek to gain followers.

In Ivorian political circles, there is still great fear of disaffection in the army with respect to the regime, which nevertheless takes care of it and watches over the ethnic balance among the generals (the highest-ranking general is a Bete, Gen Zeze Barouan Bertin, the armed forces' chief of staff. Who knows if the ups and downs of a prickly succession will not furnish the occasion to add the Ivory Coast to the list of African states endowed with a military government?

8946

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IVORY COAST

EFFECTS OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS ON ECONOMY REPORTED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jul 85 pp 20, 21

[Article by Michel Lobe Ewane: "From Economic Disruption to Upheavals"]

[Text] The international experts who have been watching over the Ivorian economy for several years indicate that 1985 may be the year of the economy's recovery. After 3 years marked by a decrease in the gross national product (GNP), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) authorities believe that the economy should show positive growth of about 2 percent beginning in 1985. This prognosis is chiefly based on the excellent 1984-85 agricultural season which, with rainfall once again at normal levels, has regained the good average of the best years: 250,000 tons of coffee and 450,000 tons of cocoa (85,000 and 390,000 tons in 1983-1984); the situation is all the more favorable inasmuch as international prices also are relatively high this year.

The Ivorian leaders, while endeavoring to remain prudent, are regaining a degree of optimism and are undertaking to restore confidence in investors. This is precisely what Leon Naka, managing director of the Autonomous Sinking Fund (CAA)¹ tried to do last 17 May in Abidjan, before the American, Belgian, and British businessmen's clubs. As the senior official responsible for the management of the Ivorian national debt, Naka declared that the Ivory Coast hoped to be able to avoid making further requests for the rescheduling of the foreign debt over the next few years if the economic situation remained constant.

He also took the opportunity to give details concerning his country's foreign debt and especially to present an analysis, no doubt an official one, of the factors which brought on the serious debt crisis. It was characteristic that the explanations advanced only drew attention to circumstantial causes, for the most part separate from the will of the authorities. In the first place, the inevitable rise in the dollar and its consequence, the rise in American interest rates: financial assistance from commercial banks subject to variable interest rates represents, as a matter of fact, more than 36 percent of the

country's loans. With more than 50 percent of them made out in dollars, in 4 years, from 1981 to 1984, these loans have resulted in an additional charge of about 117 billion CFA Fr², of which more than 95 percent is simply for servicing the debt before last year's rescheduling. Prominent among other factors taken into account were the protectionist attitude of the industrialized countries, the drop in prices for coffee and cocoa, and the 1982-1983 drought.

Nevertheless, the economic crisis is deeper and the signs of recovery due to the improving situation hardly create any illusions, at least in the minds of the international experts and the Ivorian authorities. The political upheavals of the last few months and the major maneuvering before the upcoming congress of the sole party reflect the malaise at the heart of a system which is discovering the faults of its development model at the end of a growth cycle unequalled in Africa.

The protagonists who are thrusting themselves into the struggle for the succession are not oblivious to the fact, and their arguments and strategies center on this area.

President Houphouet-Boigny, by choosing to enter fully into the international division of labor game, aimed to benefit his country--by means of the nature of the relations entered into with the western countries--with economic resources on which the economic prosperity of the country could be built while at the same time consolidating the political system.³ From that point on, opening up to outside involvement seems to be the greatest need: a massive appeal for foreign investment in view of the insufficiency of local capital; recourse to foreign assistants; and the establishment of a climate of confidence to reassure investors.

In the expansion process, this openness to foreign capital will be combined with the surpluses resulting from primary export activity. Thus, priority will be given to primary products for export, particularly cocoa and coffee, which alone account for three quarters of the GNP.

Foreign Involvement

As the driving force behind the economy, export agriculture provides the means for the state, through the Fund for the Stabilization and Support of Agricultural Prices and Products⁴, to establish structural operations supporting growth. The surpluses obtained by this organization are rapidly becoming the country's second resource after fiscal revenues. The Fund's contributions to the special investment and equipment budget have increased in proportion to the rise in price of coffee and cocoa: 0.59 percent in 1972, 31.5 percent in 1975, 78.5 percent in 1978--the year when world prices soared.⁵ Thus, on a national level, the

Fund is becoming a means for expansion through taxation of a flourishing sector which makes it possible to finance the creation of the industrial fabric and to develop services. Thanks to agriculture, moreover, it provides the authorities with the means of ensuring the distribution of resources and the maintenance of a basic equilibrium (budget, balance, etc.) while at the same time bringing in considerable financial resources.

Nevertheless, it is foreign involvement that will be the determining factor in assuring the industrial infrastructure for growth. Judicial and fiscal provisions, particularly the very liberal investment code, facilitate foreign financial involvement. Complete freedom in withdrawing capital and profits from the country guarantee sizable profits to firms established there.⁶ The participation of foreign capital in industrial enterprises as a whole, therefore, represents approximately 80 percent of the total. Since capital is not supplied without men to go with it, the domination exercised by European personnel at the top of the professional hierarchy has become an essential fact of the economy. At the height of the prosperous years in the late 1970's, foreigners occupied 78 percent of management positions and about 60 percent of executive posts in private businesses (except agriculture).

Within this overall schema, the state appears to be a sort of "relaying authority" which acts as a substitute for "market processes as a preferential agent in the propagation of consumer models,"⁷ and which has undertaken to create a national bourgeoisie.

The establishment of state companies has made its contribution to this undertaking. Their task was to support and develop certain sectors of the economy neglected by foreign investors (agriculture, regional development, infrastructure, trade) and provide a definite content to Ivorian participation in the economy. But also and above all, they would help to obtain the wealth desired in high places for part of the new managing class, as well as the introduction of the latter into the business world. At the same time these state companies were to serve as the means for political manipulation.⁸ Thus managerial positions, for example, would be awarded in exchange for political support and very soon the result would be a de facto judicial regime which has reached what Y. A. Faure calls the "spectacular summit of a profound, daily muddle."⁹

In 1979 when President Houphouet-Boigny in his end of year message to the nation denounced "the low profitability of businesses which remain too dependent on advantages granted by the state, certain tendencies to corruption which seem to be gaining a foothold in various sectors, a desire for appearances, and a thirst for ownership," he showed his awareness of the extent of the problem.¹⁰

As a matter of fact, the Ivorian president's speech was largely based on a series of criticisms made in a confidential IMF report on the development of the Ivorian economy.

The reservations expressed concerning the Ivorian "miracle" in the report, made out beginning in 1971, had much to say concerning what now clearly appears as the poor choices of the Ivorian authorities.¹¹

With the passage of time, the IMF's warnings gave way to facts in the form of a serious debt crisis. The Kossou dam episode provides a good example in this regard. The dam-reservoir was to be the engine of the Ivorian economy. It was to make possible the irrigation of 30,000 hectares of crops and to make 100,000 Baoule farmers both growers and fishermen due to the extent of water artificially retained, "three times as much as in the Lemane." Above all, it was to make Yamoussoukro, the "village-capital," self-sufficient in energy. Billions of CFA francs were poured into the dam and power station, and as much again for relocating the Baoules who had to leave their land. Twelve years later, the water level of Kossou Lake dropped, and without its drive source the dam's turbines stopped, leaving Yamoussoukro without light.

However, the choices of the Ivorian leaders were not the only problem. The development model which for a time promoted the country's growth had its structural limitations. Among these was the model of extensive development, particularly forest development, an area in which the devastating results were without doubt largely responsible for the aggravation of the drought.

Furthermore, the priority given to agricultural products for export was harmful to food crops, especially rice, which could have helped to reduce food imports.¹² However, the authorities now seem determined to increase the proportion of food products in agriculture.¹³

Finally, in industry, the application of the classical pattern, which consists in establishing light industry to provide substitutes for imports and to process primary imports, had little effect on the balance of trade¹⁴; nevertheless, the authorities never really planned any solutions.

Effects of Mixing Business and Politics

With the economic crisis having served as a revealing agent, all the problems have appeared more clearly. In contrast with the earlier situation, the stakes today are not chiefly economic. The malaise, or even veiled political crisis which has been brewing in Abidjan since the eruption of the Dioulo affair, has revealed this new dimension.

For if the former mayor of Abidjan has symbolic value, it is because Dioulo is truly a product of the system. The man has gone through the network of the state companies. He has played the game of political and ethnic patronage; he took part in the contemporary fever in which business and politics were mixed. Finally, he drew on all these networks of relationships to place himself in line to the succession. The affair brought into the full light of day the game of a political class which since then has sought its arguments in the regime's upheavals.

All this outlines the limits of the measures for recovery undertaken since 1981 under the aegis of the IMF. The recovery plan has resulted in a reduction in public investments; layoffs in state companies; the limitation of possible further loans, and the postponement--or straightout cancellation--of some major projects (the Soubre dam, the extension of the Abidjan-Yamous-soukro highway). In April 1983, after the so-called administrative leases affair, the government did away with free housing for officials.

Last year, an even bolder measure was taken by the Ivorian minister of public offices aimed at applying to employees in state institutions the pay scale of civil servants. For the first time, the general operating budget showed a decrease: 429 billion CFA fr as against 435 billion in 1983. In fact, the goal of the recovery policy is no longer simply to restore a balance in the major areas of the economy, but also to limit the opportunities for acquiring wealth, that form of political regulation whose economic costs cannot be increased any further.

Among the solutions adopted to mitigate the inadequacies in the public sector, the government has proposed the privatization of the economy. Undoubtedly, this would make it possible to restore many sectors in industry that have deteriorated through the inefficiency of state companies. But the social costs of this liberal option could become unbearable. The rural exodus and urban unemployment have already swollen the ranks of potential delinquents. After Lagos, Abidjan has become one of the continent's most dangerous cities where banditry and robbery no longer target expatriates alone, symbols of foreign domination.

Nevertheless, many assets remain available to the country. The years of growth equipped it with a solid and durable infrastructure. Industrialization, despite its structural limits, is the most advanced in black Africa. Diversification in agriculture (pineapples, hevea, sugarcane) and above all new trends in food products (especially rice) should make it possible to restore a balance in the necessary consolidation of self-sufficiency in food. Finally, the new investment code gives priority to the PME's [small and medium-size businesses] and PMI's [small and medium-size industries], and shows itself to be favorable in its orientation to the "Ivorization" of the economy.

To sum up, still to be dealt with are the handicap of the succession, and the caste attitude of the owning class which does not yet seem ready to pay attention to the demands for more social justice and equality.

FOOTNOTES

1. Organization responsible for overseeing the Ivorian national debt.
2. One CFA franc = 0.02 francs
3. Cf. Y.-A. Faure and J.-F. Medard, "Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote-d'Ivoire" [State and Bourgeoisie in the Ivory Coast], Karthala, Paris, 1982.
4. This organization holds a monopoly in the purchasing and sales control of the agricultural products in its area of competency: cocoa and coffee.
5. In 1980, the contributions of the CSSPA totaled 161 million CFA fr compared with 44 million in treasury allocations; in 1981: 109 million compared with 42 million; in 1982: 17 million compared with 94 million; since 1983, these contributions have been practically zero. Sources: BULLETIN DE L'AFRIQUE NOIR, 7 February 1985.
6. See Moises Ikonickoff, "The Art and Method of Using Multinational Firms," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 1985.
7. J. Masini, M. Ikonickoff, "Multinationals and Development," quoted by Y.-A. Faure, op. cit., European Center for Study and Information on Multinational Companies, Brussels (PUF circulation, Paris, 1985).
8. Louis Gouffern, "The Limits of a Model?" POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, No 6, May 1982.
9. Y.-A. Faure, op. cit., p 55.
10. The example of SODESUCRE is undoubtedly the most striking. The cost, 250 billion between 1976 and 1980, was a source of considerable wealth for many officials who accepted profit overcharging.
11. Gilbert Comte, "An IMF Report Takes Up the 'Ivorian Miracle'," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, March 1972.
12. Cf. Samir Amin, "Le Developpement du capitalisme en Cote-d'Ivoire" [The Development of Capitalism in the Ivory Coast], Minuit Editions, 2nd edition, Paris, 1979, p 265 ff.

13. Cf. the special budget for investment and equipment. BULLETIN DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE, 7 February 1985.

14. Samir Amin, op. cit.

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28 August 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

SITUATION AFTER DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE ASSESSED

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 25 Jun 85 pp 17, 24

[Article by Antonio Maria Zorro: "What the FRELIMO Has Done to Mozambique and What It Has Become"]

[Text] The People's Republic of Mozambique is celebrating the 10th anniversary of the winning of its independence today, but it is doing so in a spirit of euphoria in no way consistent with the reality. The scenario created by government propaganda cannot conceal the tragic situation in which the country finds itself, which, in economic terms, can be assessed at a loss of \$5 billion, according to Mozambican Minister of Domestic Trade Aranha da Silva, nor can it conceal the evidence that the FRELIMO regime is on the brink of the abyss.

It is not the opponents of the regime, represented by the RENAMO movement, who say this, who point it out, who demonstrate it. It is being said, for example, by Spanish journalist Zamora Terres, the special correspondent of EL PAIS. He gives assurance that, everywhere in Mozambique, he has heard that "we lived better in the days of the Portuguese," and for his part, he gives the following testimony: "The simple people, in whose name the worst barbarities are being committed, are suffering from hunger and shortages today such as they had never known before."

One who is saying this--another example--is Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian chief of state. In Dar es Salaam he made the statement that his country "may again have to serve as the rear guard in a new war of liberation in Mozambique," in other words, in the event that the FRELIMO has to cross the Rovuma frontier once again, but this time from south to north.

This is being demonstrated, and here we give our most eloquent example, by the Mozambican dictator himself. Just prior to the celebration of the anniversary of independence, in the speech at the Fourth Session of the Central Committee of the FRELIMO, Samora Machel admitted in very clear terms that despair is the keynote to government conduct, stating that the chief priority is the battle against "the armed bandits," and announcing the mobilization of all citizens over the age of 18. This appeal by Machel for a general mobilization is a repetition of that some weeks ago, when the supreme commander of the FRELIMO stated that if necessary, he would order the schools and the factories closed

so that all could commit themselves fully to the struggle against the rebels. What makes this significant is precisely the fact that it is a repetition. Despite the undeniable charismatic authority which has surrounded his personal dictatorship, Machel has still not succeeded in galvanizing his party supporters or the masses staffed by the party.

We had another confession of the impotence characterizing this 10th anniversary of the seizure of power in what was then Lourenco Marques by a single, totalitarian and minority party, from Mozambican government sources some days ago, when it was announced that more expeditionary forces from Tanzania and Zimbabwe were preparing to come and do battle in the service of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The truth is that for at least the past 2 years, as we have on numerous occasions reported, those two countries have provided the government in Maputo with military support, with Tanzania supplying 8,000 soldiers and Zimbabwe 5,000. These latter were used above all in the defense of the railroad lines and the "pile-line." If these troops are further reinforced, and if the Russian and East German "military advisers" are not withdrawn, and if the 275 North Korean experts in terrorist actions continue to be used, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the armed forces are completely ineffective, and second, the offensive and destabilizing capacities of the rebels have greatly increased in recent times, despite the fact that guarantees were given that the famous Incomati Accord signed in March 1984 by Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa would be their death sentence.

These conclusions directly contradict the statement made by Aquino de Braganca, the private adviser to Samora Machel, as reported by SEMANARIO last week, in which that sinister individual said, among other enormous misstatements, gainsaying even his own employer, that "the situation is difficult but in no way alarming," that the FRELIMO "is emerging from the crisis," and that Samora Machel "has rarely been as optimistic about the future." But could anything but lies be expected of Aquino de Braganca?

What Must Not Be Overlooked

Of the 10 years which have passed since the People's Republic of Mozambique won independence, 8 have been spent in civil war. This has only been possible because the rebels do in fact, and independent of foreign aid, represent what they say do: an expression of national resistance, with clandestine support from vast sectors of the population. Although they have had greater or lesser foreign support--first from the former Rhodesia and then from the Republic of South Africa--this would not have sufficed to enable them to establish themselves in almost all of the provinces of the country, nor to face up, as they still are facing up, to the government forces, which have great military superiority, exclusive domination of the air space and also foreign troops aiding them.

It is important not to forget, moreover, that the main sources of rebellion since the beginning have been found not among the former adversaries of the FRELIMO and supporters of Portuguese sovereignty, but rather in independent circles, whether for or against the FRELIMO, which in the end came to feel

betrayed by the enveloping Marxist clique of Marcelino dos Santos and Samora Machel.

Without the discovery that Eduardo Mondlane was killed by the radical faction of the FRELIMO; without the liquidation of leaders of the independence movement such as Joana Simeao, Lazaro Kavandame and Paulo Gumane; without the bloody precedent of the assassination of Filipe Magaia, Paulo Kantomba, Barnabe Tava and other military leaders of the FRELIMO; and without the ferocious brutality with which the Samora Machel team sought to impose Marxism-Leninism on the entire Mozambican population, it is clear that the RENAMO would never have developed in Mozambique. It was born of dissidence, disillusionment and generalized revolt. Even if it is conquered by arms, it will be impossible to extinguish it entirely until the Marxist roots of the regime of Samora Machel are wrenched out.

The 10 years now ending, with their appalling list of setbacks, have only taught the FRELIMO the art of duping the government leaders and the businessmen in the capitalist countries, leading them to believe in an "opening toward the West." Apart from this, Samora Machel and the FRELIMO are the same as they were 10 years ago.

There is no need for the adversaries of the FRELIMO to say it, because yet once again, there is no room for doubt. The most serious accusations formulated by Amnesty International against the Mozambique in connection with the violations of the rights of man continue to be published, and the episcopate has again denounced them in connection with this 10th anniversary. However, these violations continue to be the day-to-day form of FRELIMO repression, characterized by refinements of cruelty. Credulous minds still believe that the signing of the Incomati Accord was an act of good will on the part of Mozambique, but the Central Committee of the FRELIMO, at a time when the terrorists are stepping up their acts of violence in South Africa, has just voiced its full solidarity with the executive committee of the ANC, wishing it success in the struggle against the Pretoria government.

Contrary to what is wanted by the fine democratic and liberal thinkers who reiterate that Mozambique is about to free itself from Soviet tutelage, the fact is that the value of the Soviet aid agreement signed some weeks ago by Moscow and Maputo totals some \$11.7 million. Meanwhile, the Senate in Washington has made financial aid to Mozambique conditional upon a guarantee from the leaders of the FRELIMO, confirming that they want not only to put an end to the violations of human rights, but to establish a democratic regime through the holding of free elections, with competition, naturally, among several parties. "An imbecility"--this was how the FRELIMO leaders described the demand of their North American benefactors. And they continue to consider it that. In his speech on the 14th of this month, Samora Machel categorically rejected the possibility of multiple political parties in Mozambique. There must be elections, yes, the dictator confirmed, but as in the past, they will be limited to the framework of the single party, and they will be designed solely to make those elected "students of political power," in the phrase used by Machel himself.

And so it is that Mozambique is celebrating 10 years of independence today. Only they have not been not years of independence, but rather and only years of destruction of the country and surrender of its people, at the criminal hands of "decolonizers" of the stripe of Dr Mario Soares, to the domination of the totalitarian and Marxist party known as the FRELIMO.

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CSO: 3442/345

MOZAMBIQUE

PROVINCIAL OFFICE FOR NIASSA WAR VETERANS ESTABLISHED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] A provincial office for the former combatants in Niassa was inaugurated in the city of Lichinga, the capital of Niassa, last 22 June. Lt Gen Oswaldo Tazama, secretary of state for veterans, presided at the inauguration ceremony, and veterans of the national armed liberation struggle, party and state cadres, and residents of the provincial capital of Niassa were also present.

On this occasion, Antonio Cosme Kutchedje, secretary of the Niassa Provincial Committee for Defense, read a message on behalf of the veterans of the national liberation war in that province, conveying their greetings to the party leadership and also indicating their satisfaction with the establishment of the provincial office, since this came about in response to the desire expressed by the veterans during the meeting held in the city of Beira in June of 1982.

The message from the veterans of the national liberation war also stressed the monetary and material support provided by the party and the state, the members of the cabinet and local businessmen for the construction of the building.

On the other hand, the Niassa veterans reasserted their determination to carry out the orders of our party and state "to defend the fatherland and consolidate national independence" fully, while at the same time they hailed the return of the mortal remains of Ngungunyane, an outstanding fighter in the resistance to colonial domination, to this country.

"The history of Mozambique reminds us that the Mozambican heroes include all of those who fought secretly against Portuguese colonialism, and all of our predecessors who fought against the exploitation of man by man. We therefore hail and welcome the return of the mortal remains of Ngungunyane," the message said.

On this occasion, the veterans of the national armed liberation struggle presented a spear, arrows and a lion skin, symbolizing the traditional struggle of the Mozambican people, to Lt Gen Oswaldo Tazama, as a gift for President Samora Machel.

Lt Gen Oswaldo Tazama thanked the veterans of the armed struggle for this gesture, and he also spoke of the new office, saying that "this building represents the effort and commitment of the veterans and their determination to overcome difficulties."

He further said that the establishment of a provincial office for the former fighters will make it possible to resolve the main problems the veterans of the national liberation war face, adding that "money will not be paid out, but it will be possible to find them work."

Moreover, at a meeting held last 28 June with veterans living in the provincial capital of Niassa, Oswaldo Tazama said that the main task of the provincial office which has now been established, in addition to identifying the problems of the veterans of the armed struggle, is "to make a survey of the veterans in the province and of the graves of our colleagues, as well as the care of historic sites."

Support From Workers

At a reception given by the veterans in connection with the inauguration of their office in Niassa, the workers at the Lichinga Inn presented Lt Gen Oswaldo Tazama with a check for 50,000 meticals for the support of the veterans of the armed national liberation struggle in that part of the country.

On this occasion, the secretary of state for veterans thanked the workers for this gesture, stating that it represents recognition of the role played by the veterans in the national liberation war.

In addition, Luis Ferreira, a farmer and private merchant in the town of Lichinga, recently made a gift in cash of 20,000 meticals to support the provincial office for veterans in Niassa. Foodstuffs also were included in his gift, bringing it to a value of 58,000 meticals.

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MOZAMBIQUE

MACHEL URGES FINANCIAL AUSTERITY MEASURES

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Jun 85 p 1

[Article by Filipe Ribas: "President Urges Control of Expenditures in Speech During Banking and Insurance Workers Week"]

[Text] "The banks, in coordination with the Ministry of Finance, must implement a strict austerity policy, in particular through financial control over the expenditures of the economic and social units of the state and its apparatus, including nonproductive expenditures." This is one of the tasks President Samora Machel noted as having priority for this sector. Speaking to banking and insurance workers who had come to his office for a greeting in connection with the end of Banking and Insurance Week, President Samora Machel discussed the economic and social achievements of the country in the 10 years since independence was won, as mirrored by the banking and insurance sector.

In a ceremony which was simple but full of color, emotion and joy, the week of assessments of the main political, economic and social activities within the context of the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the winning of national independence ended early last evening.

It fell to the banking and insurance sector to close this series of assessment weeks. The banking and insurance workers, represented by Minister of Finance Rui Baltazar Alves, Vice Minister of Finance and BPD [People's Development Bank] President Eneas da Conceicao Comiche, and Bank of Mozambique Governor Prakash Ratilal, as well as other leading cadres from both sectors, paid a visit to the chief of state in connection with the conclusion of Banking and Insurance Week.

"It is no accident that the banking and insurance sector is included in our cycle of weeks commemorating the 10th anniversary of the winning of national independence. Banking and insurance reflect the level of national production, the level of enterprise profitability, the levels of profit and individual savings, security and social well-being," said President Samora Machel. He added that the banking and insurance sector also truly mirrors our foreign economic relations.

Samora Machel emphasized that the banking sector represents a major tool which is essential for the leadership, dynamization and control of economic and social activities.

It was because of its strategic value, the chief of state said, that the banking and insurance sector was closed to the citizens of Mozambique in the colonial era.

"The banks were then a strategic tool for the pursuit of the desire of the colonials and imperialists to dominate and exploit our people," the chief of state stressed.

The president of the republic recalled the process of reorganizing the banks and converting them into a tool of the state for the centralization, distribution and control of the country's financial resources.

The People's Development Bank, the chief of state said, "was established to make the national development policy a reality and to encourage saving habits among the citizens.

"We can say today that the greatest triumph in banking is that we have succeeded in imbuing it permanently with our political line, and giving the concerns and aspirations of the people roots therein," President Samora Machel said, after setting forth some considerations about the introduction of our currency, the metical, the symbol of the sovereignty and personality of Mozambique, the heroism and sacrifice of its people, and the conquests, triumphs and determination to build socialism.

Concerning the work which has been done by the employees of the banks, the leader of the Mozambican revolution praised the efforts which have been made despite the great difficulties resulting from the shortage of cadres, such as to make possible the efficient functioning of this sector of strategic importance to the national economy.

Samora Machel lauded the workers in the banking and insurance sector for their ability "to educate our people about what money, a bank, a check or a policy is, what an account and interest mean, how to make a deposit, how to withdraw money and how to endorse a check.

"The banking and insurance sectors have basic tasks to carry out in the battle against underdevelopment. It is their job to ensure that on the financial level, the economic policy measures adopted by the Council of Ministers and the state plans will be realized, taking the present war economy situation into account," the president of the republic explained.

The chief of state appealed for encouragement of savings and the use of financial resources for priority projects, through the more dynamic execution of the credit policy in the productive and social sectors affecting the people, in particular production to improve supply.

It falls to the worker in banking and insurance, as the active agent for the achievement of these tasks, to take the responsibility of involving himself

consciously and actively in the defense of the fatherland and the liquidation of underdevelopment, by constantly improving his technical-vocational and scientific training, working with dynamism, rigor, efficiency and competence, cultivating the principles of honesty, professional pride, courtesy and tact," the president of the republic emphasized.

The Struggle Against the Bandits

"There are 5,100 of us within the political and organizational structures of the workers active in national reconstruction. We constitute a reliable front in the struggle against the bandits."

This statement was made by Bank of Mozambique Governor Prakash Ratilal, who has also been a high official of the EMOSE since our national insurance agency was established, in the course of reading the message of the banking and insurance workers to the president of the republic.

Prakash Ratilal recounted the history of the situation in banking and insurance since national independence was won. This history has been characterized by the massive exodus of expert foreign cadres, who had to be replaced by Mozambican citizens in the midst of the difficulties resulting from the lack of schools for vocational training in the sector.

"When the expert foreign cadres left the country, they said that we would not last more than 6 months. However, we succeeded in surviving beyond those 6 months, and without the supposedly indispensable cadres, we managed to progress. Today, the few foreign cadres we have are our loyal collaborators," he said.

The ceremony at which the banking and insurance workers conveyed their greetings to the president of the republic was preceded by an exhibition of cultural activities by a group of workers from the State Bank Nursery School, and by a comic performance by a cultural group made up of Bank of Mozambique employees. At the conclusion of the ceremony, the Mozambican chief of state gave a reception for the banking and insurance workers who attended the ceremony.

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28 August 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

MANICA, SOFALA LEADERS PARTICIPATE IN INTERPROVINCIAL TALKS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] "Any citizen of our country, whether he be a student, teacher, worker, simple laborer or employee of the state apparatus, should be trained and ready to take up arms to defend the fatherland, which is under attack from the international imperialists through the armed bandits." These were the words of Marcelino dos Santos, a member of the BP [Political Bureau] and Sofala province leader, during his speech last Thursday in the course of regular exchanges of experience on the battle against hunger and the armed bandits in which the two provinces in the central part of the country, Manica and Sofala, are participating. These talks took place in the city of Chimoio, the capital of the province of Manica.

The delegation from the province of Sofala was headed by Major General Marcelino dos Santos, a member of the BP, while the delegation from the province of Manica was headed by Col Manuel Antonio, first party secretary and governor of the province. Other participants included the military commanders of the two provinces, the provincial leaders in various sectors of activity, party members and representatives of the state and the defense and security forces in both provinces.

Speaking at the gathering, Marcelino dos Santos said that "all citizens, particularly provincial leaders, should be trained and provided with weapons to lead the battles against armed bandits.

"All residential premises and productive units must be defended. The leaders must be in the vanguard and must set a concrete example in these actions in defense of the fatherland," this leader of the province of Sofala said.

Marcelino dos Santos also indicated during his speech that "popular vigilance should be increased at all labor and residential sites in worthy commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the winning of national independence."

Citizens Urged To Join the Military

Recently, the Sofala provincial leader also appealed to the citizens of Mozambique, and of Sofala in particular, to join either the armed forces or the People's Militia in order to eliminate the armed bandits. This appeal was

made during Defense and Security Forces Week, which was organized just prior to the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the winning of national independence.

Brigadier General Joao Aleixo Malunga, Sofala provincial military commander, who also attended the ceremonies, delivered a message from the armed forces in the province on that occasion in which he stressed the activities undertaken against the armed bandits in the months of May and June.

As a result of these actions, 27 bandits were captured and various items of war materiel, including weapons of the AKM, bazooka and other types, were confiscated from the enemy. Also, hundreds of families who had lived under the control of the bandits for months were liberated.

In the opening ceremonies for Defense and Security Forces Week in the city of Beira, Lt Col Zacarias Tivane, provincial political commissar, representing the military commander of Sofala, officiated at the promotion of subordinate officers in the district of Dondo.

At the ceremony, Lt Col Zacarias Tivane praised the role of the military and the solidarity of the entire people with their defense and security forces.

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CSO: 3442/346

MOZAMBIQUE

PRECIOUS GEMS ENTERPRISE BEING ESTABLISHED

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 14 Jun 85 pp 1, 9

[Text] Gems and Cut Stones of Mozambique (GPL) will be the name of the new Mozambican enterprise for the detailed study, prospecting, cutting, jewelry mounting and marketing of precious stones which is to be created shortly.

According to Casimiro Francisco, the director of Gem-Cutting Industry, the studies for the project have already been completed and submitted to the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Finance, the Bank of Mozambique and other Mozambican government bodies for approval.

The GPL, which will have its own mines and trade establishments, will attempt not only to improve the system of extracting and processing precious and semiprecious stones, but also to win back a leading position on the international market, based on the knowledge that in the colonial era, significant quantities of stones of these types were exported to various parts of the world.

Further details will be found on the last page of this issue.

New Enterprise Described

Mozambique will shortly have a state enterprise for detailed studies, prospecting, cutting, jewelry mounting and marketing of precious stones, Casimiro Francisco, director of the Mozambican Gem-Cutting Industry, has announced.

Studies with a view to the establishment of this sector have already been completed, and the proposals has been submitted to the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Finance, as well as the Bank of Mozambique and other government bodies, for approval.

This enterprise, to be called Gems and Cut Stones of Mozambique (GPL), may issue shares to be underwritten by industrial capital or other bodies, with a view to the later establishment of new mixed enterprises with domestic and foreign groups interested in cooperating in the mining and gem-cutting sector.

The future GPL enterprise, the proposal for which has been under study since December of last year, will have its own mines and commercial establishments. According to Casimiro Francisco, the creation of this enterprise is a part of a wide-ranging plan by the Mozambican authorities to rehabilitate the gem-cutting and jewelry industry.

Foreign Market To Be Won

"Since the colonial era, the major part of the production of precious and semiprecious stones has been destined for export, although there are no figures on the volume and value marketed," Casimiro Francisco said.

It is known, however, that in the 1950s and 1960s, large quantities of precious and semiprecious stones were exported, particularly rose tourmaline, more commonly known as rubellite. Even after independence was won, and despite the abandonment of a number of the mines, some quantities were still being exported to the United States, Japan, Hong Kong and India, among other countries.

"This year alone we have exported cut and rough stones to South Africa, the FRG and Hong Kong. We plan to expand our markets to include Bulgaria and the GDR," the director said.

The quality of the precious and semiprecious stones of Mozambique is internationally renowned, according to Casimiro Francisco, and "therefore we have no problems in marketing, and our concern, moreover, is to increase production through full utilization of the resources."

Rehabilitation of Cutting Industry

A program for the rehabilitation of the entire gem-cutting industry is under way, Casimiro Francisco said. He added that this will bring increased foreign exchange into the country, because the price of cut stones on the international market is very high.

The rehabilitation of the gem-cutting industry will include reactivation of various activities directly or indirectly linked with it. This will make modernization possible, as well as the abandonment of the semiprimitive techniques currently being used, with a resulting increase in production capacity.

"In addition to this, recovery of this industry will mean an improvement in the conditions for checking, on the marketing of stones, from the production units to the markets. Plans call for new premises in the Malanga section of Maputo, where full security systems will be established to avoid theft and the diversion of materials," Casimiro Francisco said.

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MOZAMBIQUE

NORWAY PROVIDING MACHAVA GENERAL HOSPITAL WITH AID

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] The Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) delivered a gift some days ago including about 190 pairs of shoes for the workers at the Machava General Hospital in Maputo. The gift was presented by the director general of the NORAD, Nils Vugt.

According to information provided to this newspaper, the gift of shoes for the workers at that health establishment arose out of the fact that the Machava General Hospital is making a valuable contribution to the battle against tuberculosis in a health program in which Mozambique also has Norwegian aid.

The director general of the NORAD, who presented the gift, was in this country to participate in the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of national independence. In addition to having an audience with Samora Machel, Nils Vugt had meetings with Mariano Matsinha, the head of the province of Niassa, and with the ministers of finance and mineral resources, Rui Baltazar dos Santos Alves and Abdul Magid Osman, respectively.

The meeting with the leader of the province of Niassa was almost entirely devoted to the aid provided by Norway for the programs of economic development, particularly in the electricity sector.

Mariano Matsinha and Nils Vugt also discussed the possibility that Norway will provide aid for the pursuit of certain activities of basic importance to increasing farm production. Nils Vugt left Mozambique last Thursday.

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MOZAMBIQUE

CONDUCT SUBSEQUENT TO PRICE LIBERALIZATION TERMED DISHONEST

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Rogerio Siteo: "Something More Than Mere Money"]

[Text] The markets in the city of Beira, even the smallest, have been overflowing with tomatoes for more than a week now--green ones and ripe ones of every possible level of quality from the farm fields in Sofala. Thanks to the floods of trucks which unload tons of garden crops in the markets beginning early every morning, there is every indication that the era of sufficient abundance of these products to fill bellies and end hunger is knocking at the door. But at what price? This is the Achilles' heel for the thousands of individuals who patronize the markets daily.

All of the garden products cost an average of 100 meticals per kilogram today in the markets in Beira, including oranges, cassava and fresh ears of corn.

It is the private farmers and transporters (also middlemen) who have dominated the market to date, providing a flood of all these products but at the "price of gold" wherein the law of "put up or shut up" prevails.

There has now been mention by creditable sources of prospective plans by the state enterprises to enter the race within a few days' time, but in another way. Would that they would, because thousands of individuals in Beira have placed all their hopes in a change in prices in these enterprises, because of the exorbitant prices currently being charged.

When the communique of the Council of Ministers designed to reactivate production and trade was released publicly 2 weeks ago, many middlemen plunged into "easy business." However, there was the expectation that when abundance came, they would be forced to restrain their enthusiasm and lower prices. But the time came and just the same, everything began to worsen.

Apparently there is nothing against the law. Sales are being made in accordance with the Council of Ministers communique ordering the immediate liberalization of the prices of the following products, and we quote: "All garden vegetables, onions, cassava, sweet potatoes, sweet corn, fruits, rabbits, ducks and turkeys."

But on the other hand, the attitude many people have now adopted concerning this situation could not by any means be regarded as very honest. On the contrary, it involves opportunism in the search for easy profits in some shameless cases.

The communique was issued to provide producers with an incentive to act justly, and to eliminate certain unnecessary middlemen hindering this entire system of trade. It is indeed necessary that each producer earn from his work, but it must be in honest and just form too.

What we are seeing is a lack of indicators and parameters for the "application of free prices," which in the end does not mean just honesty and money, but something more than that. We are seeing the immediate symptoms of this opportunism, in the actions of groups setting prices, and when the producer who has garden crops available 2 or 3 kilometers from the market agrees implicitly to the sale of his product at the same price as that of a producer 40 or more kilometers away, with all his transportation problems. And we do not even want to mention the variations in production cost.

Furthermore, producers using irrigation systems, tractors and other more costly production means are agreeing to act in a bloc with others whose work is done under different circumstances and conditions.

Certainly something is not going right. The communique will not in any way be properly implemented, for various reasons which any honest person will be able to see. But what is certain is that price liberalization means something more than merely money.

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MOZAMBIQUE

PROJECTS DESIGNED TO DEVELOP INDUSTRIES LAUNCHED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Abdul Carimo]

[Text] The development of basic industry, developed structurally on the foundation of the existing capacity, has without a doubt been a process in which our country has been involved in these 10 years of independence, since, in reality, there was not initially any change in Mozambique in the industrial structure inherited from the colonial era. The first indications of growth in Mozambican industry after national independence was won began to be seen in 1978 and 1979, and in 1981, the industrial production reported was 13.7 percent above that in 1977. The changes being made in the sector will make it possible to develop Mozambican industry still further.

The concern of the Mozambican government in recent times has been to establish better and more economically realistic bases for the better utilization of the available resources and all foreign contributions toward the implementation of projects designed to rehabilitate the productive units already in existence. This must be done in such a way as to guarantee, among other things, the supplies needed (raw materials, replacement and other parts and equipment) with a view to the better use of the installed capacity in the country.

Since industrial rehabilitation has been defined as the basis for the pursuit of sectorial development plans, extremely important projects are now under way, such as the implementation of programs in the three main textile factories, with foreign support, while in the metal mechanical sector, the production of farm tools is to be planned.

On the other hand, activities designed to establish a more realistic picture of the industrial sector are under way. This will also make it possible to mobilize still further the foreign technical capacity and also to encourage the capacity of the Faculty of Economics at the Eduardo Mondlane University, which can be the focus in the future of economic advisory activities.

Industry was originally created in Mozambique by the colonial system for the primary processing of farm raw materials destined for export, as was the case with sugar, tea, cashews, cotton and other crops.

As a result of the launching of the armed national liberation struggle, the colonial economy entered into crisis, and foreign exchange difficulties began to be ever more acute. The bourgeoisie, which had become wealthy on the basis of trade, chose to invest in the so-called import substitutes industry, which involved developing the final processing of imported products, and which was established through the import of equipment, very often second-hand.

Industry was created basically in the two main economic centers, Maputo and Beira, where about 70 percent of it was concentrated.

Then National Independence Came

As a result of the mass departure of foreign managers and technicians immediately after national independence was won, the sector was faced with a drop in the levels of industrial production during the first years after the country was liberated.

However, the gradual reorganization of production and distribution in the main economic units established foundations such that signs of growth could develop as early as 1978 and 1979. In 1981, for example, industrial production surpassed that reported in 1977 by 13.7 percent. On the other hand, new production capacity was put into operation, and sizeable undertakings are in progress, the Mocuba Textile Complex and steps toward the establishment of a foundry in Maputo being among them.

It should be stressed, moreover, that the attacks against the RPM [People's Republic of Mozambique], natural catastrophes and the serious consequences of the international crisis, apart from those factors related to the colonial industry, have caused a decline in recent years in industrial production, with a reduction of the influx of imported raw materials and in farm raw materials and domestic ores for industry and for export, because of the increase in the costs of materials and equipment.

Some Programs Under Way

The plan for the expansion of the Pemba Electrical Power Plant in Cabo Delgado is being carried out. The civil construction work began in 1983, with financing from Great Britain.

The British Crown Agency firm, in partnership with Electricity of Mozambique, has the responsibility for this project, which will be completed shortly. The expansion of the power plant includes the installation of two generator sets with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts. A single generator can very well supply the city of Pemba, including the TEXMANTA textile factory.

TEXMOQUE, in Nampula, may be able to produce 50 tons of goods in its sewing line this year. Its installed capacity would allow the production of 234 tons per year, but there have been problems of electrical energy supply in Nampula until the present, since the power available did not meet the factory needs.

Also in the province of Cabo Delgado, the results of the first phase of prospecting for oil carried out by a French company in Mocimboa da Praia on contract with the U.S. ESSO enterprise are regarded as promising. The final proof of whether there is oil in that region or not may be obtained after the first drilling, which will probably begin in the second half of 1986.

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28 August 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

CARGO-HANDLING FIGURES FOR INHAMBANE PORT REPORTED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] A total of 114,000 tons of various cargo was handled at the port of Inhambane from the time it resumed operation in October of 1980 until May of this year. According to reports from that province, more than 100 ships docked in Inhambane during that period.

The port of Inhambane served as a transit point of extreme importance for the handling of products destined for the populations affected by the drought in that zone, and the volume of products handled increased precisely during the 1983 and 1984 period. Food and clothing items made up the greater part of the goods shipped through Inhambane during that period.

According to reports from that province, the largest volume of cargo during the 2 years immediately after the port began functioning again was logs, and in that period, port productivity reached about 350 tons per day. Cashews, seasoning oil and copra were among the main types of freight during this period.

Since the port reopened in 1980, 15 workers have been trained in the various specialties in the port sector, and about 200 dockworkers have been recruited to handle the cargo. The port of Inhambane is presently equipped with a crane, four transporter machines and a tractor, in addition to other basic equipment for port operations. Other reports from Inhambane indicate that the CFM [Mozambique Railroad] continues to operate a railroad line between Inhambane and Inharrime, and between 1982 and May of this year it carried a total of 92,000 passengers and 11,000 tons of various freight. Despite the fact that the sector is experiencing a shortage of specialized personnel, the few CFM workers have sought to keep the roadbed and all of the rolling stock operative.

The innovative spirit of the few veteran workers employed in the offices of the CFM has saved that enterprise a total of about 900 contos. Innovations included couplings, drilling of engine brakes, piston rod sleeves and other parts. In addition to this, the CFM workers have also produced hoes, machetes and other tools as a way of converting scrap iron into something useful.

Between 1982 and last May, 100 workers were trained in self-defense courses.

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MOZAMBIQUE

PRICE LIBERALIZATION FLOODS MARKET WITH FARM PRODUCE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] Satisfactory quantities of such vegetables as kale, lettuce, potatoes, onions, tomatoes and others have been available for sale for some days now at the various markets in the capital of the country, as a result of the implementation of the recent Council of Ministers measure liberalizing the prices of some foodstuffs.

Substantial quantities of tuberous vegetables, including sweet potatoes, cassava, carrots and beets are also available in these same city markets.

Other products for sale include green beans, coconuts and oranges.

During a tour of the markets in the capital city, a vendor in the central market told us that some of these products have gone unsold for entire days "because of the present glut." She went on to say that "in recent weeks, for example, a kilogram of kale cost 100 meticals, while currently it sells for between 60 and 75. Lettuce goes for between 50 and 60 meticals, sweet potatoes for 75 to 100, and cassava between 75 and 100.

Some of the products currently available in several capital city markets had not been seen in public trade for a considerable time. Among those which have now reappeared are cassava and sweet potatoes.

Other sellers in the markets said that the most notable drop in prices has been for green beans. "Two weeks ago they sold for 800 meticals per kilogram, but now no one is paying more than 400."

Some salespersons said that "the liberalization has caused products which were not available in our market previously to appear," and they stressed that some of these had been unavailable for more than 2 years.

The price liberalization measures were announced recently in a communique from the Council of Ministers, and they covered mainly garden crops, including onions, as well as ducks, turkeys and rabbits. The prices of other foodstuffs were not liberalized, but were altered with a view to benefitting producers.

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MOZAMBIQUE

GRAIN PRODUCTION OF MOCUBA AGRARIAN SCHOOL REPORTED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] The Mocuba Agrarian School in the province of Zambezia produced more than 20,000 tons of corn and about 4 tons of rice this year. Later this year, this institution will begin cultivation of squash and sugar cane and the rehabilitation of the banana plantings, with a view to improving the diet of the boarding students at the school. This information was provided to our correspondent in Zambezia by the director of that educational institution, Abel Cassamo, who listed a whole series of other activities.

On the initiative of the administration of the school, its students produced more than 20 tons of corn and 4 tons of rice during the 1984-85 farm season, in a campaign designed to improve the diet of the students, above all at peak demand times.

"We are also developing the cultivation of garden crops in the cool season," Abel Cassamo said, also adding that "during the next farm campaign, we will introduce the cultivation of squash and sugar cane and will plant a stand of banana trees, utilizing the low-lying zones along the Licungo River."

Apart from activities of a productive nature, the school is currently sponsoring soccer and basketball tournaments and lectures on patriotism and the real current situation in the country. These lectures are given by party and state leaders on various levels, as well as members of the FDS.

Abel Cassamo said that the students have sponsored visits to hospital centers where soldiers are being treated. Currently they are also visiting the Mocuba Barracks, where they are offering gifts of books, foodstuffs and postcards and are exchanging ideas with the soldiers.

Abel Cassamo recalled that the school began operation in 1973. "At that time it was called the National Art Institute, and it trained cadres to serve the colonial apparatus," he said. He went on to explain that a significant step in organization and the definition of tasks for its development was taken in 1977.

He said that it was at that time that the name was changed to the Basic Agrarian School, and its infrastructures were improved such as to be suitably

adapted to the new phase. Also the teaching body was expanded to keep up with its growth.

"In view of the increasing needs of the country for the training of cadres, crop raising and livestock breeding were introduced at the school as specialties in 1982, and places were offered to students in the Center and North zones of the country. At that time, 12 new teachers were assigned to the school," he went on to explain.

Speaking of the faculty activities, Abel Cassamo informed us that "they reflect well-defined programs," which justifies a certain optimism concerning the results which will be achieved by the end of the year.

"I think that the level of school advancement in this first semester, as well as at the end of the year, will be positive, because despite some difficulties encountered, the teachers have succeeded in harmonizing the programs," Abel Cassamo said.

In conclusion, he noted that the OJM [Mozambique Youth Organization] and the ONP, which are organized at the school, have sponsored political, recreational and social activities, in addition to group visits to the Patriotic Education Hall.

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MOZAMBIQUE

PURPOSE, FUNCTIONING OF 400,000 HECTARE PROJECT DESCRIBED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Jun 85 p 11

[Text] The 400,000 Hectare Project is an economic giant which is progressing confidently with every passing day in its noble mission of producing in order to put an end to the shortage of food and clothing in the province of Cabo Delgado. The result of international cooperation, this project is oriented basically toward the priority production of cotton and grains, while at the same time livestock breeding in the province is being encouraged.

The activities of the project, which is divided into departments for crop raising, livestock breeding, construction, tree felling and cutting and support of small projects, rely on two large enterprises, the Cabo Delgado Cotton Enterprise and the Chipembe Agrarian Enterprise, and its zones of influence include the districts of Montepuez, Namuno, Ancuabe, Pemba, Chiure and Mecufi.

In crop raising, the realm in which the project is most active, the work will be guaranteed by the Cotton Enterprise and the Chipembe Agrarian Enterprise. In livestock breeding, the first phase, reproduction to increase the animal herds, is already under way at the Montepuez Swine Complex and the Pemba Dairy Cattle Complex, as well as a number of smaller projects in the various units for production and support of the cooperative and family sectors.

In the construction area, the project is involved in the building of the Chipembe Dam and other smaller dams for irrigation purposes, as well as the construction and improvement of workers' housing. In the tree-felling and cutting sector, the work of expanding crop areas, as well as developing them, is in progress.

"The policy of the project in this sector is not only to expand the areas, but also to improve the existing crop areas for greater profitability. To this end, experimental fields and crop testing with a view to increasing production per hectare are to be found in almost all the production units," Constancio Meli, the inspector at the 400,000 Hectare Project, explained.

In support of the cooperative and family sectors, the Integrated Cabo Delgado Development Project, another name by which it is known, is active in the

Regional Experimentation and Development Centers (CRED), F07 and reforestation projects.

Work is also being done in collaboration with various other projects and enterprises, including the campaign against the tsetse fly, MECANAGRO-Primary Health Care, and others located in Cabo Delgado functioning in the project area.

A considerable complement of machinery and farm tools is available to the project, along with the assistance of a group of Romanian technicians, who are also responsible for the training of Mozambican cadres.

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28 August 1985

MOZAMBIQUE

CABO DELGADO HAS GOOD FARM MARKETING PROSPECTS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Jun 85 p 11

[Text] The farm marketing campaign, which is being carried out in a new way this year, with the division of the province into five spheres of influence based on the production capacity of the districts, has begun throughout Cabo Delgado. This marketing season has been the focus of careful preparation, in which various party and state bodies have been involved, and the outlook for this season points to satisfactory indices. However, it will not be possible to reach the level of last season, which was the best in the past 4 years, despite the fact that the shortage of fuel and chemical fertilizers, mainly, exerted a negative influence on the 1984-1985 farm season. The best results are expected from the family sector, since it depends very little on the factors mentioned above.

Farm marketing in the province of Cabo Delgado is a permanent activity, although the official "season" falls in the months of May and June, when more bodies are involved in it because this is the period in which the majority of farm products are harvested in all the districts. This information was given us by Sulemane Juma Giramo, the Cabo Delgado representative of the Commercial Department of the AGRIGOM enterprise.

The products of which the largest volume will be marketed this season are corn, sorghum, sunflower seeds, sesame seeds, dried cassava and beans.

Spheres of Influence

The farm marketing campaign this year has been the focus of rigorous and careful preparation in the province, involving various party and state bodies both in the mobilization of the peasants and in the establishment of the material and human conditions required, particularly with regard to transportation and access routes for taking out the products to be marketed.

With a view to better coverage and functioning, particularly in the most productive districts, the province was divided into five spheres of influence, designated as the North, Center, South, Coastal and East zones, Sulemane Giramo said.

Within these zones, that same official said, we might mention the North, Center, South and East zones, which include the districts of Mueda, Nangade, Macomia, Ancuabe, Montepuez, Namuno and Chiure, wherein the family and state sectors provide farm production and marketing with great impetus.

The products to be exchanged include basically goods of first necessity such as cloth, soap, sugar and salt, among other things, and the respective quotas are guaranteed by the Cabo Delgado Wholesale Enterprise.

Interprovincial Transport

According to the Commercial Department official, a part of the products purchased are intended for interprovincial marketing, involving Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo, while another portion will go to supply the province itself, according to the established plans.

In conclusion, our interlocutor said that the farm and consumer cooperatives, the state sector and private merchants are becoming increasingly involved in the campaign.

The AGRICOM, for its part, has assigned mobile brigades to the communal settlements and production centers which still do not have definitive marketing infrastructures.

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MOZAMBIQUE

PRODUCTION OF RICE, OTHER CROPS STEPPED UP IN QUELIMANE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Jun 85 p 7

[Text] The entire area surrounding the city of Quelimane, over a radius of many kilometers, is covered with rice fields in one of the best and largest production efforts achieved in that zone in recent years. "This year the harvest will be good," the state, cooperative and private farmers who recently relaunched this type of activity, guarantee. They began with the recovery of the earlier irrigation areas and the development of other new ones in favorable zones. In addition to rice, a traditional crop in this zone, the development of orchards and vegetable gardens will make it possible for not only the capital, but also the other large settlements in Zambezia, to have markets full of the widest variety of food products soon.

The cultivation of rice around Quelimane is not a new activity. Traditionally, apart from the various farm units in the region, many families devoted a part of their time to cultivating a small area planted to rice.

At the beginning of this decade, for various reasons, this activity was being abandoned, and Zambezia experienced a difficult period in which it failed in practice to produce this grain in large enough quantities for self-sufficiency.

In 1983, the provincial government, through the agriculture office, launched a movement to promote the recovery of the sector, providing incentives for the establishment of state units of limited dimensions and supporting private farmers and the family sector.

Areas suitable for the cultivation of rice were divided up into plots of half a hectare, which were made available to hundreds of families. The result was a tremendous area under cultivation in the zone, from which the first harvest began to be collected last May.

The established irrigation areas in the zone, somewhat deteriorated due to neglect, were recovered. The installation of motor pumps made it possible to provide water to every corner whenever needed. Other areas with the proper soil conditions but lacking water were developed by providing irrigation canals to take the precious liquid wherever necessary.

The resources available in the province were also distributed to the private farmers who, knowing that they were supported, in many cases increased the areas planted and diversified their production.

Greater Yields

The state unit in Muziva, in the district of Namacurra, covers an area of 365 hectares and utilizes an irrigation system which existed previously but had been abandoned. With its recovery, the problem of pumping the water remained to be resolved. Pumps were installed and, finally, two IFA truck engines with the characteristics needed for the work were obtained. They were put into use and today the water runs freely, bringing life to the seeds planted in the fertile ground.

This year, 334 hectares of rice were cultivated there, and the harvest in May brought an average yield of 3.4 tons per hectare. During the "second season," sweet potatoes will be raised.

Moreover, an effort to introduce rice with a shorter growing season has already been made. This will make two harvests per year possible.

Brandao Berro is a worker in the state unit which has been there since the days when the land was exploited by the Monteiro & Giro enterprise. He recalls:

"In those days the yield was lower, about 3 tons per hectare. Now there is better organization because the farm is divided into blocks of 50 hectares, and each block has someone in charge."

Improved Methods

Jose de Sousa, one of these technicians, told us the following:

"Our responsibilities include improving the methods of work constantly, among other things because there is a minimum which must be achieved. Above that minimum, there are production bonuses which have been established and which we all seek to earn."

In all of the available spots on the state farm, as well as along the trails leading to it, banana trees will be planted. The goal is to plant 10,000 of them.

Provincial Agriculture Director Jose Pacheco told us that the project here is to increase the production area by 600 hectares. But he added:

"This is a project which must progress with certainty, with a guarantee that, as has been true to date, we will succeed in carrying out the plan. One of the greatest difficulties we face is the shortage of manpower, since traditionally this region has been mainly inhabited by people involved with fishing, who only engage in agriculture as a last priority.

"We must also have a guarantee of an increase in and the operation of irrigation systems, so that, only then, we can advance gradually. The final dimensions of this area will not be achieved before the end of this decade."

Satisfactory Harvest

Manpower difficulties are also being experienced by Chang Cheng, a farmer and private swine breeder, who has a beautiful farm in this zone.

He is satisfied with the rice harvest this year, and he has already succeeded in growing short-cycle rice, which will allow him to harvest another crop in 1985.

"Things are going to go well now, because we have all the possible support, given the difficulties. [Line or lines missing from the text here.] ... the raising of swine, which is beginning to develop there.

The agriculture director told us that the sector he heads intends to establish the conditions necessary for self-sufficiency, at least in pork. He expressed the belief that the lack of experience of the state sector in this activity might hinder the undertaking.

Then we talked with this private farmer to whom support was promised. The project was soon put into motion. One of Chang Cheng's sons went to Maputo immediately to take a basic course, so as to understand this livestock-breeding activity.

Due to a shortage of feed, experimental sugar cane crops were planted and they yielded excellent results. Today sugar cane is the energy base for animal feed, and much of it is also sold in bulk form on the market in Quelimane. The rations are supplemented with fruit and vegetable scraps and rice hulls, of which there is no shortage there.

It is also Chang Cheng who is directing the work of building an irrigation system on the state unit adjacent to his property. The international budget for the construction of these water-conducting canals was estimated at 12,000 contos, and it was estimated that the work would take 2 years. Using local resources and under the direction of this farmer, the work (it is practically completed) is being done in 9 months at a cost of 1,700 contos.

Obviously, one could debate the quality of the project, the aesthetics or the completion of its final details. But what is certain is that these people have experience. The result is that, after an initial test everything worked perfectly.

"Within a few days we will begin raising tomatoes, and we are convinced that we will be able to guarantee the supply for Quelimane and the surrounding area throughout the year," Jose Pacheco told us at the end of April this year.

It is in this way that the people are demonstrating in practice that unity creates strength. The efforts of each individual, it can now be seen, are contributing little by little to the building of a solid and stable economy in the province.

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MOZAMBIQUE

SHRIMP BOAT DAMAGED BY FIRE NOW REPAIRED

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 26 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] The shrimp vessel Rigel 2, which belongs to the Japanese-Mozambican EFRIPEL fishing enterprise, recently suffered serious damage caused by a fire on board while it was docked on the port of Beira, but it is now ready to sail again.

Although some finishing touches, mainly involving carpentry, remain to be completed, Sequeira Canjoara, an EFRIPEL deck inspector, told DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE that the vessel is operational, and has already made its first voyage, from Quelimane to Beira, after being repaired.

In fact, the Rigel 2 left yesterday on the return trip to Quelimane, carrying food supplies for the 25 June celebration, beverages and fish among other things.

Sequeira Canjoara also said that the repair of the vessel in record time was achieved due to the efforts of the EFRIPEL workers, in particular the Japanese technicians, as well as the smooth functioning of the supply sector. A large proportion of the materials used in the repair operations, costing an estimated 800 contos in Japanese currency, were on hand in the warehouses. The replacement parts for electrical installations, which were purchased in Beira, were an exception.

However, insurance authorities have not yet issued a statement concerning the causes of the accident. Some crew members under suspicion are in the hands of the authorities, pending investigation.

During the fire, which occurred at the end of last May, the Rigel 2 suffered total losses in the kitchen, refrigerator compartment, crew's quarters and equipment storage compartment. Some partially destroyed materials were rescued. Sequeira Canjoara added that the 343-ton vessel, which is 48 meters and carries a crew of 20, is not currently engaging in fishing, but is providing support in fishing equipment to the enterprises in the sector scattered throughout the central and northern parts of the country.

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MOZAMBIQUE

ILLEGAL CHANNELS HANDLING SALES OF COCONUT, DRIED FISH

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 26 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] About 10,000 coconuts, in hundreds of sacks, and 65 bundles of dried fish were seized in Beira during a joint operation by representatives of the Ministry of Interior and bodies in the Chaimite and Pioneiros sectors. This operation was carried out last Thursday in Praia-nova to prevent speculation in these products.

Another quantity of coconuts, estimated at more than 10,000, was found in two shacks in this fishing zone and is in the hands of the police, because there are indications that it was intended for illegal channels of sale to the public.

According to sources in the police and the sectors involved in the operation, "the coconuts and the dried fish were seized because they were involved in illegal sales channels, were unloaded at improper sites, and were not subject to the fiscal control required for operations of this sort."

These sources added that the individuals in whose possession these goods were found did not have documentat. on to justify the large quantities they were carrying or licenses as sales agents.

It is known, moreover, that the Praia-nova sector has been the scene of sales of coconuts and dried fish locally or in other sectors by individuals charging speculative prices, including 100 meticals each for coconuts.

We learned from these sources that the products seized will be turned over to HORTOFRUTICOLA and PESCOM, which will proceed with their sale through the existing legal circuits.

By way of comment, Felix Linha, commander of the First Police Squadron in Beira, said: "Dried fish is not supposed to be sold in just any way. There is the PESCOM, which engages in marketing this product, but this lot was diverted from this circuit." He added that "coconuts too are supposed to be sold through HORTOFRUTICOLA. It was for this reason and because the owners unloaded their products at improper sites or sold them at 100 meticals each that these goods were seized." We were able to learn that a large part of the coconuts seized came from the district of Buzi, particularly the regions of Sofala and Chenguane.

5157

CSO: 3442/347

MOZAMBIQUE

PRODUCTION INCREASE PLANNED AT HOG-RAISING COMPLEX

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Antonio Siteo]

[Text] In its first phase, which involves building the swine herd and promoting hog breeding throughout the province, the Montepuez Hog-Raising Complex in Cabo Delgado provided a number of state and private production units, farm cooperatives and even the family sector with its model pigsty last year. The results already obtained, according to the director of the complex, Eduardo Preso Lisboa, justify rather optimistic expectations for the phases to follow, which will include the production of pork for consumption by the population and the building of a sausage factory.

Located in the environs of the city of Montepuez, near the Ncorripo Mountains, the Montepuez Hog-Raising Complex is a part of the 400,000 Hectare Project, and is one of the production units of the Cabo Delgado Cotton Enterprise.

The complex, in operation since September of 1983, when it began with 200 breeding swine obtained from Nampula, presently has five sections with a capacity of 600 animals each, used for reproduction, including the breeding, delivery, raising and fattening of swine.

"Despite the difficulties, which are after all being experienced by the entire country, the complex is moving steadily toward the goals for which it was established, the first phase already having been completed," Director Lisboa said, mentioning the breeding animals which this production unit supplies to other enterprises and the cooperative and family sectors in such other districts as Ancuabe and Chiure.

Self-Sufficiency

The hog-raising complex, as the farm enterprise which it is, also engages in crop raising, although this is in the embryonic stage.

Currently, the attention of this unit is also focused on self-sufficiency in food for the workers and the animals, through the production of corn and vegetable crops.

Eduardo Lisboa said that last season, 150 hectares of corn were cultivated, and as of the date of our visit, this area had already yielded more than 2 tons of this grain.

"An area of more than 400 hectares is now being cleared for the production of corn during the next season. This will raise the area being cultivated for food for the workers, both in this complex and in the cotton enterprise, and for the production of animal feed, to 500 hectares."

Kale, tomatoes, cabbage and other vegetables were planted in a garden covering 3 hectares. One part of the crop will go to the workers and another to the general population, particularly the residents in the communal settlement of Ncorripo.

The workers have dammed up the bed of a small stream which arises in the Ncorripo Mountains to provide water to irrigate the vegetables.

Good Future Prospects

According to its director, the Montepuez Hog-Raising Complex has established the basic foundations for a promising future, within the scope of the goals of the enterprise, with regard to the fulfillment of the tasks for which the complex was established. To this end, four more sections of equal capacity will be built at the site.

"This construction is designed to increase the hog-raising capacity, so as to complete the next two phases: production of pork for consumption by the people and later, the building of a sausage factory," Eduardo Preso Lisboa added.

In the near future, the complex plans to add 10 more sections, so as to be able in fact to achieve the production level set for this unit--15,000 animals per year.

5157

CSO: 3442/330

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

NAUTICAL SCHOOL PROGRESSES--A delegation from our country headed by Vice Minister of Merchant Marine Isaias Muhate will leave for Norway within a few days to participate in discussions on the second phase of the Mozambique Nautical School project. This undertaking was recently launched by President Samora Machel within the framework of the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of national independence. The establishment of the Mozambique Nautical School is a part of a cooperation project between our country and the Kingdom of Norway. The NORAD [Norwegian Agency for International Development], IMO and SHIPDECO agencies are involved in the implementation of this project of paramount importance. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Jul 85 p 2] 5157

NEW LOCALITY CREATED--The headquarters of the locality of Luchimua, in the Nassenhenje communal settlement, was recently established in the district of Lucheringo, in Niassa. Antonio Saide, the administrator of the recently established locality, met with the communal settlement bodies, party cells and the people to learn about the existing problems. Several days later, the population in the locality sponsored a campaign to clean up the shoulders of the road linking the towns of Unango and Lichinga, to furnish the administrator's office and to place a flagpole in front of the administration premises. After the work was done, the administrator gave a speech on armed banditry. The residents in the communal settlement of Nassenhenje undertook cultural activities and the local cleanup within the framework of the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the winning of national independence. (GCS). [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Jul 85 p 2] 5157

FORESTRY STUDIES ABROAD--The last two of the seven IFLOMA [Manica Forestry Industries] workers who went to Czechoslovakia for a refresher course in the forestry and forest exploitation industry sector have now returned to the country. This group of middle-level and basic technicians was provided with intensive training over a period of 6 months in new forest exploitation methods, particularly the organization of brigades for felling, hauling, shipping and processing logs, as well as matters pertaining to the mechanisms for the industrial processing of pine. Americo Lino, one of the individuals who took this course, said in Beira that "the course in Czechoslovakia was quite positive, above all in connection with the standardization of some work methods, although it will be necessary to link our knowledge with the reality in Mozambique." [Text] [Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 25 Jun 85 p 2] 5157

LOW FISH PRODUCTION--The Island of Mozambique Fishing Combine in Nampula, which planned to produce 220 tons of fish, will fulfill about 70 percent of its plan for this year. This information was revealed several days ago by the director of the enterprise, who added that the failure to fulfill the plan will be due to low production caused by a shortage of fuels, oils, and equipment for preserving the fish, linked with the fact that the fishing vessels have ancient engines. He stated moreover that the fact that there was low production in the first quarter of this year was due to bad weather, and subsequently, the problems mentioned above. It should be noted that the Island of Mozambique Fishing Combine not only engages in fishing, but has also provided support to traditional fishermen in terms of fishing equipment, oils and fuels. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Jul 85 p 2] 5157

CSO: 3442/346

NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

WHITE GROWTH RATE DECLINES--Windhoek.--South West Africa's White population showed a negative growth rate of 0,7 percent, calculated on an annual basis from 1970 to 1981, according to results of the census held four years ago and released in Windhoek yesterday. All other population groups showed increases, ranging from 1,4 percent for the Damaras to 5,8 percent for the Kavangos, with the territory's total population increasing by just under 300 000 from 739 632 to 1 033 196, or three percent on an annual basis. The total number of Whites declined by some 6 000 from 1970 to 76 430 in 1981. The census in the urban area of Windhoek showed a total population of just over 96 000, with 29 400 being Whites. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 26 Jul 85 p 9]

OWAMBO ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN RESIGNS--WINDHOEK--The chairman of the second-tier Owambo Legislative Assembly, Senior Headman Mr Gabriel Kwautima, announced his resignation from the post yesterday, saying he wanted to join South West Africa's new transitional government. Mr Kwautima, who has held the post for the past 17 years, was speaking at the opening of the Legislative Assembly at Mwenshipandeka, in Owambo. He said he would like to join the transitional government but could not do so while a member of the assembly. He gave no indication of what political party he would join. The vice-chairman of the Owambo Legislative Assembly, Senior Headman Mr Wilpard Shitaatala, had also resigned for health reasons. The Owambo Legislative Assembly's session is the first of a series by second-tier governments in SWA which are meeting to discuss draft budgets for the present financial year. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 24 Jul 85 p 12]

FARMERS' DEBT--WINDHOEK--The total debt of SWA farmers had increased by about 900 percent since 1960, from R23 million to nearly R230 million, the SWABC reported in Windhoek yesterday, quoting bankers and government officials. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Aug 85 p 4]

CSO: 3400/809

28 August 1985

NIGERIA

COUNTERTRADE VIEWED AS THREAT TO LOCAL MANUFACTURERS

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 8 Jul 85 p 23

[Text] THE counter-trade agreements involving Nigeria and some other countries of the world are said to be threatening the 40 manufacturers of auto-components in the country, members of the Automobile Local Content Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (ALCMAN).

ALCMAN members said that while many assembly plants like PAN, VON, FIAT and STEYR were assured of a return to maximum production through these deals, ALCAN which supply car components like chemicals, batteries, paints, accessories and other electrical components were not taken into consideration to produce proportional local inputs for the assembly plans through granting of import licence for some of their raw materials not available locally.

The President of the Association, Chief M.O. Akinrele, said in Lagos: "the net result is that assembly plants would revert to importing 100 per cent CKD in order to carry on production while ALCAN members plants will shut down for lack of materials."

He further said "ALCMAN therefore calls on government to review most urgently, the current approach, so that local content manufacturers can be fully included, to the extent of their supplies, in any and all arrangements to source additional CKD components for the assembly plants.

ALCMAN at present accounts for up to 20 per cent of some models of locally assembly vehicles.

The association had established rapport with the ministry of commerce and industries in particular and other relevant organs of government as well as all the automobile assembly plants.

Chief Akinrele said: "at the various meetings with teh ministry of Commerce and Industries and the assembly plants, ALCMAN has always stressed the need for proper co-ordination of activities and development in the industry."

He contended that the co-ordination was particularly necessary in the following areas:

--Rationalisation of the issue of import licences to both the assembly plants and local content manufacturers so that the quantities match and thereby ensure maximum output by both parties at minimum cost in foreign exchange to the country.

--Recognition and support for genuine local manufacturers.

--Provision to cover spare parts for after-sales servicing particularly where local production capacity exists.

--Proscription of component import where adequate local production capacity exists.

--Establishing appropriate and relevant local standards and specifications in order to promote local content.

--Striving for full commitment of the assembly plants to the idea of local content incorporation.

However, Chief Akinrele observed: "While there appears to be general agreement on all these areas, the harmonising of policies necessary to ensure rapid growth of industries is yet to be achieved."

CSO: 3400/830

NIGERIA

NEGATIVE VIEWS ON IMF AGREEMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS DETAILED

Ikeja NEWSWATCH in English 17 Jun 85 pp 14-15, 17

[Article by Dele Omotunde]

[Excerpt] Nigeria joined IMF in 1961 with a subscription quota of SDR 50 million. By virtue of this, said the finance minister, Nigeria is entitled to between N1.75 and N2.14 billion loan to be disbursed in three instalments over the three-year period of an External Fund Facility (EFF) programme which the Shagari government had earlier asked for in April 1983 and which has now become the "legacy" of the present administration. Soleye believes that "as a member of the IMF, it is normal for us to seek to use the facilities of the fund if we can reach mutually acceptable conditions for such access."


But the chips are already down. Without actually showing that the government was dancing to the IMF tune, some drastic measures have been taken to satisfy some of the adjustment programmes listed as preconditions for an IMF loan. Expenditure has been drastically checked both in the private and public sectors while workers have been retrenched in their thousands. Figures at the end of 1984 show that more than 300,000 have been kicked out of regular employment to reduce overhead costs. Wages for the lucky ones remain frozen. Basic Travelling Allowance (BTA) has been reduced from N500 to N100 and for those travelling outside Africa the N100 BTA has been "annulled" with a N100 tax on airline ticket. There are import restrictions while agriculture is being given a new impetus with a decentralisation of river basin authorities with each state (except Lagos) having its own authority.

All these steps have been taken to prove to IMF that Nigeria means business. But there are still tricky areas of negotiation. These are naira devaluation, withdrawal of petroleum subsidy and trade liberalization. Should Nigeria satisfy these conditions in order to take about N1.8 billion IMF loan to service her foreign debts which stood at N7.9 billion as at October, 1984? So far, the pressures arising from external indebtedness have led to the reservation of 44 percent of foreign earnings for debt servicing in 1985.

This, notwithstanding, many are in favour of not taking the loan. Tomori of the University of Lagos Department of Economics argues that a devaluation of the naira will make exports cheaper while the cost of importation will be dearer. A colleague of his who doesn't want his name in print is in support of devaluation of the "over-valued naira." According to him, Nigerians will be forced to look inwards for local alternatives if imported goods are dearer, thereby giving local manufacturers the impetus to use local raw materials to produce substitutes. "Smuggling will also be curtailed," he argues.

Michael Omolayole, president of the Nigerian Employers Consultative Association, does not support the taking of further loans to resuscitate the ailing economy but he has been quoted as expressing support for a gradual devaluation of the naira "to promote exports." What he is against is its "announcement effect"

Table 1
MOVEMENT OF NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL
RESERVES
(in billions)



Source: Federal Office of Statistics.

The reserve position reached its peak in 1980 and had worsened considerably since then. By 1983, it was clear, the ship of state was sinking as the reserve was barely enough to finance one month of imports.

which, according to him, "could produce devastating fallouts for the economy."

The fear with naira devaluation is that it is bound to make the present inflation rate rise beyond contemplation. At present, the official rate of inflation, according to the Central Bank, is 38 percent. But experience in terms of high market prices and cost of living in the country today puts the inflation rate at the unofficial figure of 300 percent.

The 60 percent devaluation as demanded by the IMF, in simple economics, means that the value of N1 in the market will be 40 kobo. While this may not necessarily be so, the reality now is that the naira has already lost its strength because of the prevailing inflation. The government has been cautious on the currency issue by adopting a discreet but gradual process of devaluation. In the fashion of a short gun equipped with a silencer, the naira has been shot into a reduction without much noise. The naira, which was much stronger than the US dollar, has gone down drastically of recent. There was a 10 percent reduction in January and a further 12.5 percent reduction in February as revealed on the stock exchange. The dollar and the naira are now almost at par. If things continue at the prevailing rate, the naira may fall below the dollar.

But can the government really afford a 60 percent devaluation? This is a poser that is still being examined by government and IMF negotiators who have already visited the country several times. It appears that the question now is that of method rather than acceptance. IMF wants a sudden readjustment while Nigeria prefers a sliding, gradual devaluation to a cataclysmic reduction which could ignite an explosive reaction from Nigerians. The

Buhari regime is known for its cautious move along the IMF path. So far, there has been no precipitate action lest it should hurt the feelings of the masses who have already made a lot of sacrifices.

But authoritative sources have it that the trade liberalisation precondition (one of the three main stumbling blocks) has been jettisoned by the IMF in favour of Nigeria's devaluation of the naira. The biggest problem remaining is the withdrawal of petroleum subsidy. But Tam David-West, Petroleum and Energy Minister, flew what could be considered a government kite the other day when he told journalists that government had no intention of removing petroleum subsidies without the approval of the people. "If subsidy is to be removed," he said, "such a decision must carry the people along." It was indeed a kite and editorials in many newspapers promptly reacted against such a move.


One of them, in the *Vanguard*, says it all: "If what the IMF must get is an abrogation of petroleum subsidy, then the government has to be alerted that the IMF is demanding not only a pound of flesh but the heart of its victim." Saying that petroleum is at the heart of the country's economy, the editorial went on to explain what it meant by that. "A kobo increase in petroleum will mean three kobo increase in public transport cost which will finally add up to ten kobo in general price level... Inflation has already pushed and pressed the sunken backs and stomachs of the consumers to the wall." The paper concluded by warning against subjecting "people's endurance to further strain."

The *Vanguard* argument falls in line with the general mood of the opponents of this IMF condition. The argument is that since food is not subsidised in the country, withdrawal of petroleum subsidy will force prices of food to escalate, for the food industry largely depends on the transportation industry which will naturally be the victim of such a withdrawal. To alert the nation to the inherent danger in withdrawing such a subsidy, fingers are pointed at Jamaica and Dominican Republic where price hikes on petrol have led to riots.

Tomori of Unilag explains how the removal of petroleum subsidy will affect the average man. "Since commodities will cost more, family maintenance will be a difficult task." But a government official has a different view. "Withdrawal of subsidy on petroleum products will fetch government more money," says the official, who wishes to remain unnamed,

"but the problem is what it will fetch the government in terms of people's reaction." Withdrawal of subsidy will bring in N1.4 billion in a year. At an estimated population of 94 million, each Nigerian will have made a contribution of 15 kobo. Omolayole is also in favour of withdrawal of the petroleum subsidy, "because it would only affect the heavily subsidised

Table II
NIGERIA: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(in million)



middle class." He made this remark during a television programme in March while suggesting ways of improving the economy in the absence of an IMF loan, which he said Nigeria doesn't need.

Many other prominent Nigerians have voiced their opinions against the taking of an IMF loan. However, the distinction must be made that most opponents of the IMF loan are not against the loan *per se* but against the "booby trap" conditions. In such a situation, this question arises: What are the ways out of the economic wilderness in which the country has found itself?

Ojetunji Aboyade, retired professor of economics and former vice-chancellor of the University of Ife, says that an internal arrangement can solve the debt problem. He says that "if we can correct the distortion on our policies and productive capacity we'll make it." He says that the revenue from 1.45 million barrels of oil per day is enough to see the country through without resorting to any extra borrowing. His argument is that Nigeria needs a real structural adjustment in economic policies, lifestyle and needs.

"What we can't produce, we can do without," is the professor's recipe for self-reliance.

Others like Tomori suggest that we can survive for the next four years if we continue to use 44 percent of our foreign earnings to service our debts yearly, provided that we produce more goods, manage our resources well and reduce wastage. Felix Adetunji, an official of the Allied Bank in Ibadan, says that Nigeria's economy is not so weak that it will collapse if we don't take the IMF loan. He believes that the country has enough resources to weather the storm and does not deserve to be saddled with the unacceptable IMF demands. But Yomi Omonubi, an economist with the Nigerian Fisheries Limited, Lagos, has a different view. He wants Nigeria to take the loan. According to him, the N1.8 billion loan is not even enough "but it will give our creditors confidence to honour our bills and allow us some credits until the economy improves."

There is no doubt that the country badly needs the loan, according to UACN chairman and managing director, E.A.O. Shonekan, who told *Newsweek* that the loan is very necessary, the only snag about it is the attached string. His suggestion is that we should look for countries which can lend us money for development and expansion of the economy.

Unfortunately, there is a feeling that there is a conspiracy of some sort by some western countries and credit agencies who can lend Nigeria money but who have refused to give out loans and credit facilities until the country has settled with the IMF. A stalled negotiation with the IMF, however, means that Nigeria cannot obtain a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) of about N224 million per annum for a period of three years. It also means a loss of confidence in Nigeria in the international capital market.

The alternatives being suggested include more counter-trade agreements with willing countries like Brazil, which has already signed a bilateral agreement with Nigeria to barter its finished products for Nigeria's petroleum to the value of about N650 million. Some alternatives are, however, as economically stimulating as they are suicidal, like the call to break rank with the OPEC and adopt an aggressive selling policy in order to make amends with the accruing revenues. Opinions differ on this strategy but the most striking of them is that it is an alternative

that could bommerang both economically and politically.

But the big question is whether Nigeria is eventually going to take the IMF loan or not. From all indications, the government is only biding its time to feel the pulse of the people before reaching a final decision on the loan. Economists agree on one point, at least. That the country requires a new loan to give the economy enough room to grow but the recurring question is: at what cost? This is the question that has also been agitating the minds of Nigerian leaders for the past 17 months.

There is no doubt that over-indulgence, recklessness and lack-lustre economic management over the years have built up a foreign debt that has now turned into an albatross around the nation's neck. Who is to come to the rescue — IMF or Nigeria itself? Government's eventual decision will answer that question.

CSO: 3400/830

NIGERIA

IDIAGBON, CHUNG DISCUSS MILITARY COOPERATION

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 21 Jul 85 p 4

[Article by Nkem Agetua]

[Text]

CHIEF of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Tunde Idiagbon has stressed the need for Nigeria and Korea to further strengthen the cordial relationship between them.

General Idiagbon made the call at the weekend when General Ho-Yong Chung, the visiting Chief of Staff of the Korean Army paid a courtesy call on him in his office at Dodan Barracks.

The Chief of Staff said the visit was a useful gesture that would provide an opportunity to exchange views on various matters of mutual interest.

He also pointed out that the meeting would contribute to cementing the friendship and co-operation existing between the two countries.

The chief of staff expressed the belief that alot could be achieved through the exchange of visits by both leaders.

He then advised that Nigeria and Korea should explore more areas of assistance and co-operation between the two armies.

General Idiagbon also told General Chung that the armed forces took over because the

country was drifting aimlessly and the economy was seriously mismanaged.

He said that the present administration had to launch the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) because of indiscipline and lack of dedication in the country.

General Chung in his reply, commended Nigerian leaders for their determination to rid the society of crime, corruption, and indiscipline.

He said that his country had passed through similar situation adding that the introduction of WAI was a right step in the right direction.

The Korean army leader, however observed that the masses should be properly educated on the tenets of WAI and if need be, the authority should not hesitate to back up the WAI campaign with some force of law.

General Chung told the chief of staff that his country was willing to co-operate with Nigeria in military matters.

He later presented a letter of invitation from his Prime Minister to Chief of Staff to visit Korea. He has since left Lagos for home.

NIGERIA

FMG TO IMPORT DRUGS FOR TEACHING, SPECIALIST HOSPITALS

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 16 Jul 85 p 32

[Text] **FEDERAL Military Government will import drugs worth 14 million Naira for all the teaching and specialist hospitals in the country during the current financial year.**

This is in addition to the drugs being procured by state governments within their financial capabilities.

The Minister of Health, Dr. Emmanuel Nsan, who disclosed this while addressing the annual meeting of the Nigerian chapter of West African College of Physicians in Benin at the weekend, regretted that it was unfortunate that the present administration came into power when the financial resources of the nation could not sustain the great burden of health care.

Dr. Nsan further disclosed that the Federal Military Government would soon publish a formula that would help control and monitor fake drugs in the country.

He said the formula to be known as the National Drug Formula and Essential Drug List "would also help to check the practice whereby useless drugs are being dumped on the third world countries."

The minister said the Federal Government was currently reviewing the training programme for medical profession.

He called on the West African College of Physicians to help fulfil the medical practitioners' need for the sub-region.

In his speech, the state acting Governor, Lieutenant Colonel John Inienger, called on the college to speed up research effort in appropriate medical technology, so as to gradually reduce our reliance on advanced nations of the world.

NIGERIA

ONDO GOVERNMENT AWARDS PHARMACEUTICAL CONTRACT

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 18 Jul 85 p 13

[Article by Folu Adelaja]

[Text]

THE Ondo State Government has awarded contracts worth 1.2 million Naira to about 36 companies for the supply of drugs to its health institutions.

Speaking during the signing of the contract agreement in Akure recently, the state health commissioner, Mr. Jacob Elekolusi urged the suppliers to keep to the term of the agreement.

He said the health care delivery system of the state has improved greatly since the military took over the reign of power.

Mr. Elekolusi added that the government and the suppliers should see each others as partners in progress with the sole aim of helping the masses.

He assured the drug suppliers that the government would do something on money owed them by the last civilian administration as soon as their files are cleared by the contracts review commission.

Responding, a spokesman for the contractors assured that they would honour all the terms of the agreement.

All the drugs ordered for are expected to be delivered within ten weeks.

CSO: 3400/824

NIGERIA

OIL PRICE SLUMP THREATENS COUNTERTRADE AGREEMENTS

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 15 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Ndu Ughamadu]

[Text] THE global oil market is characterised by a farrago of speculations and price fluctuations. Abilities of producer-countries, individually or under an organisation to manipulate these abrasive forces are contingent upon their market size.

Where these factors favour buyers, it usually results in under-selling of crude oil on the spot markets.

The consequence of this is drop in anticipated revenue especially to countries producing under a quota system.

Consequently, a dislocation in their expenditure and its devastating multiplier effects on the economy.

To guide against these unpleasant situations, some producer-countries do sign long term contractual agreements with oil companies for about a year on the minimum and maximum quantities of oil to be lifted irrespective of the brightness or glommy outlook of the market.

Accordingly, these companies or other buyers do resort to minimum quantity agreeable under the agreement in a situation where the spot market prices are falling because the spot prices to a large extent influence a country's official selling price.

Countries with large quantities left do resort to the spot market to dispose of them, in effect, bringing down further the sliding price on the sport market.

Of recent, spot market prices have been falling unprecedentedly, unfortunately below the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC's) official prices. This in turn, has affected Nigeria's crude oil prices on the spot market.

Though Nigeria does not trade officially on the spot market, nevertheless, as in other crude oil producer-countries, the spot prices are taken seriously especially now that it is showing a down-ward trend.

For example, as at June 19, 1985, the Bonny Light, Qua Ibo and Forcados blends were quoted between 26.40 and 26.50 dollars per barrel. These are below the official prices.

Some reasons are responsible for the sagging prices on the spot market in particular. The counter-trade deals of a few oil producing countries have meant that some countries or companies in the deals get, at times, more crude oil than they would have needed without the deals, consequently they resort to selling the surplus crudes at lower prices on the spot market.

The Business Times issue of July 8, 1985 reported: "Many OPEC countries, Nigeria, Ecuador, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Indonesia are either producing more than their quotas or are entering sales arrangements such as barter or counter trade which tend to make oil available at discount prices on the spot market."

Secondly, the activities of speculators in the past months had been that OPEC would disintegrate after the July 5 Vienna conference.

The effect of this, was that some countries or marketing companies started selling of crude at lower prices on the spot market, hoping that following the "disintegration" more oil would be pumped into the market.

This underscores the point that though OPEC's share of the world oil market size has fallen in recent years, it still plays some price balancing role in the market.

Thirdly, OPEC countries have been under producing, while non-OPEC producers have ceased this opportunity to be over producing indiscriminately and selling at reduced prices. While not ruling out the fact that some OPEC member-countries have been jumping their quota nevertheless, all these have contributed to glut and the sagging oil prices.

For example, countries like Egypt, Mexico, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Oman and Abudabi have been noted of recent to have increased production and cut their official selling prices.

A major implication of the sagging global crude oil prices, which causes have been identified above, is that it is threatening the countertrade deals between Nigeria and some foreign countries or companies.

For example, quoting authoritative oil news sources, the Business Times issue of July 1, 1985 in a front page story said that Nigeria's one billion naira countertrade deal with the French granding house (SCOA) was being threatened by "the softness of the oil market."

Under the April countertrade agreements, Elf, the French State oil company, is to lift 50,000 barrels of oil a day (mbd) for one year worth about 500 million dollars in return, Nigeria will import sundry goods worth 500 million dollars.

The contracts provide that Nigeria's crude is to be purchased at the official price "but with provisions to safeguard Elf from any loss in the transactions."

But after agreement on price and start-up of deliveries, the sudden decline in market has made the deal unworkable unless SCOA can get more acceptable terms in its current talks with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

The countertrade is believed to involve a marketing fee of six to seven per cent of the official price to be paid by SCOA to Elf depending on the crude type. It is now estimated that the spot prices have fallen by more than seven per cent below official levels, leaving Elf with a loss.

SCOA was reported to be unwilling to make it up and trying to convince NNPC "for more realistic price arrangements." The agreement signed in April call for deliveries by SCOA to Nigeria of automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, chemical and agricultural products.

Against this background, a weekly newspaper said: "The shortfall in demand and price slump during this period were envisaged by the federal authorities hence the suspension of further deals after the ones with the Brazilians, French, the Austrians and Italians."

In the agreement with Austria, Nigeria signed a 200 million dollar deal. This is for oil supplies from Nigeria and capital goods and raw materials from Austria. It was signed by Voest-Alpine intertrading, the specialised trading subsidiaries of the state owned steel engineering and electronics group.

However, the deal between Nigeria and Italy involves Fiat, Agip, Eni Group the Italian state oil corporation. The volume of crude involved is 40,000 barrels per day and the agreement covers supplies of vehicle CKD and spare parts to the National Trucks Manufacturers Assembly Plant, Kano. The supply of materials for the Escravos--Lagos gas pipeline being constructed by Saipem, may form part of the contract deal.

May be the "suspension order" is to enable the country work out a more dynamic modality that would take adequate care of "shocks" in the oil market and other loopholes.

I make bold to submit that a long term contractual agreement should be evolved without any provision to compensate for losses on either sides, since the agreement is based on official prices. This is because the oil market as pointed out earlier is unpredictable.

Under such a long term agreement, prices may rise tomorrow to the advantage of our partners while the sag today is to their disadvantage.

If really the suspension order was for the reason quoted above, my contention is that it should not last long. What if the market turns worse tomorrow?

While countertrade is good on its merit, however, this game of 'probabilities' we are doing now, calls for hastening of action by the Federal Government in processing and marketing of petroleum products or using such for countertrade. This is necessary because the market for these products is hardly slippery. The earlier we do this, the better for our economy.

CSO: 3400/828

NIGERIA

PRIVATE EXPORTATION OF GINGER, GROUNDNUTS, SHEANUTS BANNED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 19 Jul 85 pp 1, 3

[Article by Sani Haruna]

[Text]

EXPORTATION of ginger, groundnut and sheanut by all private exporters has been banned by the Federal Government, General Manager of the Nigerian Groundnut Board, Alhaji Umaru Baba Danfulani, said in Kano yesterday.

He said the board was now the only authorised body to export the commodities. He therefore warned illegal exporters of the commodities to stop it immediately.

The general manager expressed regret that despite the commodity board's Decree 29, all efforts by the board through security agents to curb smuggling had proved fruitless.

Alhaji Umaru gave the assurance that the board would not relent in its effort to check these "unpatrotic il-

legal exporters and smugglers" whose interest was only to get our money out.

The general manager said a high level discussion between the board and officials of the Customs and Excise on how to arrest the situation is now going on. He said all customs area administrators have been alerted by their directors to put more effort to check the smuggling of the commodities.

Alhaji Umaru expressed concern over smuggling activities on sheanut in Kwara and Niger states and warned that any individual or group of persons or companies found dealing illegally in any of the commodities under the NGB would be dealt with severely.

CSO: 3400/828

NIGERIA

BENEFITS OF COMPLETELY KNOCKED DOWN PARTS NOT REALIZED

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 10 Jul 85 p 9

[Text]

THE nation has not derived the anticipated benefits from the industrial policy based on the strategy of importing Completely Knocked Down parts, CKD.

The Minister of Finance, Dr. Onaolapo Soleye, stated this while declaring open a symposium on "Nigeria's industrial policy-retrospects and prospects", in Lagos.

He also noted with concern that the implementation of the import substitution policy had proved very costly for the country.

In addition, he pointed out, the over invoicing of CKD parts constituted a real drain of scarce foreign exchange while other inefficiencies of the system rendered prices very uncompetitive.

Dr. Soleye similarly lamented that the projected transfer of technology under the import substitution programme had also proved very unrealisable.

Consequently, he added., "we are still as dependent as ever on foreign personnel, machines and raw materials to keep the imported technology working".

The minister, however, thought that the country's industrial development could still materialise if steps were taken to correct the shortcomings of the past.

To this end, he suggested that every industrial establishment should be concerned with the development of its manpower resources.

Dr. Soleye called for closer collaboration between industrial establishments and such institutions as the Industrial Training Fund, ITF, and the Centre for Management Development to achieve that desirable end.

The minister thought that the problem of spare parts would be considerably reduced when the flat sheet steel plant eventually became operational, and the machine tools began to roll out small machine spare parts.

He similarly thought that with the successful execution of the petro chemical complexes the raw material problem of the plastic, detergent and related industries would be solved.

CSO: 3400/828

SENEGAL

OPPOSITION REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REPORTED

Dakar FAGARU in French Jul 85 pp 1-3

[Text] What is an effective counterattack to the price hikes, massive layoffs of workers, police violence and violations of political and trade union liberties? How can we put a stop to the policy of social misery and economic chaos that the government is trying to impose on the country by force? How can we stop this liberty-stifling process which each day assumes more of the exercise of power through Abdou Diouf's strong authoritarian tendencies?

The present sufferings of the people and the mortal dangers that hang over their democratic gains demand a duty and a responsibility: It is urgent and imperative for us to make the neocolonial government withdraw. And to assume them, there is but one alternative for the opposition: a united struggle. This is what the AJ/MRDN [Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy], the LD/MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party], the OST [Workers Socialist Organization], the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] and the UDP [expansion unknown] have just affirmed in adopting an opposition unity of action platform and in establishing a new Senegalese unity organization: the Senegalese Democratic Alliance (ADS). This is the result of a process which had at the outset rallied all of the opposition parties except the RND [Democratic National Rally] around the protest against the demolitions of the tenements on Grand Yoff and on Rufisque Road. It bears witness to a determination to assume the initiative that has never been lacking in the LD/MPT, constant as it is on the road to the search for unity.

Our position is known. To vanquish the neocolonial government, we have to isolate it; we must therefore rally and concretely engage in the struggle all the forces involved without exception. This open conception of united combat for the triumph of a democratic and national alternative figures clearly in our party's platform published in October 1981. It has already earned us diatribes from precisely those who today accuse us of contradiction because we apply it.

A Complex Process

The truth is that the road to unity is neither simple nor continuous. In fact the distribution of forces between the camps of progress and reaction is not assigned once and for all. In connection with this, changes of sides — and

recently to boot — have not been lacking in Senegal. The construction of unity is a complex and contradictory problem because it is created with advances and setbacks, accelerations and marking time, breaks and recoveries determined by the constant movement of social and political forces, themselves impelled by the developments of contradictions in the society.

Given such contradictions, which are hardly new since they have been expressed starting with the first issue of our chief organ FAGARU, our alliance tactics cannot but be flexible, dynamic and open. Which means that we will take advantage of any opportunity to seek alliances established for political agreements, for unity of action always moving in the direction of reinforcement of the Senegalese people's struggle against the neocolonial government. This was the case in the past with the COSU [Coordination of the United Senegalese Opposition], the CUAEA [expansion unknown], the CUAPO [expansion unknown], the CNPFC [expansion unknown] and specific multilateral and bilateral unity initiatives. Our party, the LD/MPT, has always been present and active. Today, we are here again with the establishment of the ADS.

Tasks of the Opposition

On the other hand, what we have refused, still and always will refuse to do is to alienate the interests and positions of the proletariat in alliances in which its side loses its autonomy of expression and struggle and/or follows in the wake of other forces. /The ADS respects and safeguards/ [in italics] the personality of each of its component forces and above all through its platform goes on record for its action in defense of all of our country's oppressed social strata and classes. From now on, our role, that of any proletarian party, is to work in it with all our forces to see to it that this new organization realizes the objectives it has set itself: to firmly oppose the deterioration of the living and working conditions of the working masses in the city and in rural areas, to defend and strengthen the liberties and rights of citizens, the people and their representative trade union and political organizations, to support the organizing and unification of the people's movement through the trade unions and other democratic organizations of the masses. These tasks are indeed ours. They are also those of all the forces of progress and democracy. They should be those of any political opposition that calls itself such. This is why, beyond the different convictions that each party may have as to the most effective forms of unity, the ADS can only be conceived of as a competitor, even less opposed to the interests of any party or group of parties of the democratic opposition.

A Rampart

On the contrary, it wants to and should be a contribution on the road to cooperation and solidarity in the fight of all the forces opposed to the neocolonial government. It wants to and should be a rampart against all the forces that are dead set on breaking the ranks of the political opposition and on thus dividing and weakening the camp of the people's democratic forces and on isolating the revolutionary forces. It is indeed in this way that they are today trying to paralyze any consistent struggle against the neocolonial government

in order to provide the latter with the means for applying its program of social misery and national ruin, one imposed on it by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In choosing a united response to their tasks and responsibilities of the moment, the parties the ADS is composed of have therefore decided to without delay launch the counterattack that must be made against present-day and future attacks on the Senegalese people by the government. And if the planned unity of action is indeed realized in all these areas in which the future of our country is at stake, we are convinced that a broad, united, dynamic process will thus be set in motion that will at last permit the Senegalese opposition to offer a credible democratic and national alternative.

The stakes demand that all our forces be mobilized in it: the activists, of course, but also and especially our country's popular masses. This is the condition for the hopes that have been raised's becoming a reality.

11,466

CSO: 3419/478

SOUTH AFRICA

BOTHA-BUTHELEZI RELATIONSHIP SEEN TO WORSEN

Pretoria DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 24 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] At a time when deliberation over the political future of Blacks is a matter of preference, it looks as if relationships between the government and KwaZulu are taking a turn for the worse.

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's reaction to the speech made by the state president on the occasion of the closing of the session last week was, to say the least, not quite conducive to good relations.

Since then, the legislative assembly in Ulundi decided to request that Mr Botha preferably postpone his planned visit--in the light of his "confusing" speech in parliament.

There was also the reproach that the state president's remarks laid "the foundation for greater disunity."

We cannot readily understand this reaction to Mr Botha's speech. Therefore we suspect that the chief and his legislative assembly have perhaps read more into the speech than what it quite simply said. It might also be that they wanted to read more into it.

Indeed, this was not the first time that Mr Botha has alienated the thinking of a unitary state. And although Mr Botha has expressed certain (albeit well-known) reservations concerning the extension of political rights, nowhere did he close any doors once and for all.

We feel that Captain Buthelezi's interpretation of the above-mentioned speech to mean that the state wants to make principal use of the army, the police and the security forces is emotional and exaggerated.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that tension is mounting where a while back, it was beginning to look as if the channels of communication between the government and KwaZulu would finally be opened up; and still more, that the mutual mistrust of the past was gradually disappearing.

The most recent troubles place a damper on those expectations.

8117
CSO: 3401/185

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

ANGLICAN SAYS ONLY WAY TO PEACE IS TO END SEGREGATION

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 3 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by Church Affairs Reporter: "SA Will Have Peace When Whites Cede Advantage"]

[Text] PIETERMARITZBURG--Sharing power in affairs which really matter in South Africa does not yet exist. There will be no peace in the country until a white skin offers no advantage over a colored skin. That is what Rev. Philip Russell, Archbishop of the Anglican Church, said here last night when he opened the church's synod.

He said the Anglican Church as such did not declare itself for the referendum of October 1983, but the appeal of various bishrops for a national convention is "a hydra-headed monster" which will not die, although President P.W. Botha says he will have nothing to do with it.

The present period will probably be known in history for its violence, of which southern africa is getting more than its share, as is evident from claims against the Defense Force's Koevoet unit and the police. South Africa has contributed its own plus factor to the current economic crisis: the costs of maintaining apartheid, such as the destruction of buildings for the sake of the Group Areas Act and the duplication of services. It is significant that no data are kept on the unemployment of Blacks.

Rev. Russell said it is, however, a danger to the church for it to busy itself with politics and violence to the extent it regards matters such as personal morality and man's handling of the environment as of less importance. That would be a tragic mistake. Christ was concerned about the whole man.

13084

CSO: 3401,263

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

ARCHBISHOP RUSSELL SPEAKS ON DIRECTION TAKEN BY CHURCH

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 29 Jul 85 p 5

[Text]

THE "English" churches in South Africa are adopting an increasingly aggressive political stance which is drawing criticism from their white parishioners. Bishop Desmond Tutu is often right where the action is. Television coverage of the funeral of four Cradock men showed a cleric armed with a kerrie, and others marching ahead of the Soviet Union flag. The Anglican Synod directed the leader of the Church of the Province of South Africa, the Most Reverend Philip Russell, to discuss its concern about the country with State President P W Botha.

What is the church doing, where is it going, does it have the answers? Our correspondent spoke to Archbishop Philip Russell . . .

ARCHBISHOP Philip Russell finds justification for the Anglican Church's political activities in a letter from St Paul to the Corinthians.

He opens a well-thumbed Bible and reads: "All things are of God, who reconciled Himself to us through Christ and gave unto us a ministry of reconciliation."

In short: "The church is an agent of reconciliation."

If this means "politics", he says, then it means it. "Christ was incarnate. He was made of flesh. We have an international religion and it has to involve itself in

the economic, political, social and cultural circles in which it finds itself."

Convention

In his opinion, its main task is to get people to talk.

"I don't think it is the church's job to encourage people to get together. That is why, at synod after synod, we have been urging a national convention.

"How it would get set up and what would be involved are more than I can say now.

"But we want people to be prepared to meet, to listen, to concede points to each other and

to say: "This is the bare absolute minimum which I cannot compromise at all."

"We can share the gift God has given us together and build up the country in those circumstances."

He concedes that our apartheid-riven society makes talk across the colour line difficult for most. But he expects the average parishioner and his local church to make some effort by "inviting people from other parts of the Christian church to meet, to try to learn from each other."

"Many people think the Gospel is for one's own personal salvation. They don't understand Jesus' most basic command, that you will love God and your neighbour."

"They will find themselves cut off in a little rut with a vertical relationship with God, and without a horizontal relationship with their fellow man."

The practical way of achieving this "means belonging fully, boots and all, to the local congregation."

"It means time for prayer and Bible study. It means time to read what the Christian faith is really doing and saying in our age. It certainly involved talking to people of other races and trying to share with them a vision of what God is saying for this land."

The average white

Christian, he suggests, could begin by doing a little homework on his black opposite number by reading the reports of such organisations as the Black Sash, the Athlone Advice Office, and the Institute of Race Relations.

Ungodly

"This would open up to most whites an area which is totally closed to them."

He dismisses the idea that the church is somehow in the same political league as the ungodly, an impression that may have been created by pictures of the Cradock funeral, in which ministers were framed by the Soviet flag.

"How many people know what takes place at a funeral? Most of them are used to a little shuffling affair at a crematorium. With thousands of people from different facets and aspects, there were many at the funeral who were doubtless communists. Many of them were members of the ANC, the UDF, members of everything...

"The church is doing God's work, and if other people choose to stick around then that's just too bad."

Complaints

Archbishop Russell says the church's direc-

tion will always be criticised by some Christians. If the church were to complete a 180 degree turn it would draw flak from those members at the other end of the political spectrum.

White Anglicans make up only 20 percent of the church but provide more than 80 percent of its funds. A steady stream of complaints about the church's direction has been received from white parishioners.

Even so, Archbishop Russell does not believe "there is going to be any great fall-off numbers. Most of the people who write me letters are peripheral members."

He is also under pressure from black Anglicans who believe "the church is (politically) slow and dodderly, not really with it, and who want us to play a more aggressive role."

It is debatable whether the church will be able to bridge white and black political aspirations.

"The real problem is ignorance. Ignorance of how the other half lives, what it hopes, or how it wants to exist."

The difficult question he believes, is "how to accommodate black aspirations. I certainly think there will be a curtailment of privilege, but if the price of keeping white privilege is black suffering then I

have no hesitation in saying what I believe God wants."

He has written to President P W Botha, as directed by the synod, and asked for a meeting. If it comes off, he will be joined by delegates from the Roman Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational, and Lutheran churches.

"We want to talk to him about disturbances, about people who live in townships, about the lot of black people."

Pessimist

He says he has no idea if President Botha is really aware of these. "Any person is very much dependent upon information given by his juniors. I hope we would include in our delegation people who are church leaders living in the actual (township) situation."

His view of the future: "Politically, I am a pessimist, but because I am a Christian spiritually I am an optimist. I don't know how I match those two. If I didn't believe in a God of love and order, then I think the logical end is a suicide's grave."

"How is one going to mould the various forces? I don't know. Maybe the most the Christian church can do is to offer its services as an intermediary, a reconciler."

SOUTH AFRICA

HSRC REPORT RECOMMENDS MORE COMMUNICATION WITH BLACKS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 4 Jul 85 p 10

[Editorial: "That Which Speaks to the Soul"]

[Text] One of the disconcerting findings in the HSRC [Human Sciences Research Council] report on intergroup relations is that Afrikaans-speaking Whites and Blacks are not only the least willing to have contact with each other, but that the stereotypes which they have of each other are also the most negative.

Although Whites have lived for centuries in the same country as their black neighbors and come into touch with each other in practical living, in general they do not really communicate with each other, often live their lives right past each other and do not always understand each other. The lack of dialogue and understanding cannot only be attributed to the black man's political frustrations and impatience and the exploitation of these by certain elements. An important factor is the indifferent attitude of other population groups toward the black man. Among other things, this is evident from an unwillingness to learn to speak the black man's language and to get to know more about him as a person.

The HSRC recommends that students at school should be exposed to the history, cultural background, as well as at least a third language of another culture group. Of course the preference would have to be given to the dominant language spoken in a particular region. In Capeland, for example, it ought to be Xhosa.

Earlier this year, Prof Samuel Ngcongwane, head of the Department of African Languages at the University of Zululand, said that if someone from another population group speaks to him in Zulu, "then he speaks to my soul." This is a truth which Afrikaners themselves know well, but to their disgrace often forget when it comes to Blacks. Without speaking his language, it is difficult to get through to the black man and his culture. Political formulas alone are not enough for the country's problems. There must also be talking, especially in the language which "talks to the soul."

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

WEST GERMAN NEWSPAPER ON POLITICIANS' ATTITUDES TOWARD RSA

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 5 Jul 85 p 10

[Article from Sapa: "West German Newspaper: Politicians Should Not Misuse SA"]

[Text] BONN--A well-known nationwide West German newspaper yesterday said that acting properly toward the South African government is the most difficult task now facing West German politicians.

In a front-page article, the independent FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FAZ) made an appeal to politicians not to just use South Africa for the sake of popularity among their voters. The FAZ noted the constitutional reforms in South Africa which gave Coloreds and Indians representation in the parliament, and quoted assurances by the South African government that urban Blacks will receive a form of franchise.

Chessboard

"In other words, the old dispensation, which resulted in limiting the rights of Blacks to their homelands, is practically dead," according to the article. The newspaper said some politicians "use South Africa as a chessboard" in their constituencies. Such politicians "perform the worst possible service" to the cause which they claim they have at heart. This is true of politicians in both America and Europe, and especially German politicians, the article said.

The FAZ said there is a need "not for cheap polemics, but for 'constructive engagement' vis-a-vis the South African government." "The South African government should indeed be kept aware of the West's desire to see a just society for all South Africans, but that message must be conveyed without making use of either the carrot or the stick."

13084

CSO: 3401/263

SOUTH AFRICA

PRESTIGIOUS FRG COMMENTATOR PESSIMISTIC ON PEACE RESTORATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Jul 85 p 2

[Commentary by Andreas Razumovsky: "Peace in South Africa Still Long Way Off—Where Are the 'Responsible Leaders'"]

[Text] Pretoria, 28 July—At the end of the first week of South Africa's state of emergency, the restoration of peace is nowhere in sight. According to official reports, the police had arrested 1,086 persons by Sunday—471 of them in the industrial areas of eastern Cape Province. Naturally enough, there are good many people who are suspicious of these figures, believing that the number is far greater. According to normally well informed sources, the security forces set an initial goal of 3,000 internal enemies to be arrested. According to the police, the vehemence of the socio-politically motivated unrest has clearly abated. The measures were said to have begun "to take."

In the country's interior opinion is divided. There are some who view the imposition of the state of emergency a week ago as one more of the government's "monumental stupidities;" but others look upon the drastic police actions as "an operation necessary to restore the health of the society."

Commerce, banking and industry are among the hardest hit. The past week brought a decline in the stock market such as has not occurred within living memory. Stock market commentators refer to it as a "blood bath." They say that 11 billion rand or some \$5.5 billion were lost at the Johannesburg stock exchange during the past few days. The whites of Johannesburg are "taking shelter inside their castles" and "digging in," nervously "awaiting the reaction to the state of emergency." The gun shops in Johannesburg certainly have no reason to complain about a lack of business at this time. People are hurrying to buy whatever they can, in addition to the weapons they already own. "Even prior to this," one knowledgeable observer said, "Johannesburg was known as the city with the most handguns per family in the world."

The authorities are not only faced with terrorism and open violence in the course of their "mopping-up operations" but also by rapidly growing, Mafia-style bands of criminals who, according to reports, have extorted large sums of money from individual black shop owners in the townships. Under the pretext of "political motivation," the property of these small craftsmen and traders was mercilessly burned down, if they refused to make "contributions to the good cause" or to pay for "protection." Terrorists who "actually are politically motivated" have also resorted to more violence, according to reports. Several children and teenagers who refused to join the countrywide, successful school boycott instituted by the "progressive forces" were summarily shot before their parents' houses during the past few days.

Such incidents may explain, if not excuse the draconic police measures employed in the 36 (of a total of 293) administrative districts of South Africa affected by the state of emergency. This time, the goal is not to arrest the leaders and organizers of the diverse Christian-Leninist opposition groups but to "root [these groups] out altogether." One newspaper reported last Sunday that prisoners are being subjected to far harsher conditions than ever before, based on provisions thus far considered somewhat barbaric which are part of the "terrorist" and "internal security" laws.

The United Democratic Front (UDF) is one of the organizations that is "to be struck at the roots" this time. An anguished black father [of children of school age] wrote an anguished, anonymous letter to the editor in which he asked why the UDF leaders and "patrons" had never spoken out in their incessant sermons and other declarations against the insanity of the school boycott which is causing irreparable harm to the children of the black townships. There may well be several answers to his question. One of them is that the churchmen who do not so much act as apostles of peace but as instigators and agitators are unwilling to risk losing their constituency. There are those, looking at the present, somewhat chaotic situation at some remove, who feel that this is just one stage along the thorny path which will lead South Africa toward reform. One would hope that in their hour of need the desperate, disoriented black citizens lacking civil rights will be blessed with politically astute leaders with the proper credentials who will participate in defusing and pacifying the situation within the context of a negotiated reform process rather than on the basis of bloody confrontation and terrorism.

The only ones who have denied that there are such "responsible leaders" among the black elites have been the fanatical racists belonging to the many powerful right wing extremist groups here. During this past week of misery it has been above all two men of very different origins and persuasion who, it is devoutly to be hoped, have earned the title of "responsible leader." One of them is Nobel Peace Prize laureate Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg Desmond Tutu, who managed to prevent the lynching and burning of an alleged "spy of the system" and showing great personal

courage in so doing. Almost alone among his peers, Tutu has openly and expressly come out against the madness of violence. The other is the royal Zulu prince and chief minister Buthelezi on the strength of whose authority the Zulu people has remained aloof to the unrestrained violence of the past few weeks and months. In Natal in Zululand law and order reigns. Perhaps too soon and perhaps too much, both men are now expected to assume the role of honest broker and mediator. Tutu, at any rate, intends to meet with President Botha next week who said "without loss of face" that he was willing to sit down and talk with his archenemy. It is also said that a plan will soon be implemented to release Nelson Mandela, the former head of the African National Congress, who has been imprisoned for 25 years and to let him take part in the long overdue negotiations which are to lead to "a South Africa in which all people can live as free and equal citizens." But on this particular Sunday, this type of talk sounded like a pipe dream more than anything else.

9478

CSO: 3420/78

SOUTH AFRICA

PROMOTERS OF ALL-WHITE COMMUNITY INCREASING

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 16

[Article: "Oranjewerkers Grow by 500"]

[Text] Over the past year the membership of the Union of Oranjewerkers ["Orangeworkers"] increased by more than 500.

This was announced by the general secretary of the union, Mr Hendrik Verwoerd, when he recently delivered the annual report at the Oranjewerkers annual meeting. The annual meeting, which was attended by 250 people, was held at Morgenzon this year.

Mr Verwoerd said that all possible energy must be focused on Morgenzon this year. There must be development, Oranjewerkers must move there and local inhabitants must be recruited and encouraged to cooperate.

"We must not be satisfied with our progress over the past 5 years," Mr Verwoerd said. "There is too much at stake. A political and social structure is busy taking shape in the RSA [Republic of South Africa] that leaves little room for the ideal of a free, white Afrikaner state. The only thing that can still make that ideal realizable is for us to make progress rapidly in occupying at least some parts of the country physically with Afrikaners and fellow Whites within a few years so that we constitute the sole inhabitants and the labor force there. We shall each have to do our utmost to that end," Mr Verwoerd said.

In a message, the chairman of the Oranjewerkers, Professor Hercules Booysen, said that the union's purpose is not primarily to protect and develop Morgenzon economically. The Oranjewerkers' main aim is not to rescue this first nucleus from black domination. It is not a matter of Morgenzon, but of the Afrikaner. "Our aims are broader than any one growth point. We are exerting ourselves to regain and maintain our political self-determination," Professor Booysen declared. At the meeting a former first lady, Mrs Betsie Verwoerd, presented a gift to the union. It consisted of a number of books by the late Dr G.D. Scholtz, an honorary president of the union when he was alive, and a statue by the sculptor Pienaar du Toit. Both the books and the sculpture were gifts to the late Dr H.F. Verwoerd.

SOUTH AFRICA

SABC PARTISANSHIP CRITICIZED

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 1

[Article: "Partisanship of SABC Put on the Rack"]

[Text] The SABC's [South African Broadcasting Corporation] partisanship for the NP [National Party] has once again been publicly scorned. The Institute for Communication Research of the HSRC [Human Sciences Research Council] has found that during the 1983 referendum campaign SABC dedicated 44 percent of its broadcasting time to a "yes" vote on the referendum. By way of contrast, only 27 percent of its time was devoted to those who favored a "no" vote.

The findings of this investigation are similar to those undertaken by Unisa's [University of South Africa] Communication Science Department after the general elections of 1981. At that time it was revealed that the SABC devoted 2,668 seconds in television and radio broadcasts to the NP, as opposed to a mere 453 seconds to the HNP [Herstigste Nasionale Party].

The RGN says that there is a strong indication that television programs influenced the voting behavior of Whites in the 1983 referendum. Television news and news focus programs broadcast before the referendum could have influenced voters in the reasons why they voted "yes" or "no." According to the HSRC, it engaged in three investigations on television and the 1983 referendum at the same time. The findings of the researchers have just been released by the HSRC.

The researchers found a big correspondence between the topics to which the most television time was dedicated and the topics which, according to the registered voters, exercised the greatest influence on their voting behavior. The correlations were interpreted as strong indications that, insofar as the referendum was concerned, television fulfilled a so-called agenda-setting function. By agenda-setting function is meant a subtle, but far-reaching influence which television can have on the viewer. The influence lies in the fact that television could make certain topics appear more important for the referendum than other topics.

The RGN said that "the research consisted of an analysis of contents of television news and news focus programs done in the 6 weeks before the referendum." "The analysis of the television programs revealed that the messages asking for a "yes" vote took up 44 percent of television time, while 27 percent of the broadcasting time was devoted to messages asking for a "no" vote and 28 percent to providing information such as news coverage on the events of the referendum.

"The Government was the source to which the most television time, about 25 percent, was dedicated. Spokesmen for the opposition parties also got a total of about 25 percent of the broadcasting time. Other sources which were stressed relatively heavily in the programs were SABC personnel and newspaper representatives. The pronouncements of the news sources had a noteworthy agenda-setting function in the case of the viewers' voting behavior only in a collective manner and not in any individual case."

According to the HSRC, constitutional change was the topic most emphasized in the television programs, especially in messages favoring a "yes" vote. The topic of sharing power occurred the second most often and was stressed in most of the messages favoring a "no" vote. The HSRC stated that "the findings of the investigation indicate that even in the case of people with moderate exposure to the programs television could have had an agenda-setting function as far as their voting behavior in the referendum is concerned."

The investigation was undertaken by Drs. Pieter Conradie, Daan van Vuuren and Mrs. Maretha de Waal. They are all connected with the Institute for Communication Research.

The HSRC's findings show strong parallels with findings of Unisa's Department of Communication Science after the 1981 general elections. It was found that in the election campaign SABC devoted only 453 seconds to the HNP as opposed to 2,668 seconds to the NP. Nine meetings of the HNP were reported on, compared with 30 of the NP. The report especially characterized some news broadcasts on radio as "extremely partisan" toward the NP.

13084

CSO: 3401/260

SOUTH AFRICA

NATIONAL PARTY ENVISIONS MULTIRACIAL FEDERATION

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 1

[Article: "Plan to Entrench Power Sharing"]

[Text] Prominent and influential members of the National Party [NP] formed the nucleus of a brain trust that has formulated a plan for a multiracial federation on behalf of Assocom [the Association of Chambers of Commerce].

The committee that implemented the decision included well-known NP ideologists such as Professor Gerrit Olivier, Dr Ben Vosloo and Professor Jan Lombard. Later Professor Johan du Pisani was involved in the report, which he wrote together with Professor Lombard.

The new constitution will turn South Africa into a full-scale federation of races in which the white chamber will be deprived of its chief rights. Political observers take the new plan seriously and regard it as the Botha regime's answer to the threatened takeover of power by the rightist opposition. In a federation the government will be able to ignore the Afrikaners entirely and continue to govern with the direct support of speakers of other languages and of non-Whites.

The brain trust's report resulted from a decision by the Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom) to submit a detailed memorandum to the cabinet on the political future of the urban Blacks.

Attention is drawn in political circles to the correspondence between the Assocom plan and the Buthelezi report on the future of Natal and Kwazulu, which proposes a federation of its own. A prior report by Professor Jan Lombard on the federal alternative was the main political input in the Buthelezi report.

Political observers say that the Assocom plan is in no sense original. The government has long shown great interest in the Buthelezi report, as emphasized by the meetings of Mr P.W. Botha with the Zulu leader and Dr Gerrit Viljoen's view that the Buthelezi plan can constitute "the basis for negotiations."

The Assocom report proceeds from the assumption that the present system of government is, in the final analysis, unlawful inasmuch as Blacks are not citizens of the Republic of South Africa with the same legal rights and the same economic opportunities as Whites--a thesis hitherto advanced only by ultraleftist academics such as Professor Lawrence Schlemmer and Professor Johan Dugard.

On the grounds of the report's underlying philosophical view of the state as a social contract, the local authorities are seen as mere extensions of the market economy in which everyone must be able to participate on an equal footing under common law without any discrimination. This principle is then carried over to the state with the addition that the central government must be a contract between the separate authorities that will form the proposed federation. The brain trust contrasts this federal system to the current unitary state system in which a population group that controls the sole, central source of authority of the state can rule the entire country.

The constitutive elements of the federation can be organized in terms of regions, languages, religions and other criteria. The practical consequence will be that no political party will be in a position to rule the entire country unless it controls every participating authority. This, say the writers of the report, is the federal alternative to the present unitary structure.

At the same time, however, each participating authority, or lower-level authority, will play a role in the public life of each other group in the federation through the medium of the central federal authority. It will be a permanent sharing of power in which the sovereignty of the state itself will be shared.

The constitution of the federation will be maintained by a high court along the lines of the American "Supreme Court," to which each participating authority will name its judges. The high court will judge the validity of a federal law not only with respect to the legal procedures followed but also by the standard of the "legality" of the state itself, resting on the complete equality of all its citizens.

In practice it will mean that the president's council will be transformed into a court of appointed judges who must each be acceptable to Mr P.W. Botha as well as to Messrs Rajbansi, Hendrickse and Buthelezi.

The federation need not necessarily have a territorial basis, says the report. It can also be a federation of races, or a combination of the two.

Minority rights can apparently be protected by making the appointment of all government officials, or senior government officials such as high-ranking officers of the police or the Army, subject to the right of veto by any participating group authority.

A possibility mentioned by the writers is that the participating authorities may be broadly constituted like the present central government, with a chamber for Whites, Coloreds, Indians, and Blacks, where applicable. The black national states would then have only a black chamber.

The Assocom point of view is expressed in the proposal that the principle of free enterprise and the limiting of the right of the state to interfere in the economy be placed under the protection of the federal high court and entrenched in the federal institution.

12906

CSO: 3401/259

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

PAPER VIEWS U.S. REACTION TO CABINDA, GABORONE

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 19 Jun 85 p 14

[Article by Dawie: "Goal of US Strategy Is Perhaps To Forestall Democrats' Plans"]

[Text] It looks very much as if America, hardly unknown for its obliging actions, is already trying to get the first hold once again, this time in order to steal the march on its own opposition and to "settle accounts" with South Africa.

The sharp and rather dramatic American reaction to South Africa's involvement in Cabinda and its attack on ANC targets in Gaborone is strangely surprising, coming from a nation that has a great deal to answer for on that score itself.

For South Africans it will be advisable not to overreact to the performance the Americans are staging. We must rather try to understand what they are up to at the moment.

A Different Yardstick

To begin with, they do not want to be out of step with the international community, and this means harsh denunciation of South Africa. We have indeed already learned that we are being measured by a different yardstick, even when it concerns the application of practices that are otherwise acceptable as wholly justified.

Understandable

But there is a much more important consideration: South Africa these days plays such a large role in the domestic politics of the United States that the internal repercussions from any move cannot be lost sight of, even for a moment.

The accusation that South African soldiers tried to attack an Angolan oilfield in which American interests were represented has aroused certain American sentiments. This is understandable. What is not so understandable is that one of the most recent American statements dealing with this "attack" spoke of it as a fait accompli.

Was this contention a slip? And if the munition depot was really "attacked," why was this not so stated earlier? Or was everything exaggerated so as to be able to make a better case against South Africa?

Be that as it may, one must accept the American government's claims that it has to defend American interests in sharp language. This is the sort of argument that always sells well on the domestic scene.

More Cunning

But perhaps these are only the surface reasons. Perhaps there is a deeper and more cunning strategy whereby the Reagan administration is trying to repel the fierce attack by its Democratic opposition over the entire South African question.

It is quite possible that we are dealing here with a forestalling action. The "significant" behavior for which the American ambassador to South Africa was recalled for discussions, the explicit statements and the coolness in relations may all be aimed at eroding the ground from under the feet of the Democrats.

The Reagan administration may perhaps have a stronger case against sanctions and divestiture if it can say that, when necessary, it does not hesitate to talk and act hard. Precisely how far the American government will go we shall still have to see, but at this stage of the game, one can hardly believe that it is prepared to give praise to everything that has already been accomplished here.

Bathwater

Whether it is wise to assume such an ambivalent attitude concerning the principle of preventive action, which enjoys international recognition, is one question. Whether it will be worth all the trouble if the American policy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa is to fall victim, is another and far more important question.

In certain circles in South Africa, there is a concern, and it is hardly any secret, that the relations between South Africa and America must surely run aground. There are those who will rejoice the day that this happens, but it is not the authorities that are concerned that South Africa must get all possible support in order to carry it off before then.

Whatever else is about to happen, the United States will not throw out the Angola and Gaborone bathwater. Here so much that is good and beautiful has already been achieved, that there is certainly a case to be made for American involvement, to see to it that the processes be continued at any cost.

Sterile

The alternative speaks for itself. We saw this in the sterile Carter period, when a policy of confrontation was followed, and nothing positive came to exist out of the mutual concerns of the two countries.

We believe that there is no reason to suspect that the Reagan administration wants to return to that course of action.

8117

CSO: 3401/249

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

FORCEFUL REACTION AGAINST TERRORISM CONSIDERED LEGAL

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 18 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] The present relations between the US and South Africa, which are characterized as somewhat cool at times, have had a long history, and this must be taken into account if an evaluation of what is now happening is to be made.

The Reagan administration, soon after its assumption of the reins of government, began to implement the policy of "constructive engagement." It was born out of the realization that the quest for confrontation that marked the Carter era was completely counterproductive. The new policy was one of "quiet diplomacy," with peace and stability in Southern Africa as its major objectives, as well as the repulsion of communism, which is trying to gain an advantage from the unstable situation in the subcontinent.

That policy had certain repercussions, it is true, but it had far more important successes, of which even recently American spokesmen were still talking. For example, they claimed credit for the Nkomati Treaty and the Lusaka Agreement, among other things, in order to lessen enmities in Angola. Whether America had a right to so much commendation is highly debatable, but at least it will be admitted that it has helped to create a climate that has facilitated such developments.

At the same time, risks for the Reagan administration have multiplied after the humiliating beating the Democratic Party took in the 1984 elections. The opposition tried to win back lost ground by identifying the Reagan administration with South Africa. Since then an emotional sanction campaign has been raging in the US.

In this conjuncture one must add that the Reagan administration could not succeed with a plan that has set up as one of its chief goals the withdrawal from Angola of those minions of the Kremlin, the Cubans.

Such factors, together with the traditional American impatience to see speedy results, has probably contributed to the rather demonstrative American reaction to the Cabinda episode and the Gaborone attack.

Still, knowledgeable Americans ought to be convinced that South Africa took such actions because of legal security reasons. Just as they are convinced

that their own country is taking and will continue to take reprisal measures-- such as were again threatened recently in the case of the aircraft hijacked in the Near East.

It certainly seems that it would be neither proper nor wise of America to take steps to abandon the policy of "constructive engagement"; a policy which, according to leading policy-makers, has already been most successful. It really makes little sense to turn back to its alternative: the proven failure of Jimmy Carter's efforts.

8117

CSO: 3401/249

SOUTH AFRICA

INCREASING NERVOUSNESS OF WHITES SEEN

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 29 Jul 85 p 2

[Text]

NERVOUS white South Africans are digging themselves in for a siege in response to the state of emergency.

While mass detentions have increased by 200 a day, reaching 1 166 at midday yesterday, and the country's international relations have plummeted to an all-time low, whites have been buying guns and getting videos on how to cope with fires and bombs.

Some are also putting their homes on sale, and there are indications that panic-selling might force the property market lower near the riot-torn areas.

Since the declaration, staff at the Department of Foreign Affairs have been working overtime to cope with bewildering barrage of repercussions. France unexpectedly recalled its ambassador, the United Nations voted for voluntary sanctions against South Africa, and the United States demanded the immediate ending of the emergency and the establishment of a just society.

Although the Government did not expect this

dive in diplomatic relations, a foreign affairs expert has said it should have predicted it.

The declaration of a state of emergency, he believes, is just the latest in a series of gaffes, among them the Cabinda and Gaborone, incursions and the De Jonge affair, in which the Government has "grossly miscalculated the consequences of its actions."

A dramatic shift in the tactics of the security forces has become apparent with the release of details of some of the hundred detained.

In the past, the police have tended to round up the leaders of opposition groups. This time, the authorities appear to be trying to break the backs of organisations like the United Democratic Front. They have arrested grassroots supporters of civic organisations. But only a handful of leaders.

A number of Uitenhage residents who helped with investigations into the Langa shooting earlier this year have also been detained.

The UDF has borne the burnt of the deten-

tions. Some observers regard this as evidence that the Government considers the UDF to be a more significant opposition force than Azapo.

The detainees are being held under emergency regulations gazetted this week.

The regulations are considered to be harsher than the once-notorious Section 6 of the Terrorism Act and the present Section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

A study of the emergency regulations shows that detainees can be assigned to 30 days in solitary confinement merely for whistling or singing in custody.

As a further punishment in solitary confinement,

they can be put on a drastically reduced diet.

Even the occasional visit and gift of food and reading material may be denied them.

Meanwhile, the gruesome murders of four Eastern Cape community leaders and UDF members, one of them Matthew Goniwe, have not been solved.

In a bizarre development during the wave of arrests, Duyiswa Fazi of Port Elizabeth returned home to find her husband Henry, vice-president of the UDF in the Eastern Cape, had been arrested and a dusty, cobweb-covered scarecrow had been left in his bed.

CSO: 3400/857

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

SCHOOL ATTENDANCE INDICATES DECLINING WHITE POPULATION

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 3

[Article: "Decrease of 27,000 in 7 Years: Shocking Figures for White Children in Lower Schools"]

[Text] The number of white children in grades I and II (sub A and B) has declined by more than 27,000 over the past 7 years. The number of white students in the two standards reached a high of 185,033 in 1978, but since then the number has declined systematically to the 157,125 students who are in these standards this year.

The most recent educational statistics just issued by the Central Statistical Service indicate that the low white population growth figure has a far-reaching influence on the number of white children attending school. How extensive that effect is appears from the fact that the number of children attending school in grades I and II this year is more or less the same as in 1967--18 years ago. In that year there were 58,162 children in the two standards in question. The difference is, however, that student numbers in 1967 were part of an upward trend in the number of white students. That tendency continued until 1978, when a high point was reached with 185,023 children in grades I and II.

The same tendency is noticeable in the total number of white children in lower schools. In 1983, for example, there were 612,225 white children in lower school, but the number decreased by 29,178 to the 583,047 in primary schools this year.

The ever-lower number of children in lower school is the direct result of the decline in the White's natural rate of increase. In 1973 white births reached a high of 90,501. From 1974 on, however, the number of births began to fall dramatically, and last year, for example, only 76,900 white children were born.

The falling white birth rate has a progressive influence on the number of children at school. The turning point in white births, for example, first had its effect on the number of students in grades I and II in 1979. As far as standard I is concerned, the number of students began to decline in 1980. In 1981 the number of students began to decline in standard II, and so forth. Within a few years the total number of white children in school will begin to decline, and thereafter the number of university students.

The original rise and subsequent sharp decline in white children in grades I and II is strikingly shown by the complete figures since 1967. 1967: 158,162; 1968: 158,562; 1969: 161,807; 1970: 163,075; 1971: 163,811; 1972: 162,559; 1973: 163,878; 1974: 167,080; 1975: 172,222; 1976: 178,961; 1977: 182,873; 1978: 185,023; 1979: 181,717; 1980: 174,918; 1981: 172,424; 1982: 170,117; 1983: 166,253; 1984: 161,902; 1985: 157,125.

Last year South Africa's white population grew by 1.23 percent, but that includes a net gain of 22,236 immigrants. The white's natural growth rate was a skimpy 0.78 percent.

The decline in white births stands in direct relation to the economic conditions. The first great depression in the 1930's and the one between 1974 and 1977 had a negative influence on the white birth rate. The expectation is that the present depression, which is viewed by some economists as worse than that of the thirties, will have a far-reaching effect on white births.

Factors of importance here are the heavy tax burden that Whites must bear, the equalizing of white and non-white wages, and the fact that many young white married couples cannot afford to buy a house.

/*The number of Black students in primary schools increased from 3,262,424 last year to 3,401,351 this year./ [in italics]

12906
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28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

WHITE UNIVERSITIES BECOME INCREASINGLY MULTIRACIAL

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 2

[Article: "Almost 8 Percent Non-White Students: White Universities Increasingly Multiracial"]

[Text] White universities in South Africa are becoming more and more multiracial. According to the most recent figures released by the Central Statistical Service in Pretoria, 7.75 percent of the students studying at white universities this year are non-White.

The number of non-White students on white campuses has increased drastically since 1977. In that year only 2,176 non-White students studied at white universities. That figure represented 2.79 percent of the total number of students. Three years later, in 1980, the percentage had climbed to 4.5 percent. In 1982 the figure was 5.99 percent, and in 1983 non-white students made up 6.3 percent of the total student body at white universities. In the following year the number of non-white students increased exceptionally rapidly: in that year (1984) there were 6,863 (7.3 percent) non-White students on white campuses. This year the figure is 7,647, or 7.5 percent of the total student body--the highest ever.

Of the 7,674 non-white students 2,219 are colored, 2,402 are indians and 1,453 are Blacks.

The information sheet of the Department of External Affairs, SA PANORAMA, reported last year that the number of black students at white universities was increasing by between 10 and 20 percent annually. Since 1979 the number of blacks at the University of the Witwatersrand, for example, has increased by 10 percent annually to a total of 1,605 in 1982. In 1983 the number rose by 19 percent over the 1982 level to almost 2,000. Between 1981 and 1984 the number of black students at Rhodes University increased by 60 percent. Last year 21 percent of the freshmen were non-white.

The same tendency is observable at the University of Cape Town. Last year there were already about 1,800 non-white students at that university. Non-white students then made up 15 percent of the total student body.

Earlier this year the same publication reported that most white university campuses are now mixed, including those of the University of Stellenbosch and the Rand Afrikaans University. Sixty colored students studied at the RAU last year.

The direct cause of the increase in non-Whites at white universities was the abolition of the permit system. Under that system university authorities had to apply for a permit for each non-white student admitted. The government wished to replace that system with a system whereby a quota of non-white students would be conceded to each university. The government did not proceed with that system, however, because the heads of English language universities above all objected strongly. They alleged that a quota system would affect their "academic freedom."

The then minister of national education, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, said that the government had not proceeded with the quota system because he had come to the conclusion after discussions with the heads of the English universities that the composition of their student bodies "will not basically change."

12906
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SOUTH AFRICA

CHANGES AHEAD FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 7 Aug 85 p 15

[Article by Brian Stuart]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — Legislation approved by Parliament in the past two years will bring about fundamental changes in the structure of local government in South Africa, says Mr Gene Louw, the Administrator of the Cape.

Speaking yesterday at the annual congress of the Association of Divisional Councils of the Cape, Mr Louw warned that many divisional council functions would be taken over by the new regional services councils.

In the meantime the provinces were preparing to implement the recommendations of the Venter Commission in regard to transferring certain provincial powers to local authorities.

New planning struc-

tures were being created at semi-regional and local level and, in the Cape, sub-committees had been set up to deal with specific aspects of planning, such as infrastructure, agriculture and social activities.

Mr Louw said that in the new dispensation local authorities would be given greater responsibility over nature and environmental conservation.

Natural resources were limited and the growing human population was threatening plant and animal life at an alarming rate. In this respect, local authorities would become the guardians of the future.

Mr Louw said further details about changes in local government were being awaited from the central government.

CSO: 3400/858

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC SEEN AS PLOTTING TO BECOME GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 20 Jun 85 p 14

[Article by Political Commentator Piet Muller: "ANC Thrives on South Africa's Diplomatic Mistakes"]

[Text] "What are South Africa's diplomatic objectives in the long run?"

This question was put to me this evening by a visiting U. S. diplomat and I could not provide him with an answer. People have become so accustomed to seeing South Africa go from one crisis to another that actually there is little impetus left for determining future objectives.

"Crisis management" has become the vogue expression of our times and South Africa has acquired the reputation of being able to manage crises in a cool-headed and effective manner. However, crisis management can never take the place of long term objectives.

Last year when State President P. W. Botha was addressing the golden jubilee dinner of the Institute for International Relations in Johannesburg he slightly lifted the veil over what South Africa desires.

Normal

He belabored South Africa's point of view about the Nkomati Treaty saying: "There can be no progress towards economic prosperity in an atmosphere of discord and interference in each other's internal affairs."

"What South Africa wants is normal international relations based on mutual respect of each other's sovereignty."

It is therefore clear that the Nkomati Treaty is an important milestone on the road of a comprehensive South African approach in Africa.

Two clear objectives for South Africa's diplomacy could therefore be:

To put an end to its isolation in the Western community;

To assume its rightful place in Africa's community of countries by striving for normal relations with the countries of southern Africa.

But in practice South Africa is steering both communities to clash with its own. Western countries often complain that South Africa's actions appear to be calculated to express disdain for the international community.

A Desire

They point out incidents like the operation which South Africa planned in Cabinda at a time when the U. S. debate on disinvestment had reached a high point. They also point to the raid on Gabrone which coincided with the debate in the Security Council.

Naturally, in the course of the years South Africa learned that the rhetoric of debate over South Africa cannot easily be turned into deeds. Something like a general boycott is little more than a desire.

But is South Africa perhaps losing sight of the cumulative effect of the campaign against this country? The danger that South Africa as well as the West will someday realize with shock that an invisible threshold has been crossed which makes it impossible for both groups to turn back?

As for its neighbors, South Africa is a military and economic giant with whom it is better to cooperate than to oppose. But they accuse it of being an uncomfortable neighbor who does not always act in a manner that inspires esteem as well as trust.

Coldly Correct

According to them an example of this is the raid into Botswana.

For years the relations between Botswana and South Africa have been coldly correct. As one of Africa's few democracies, Botswana feels that it is morally justified in criticizing its neighbor's policy. In the UN it is often one of the first speakers against South Africa, but as yet it has never accused it of misrepresentation and of the most extreme distortions, as Lesotho often does.

Despite the open tension existing between South Africa and Lesotho, in the recent past South Africa has digressed from the military model and has driven the ANC from the country simply by closing the border between the two countries. However in Botswana it took military action at a time when that country was evidently thinking that normal relations were being maintained.

Undermine

In order to evaluate South Africa's diplomatic offensive it must be compared with that of its greatest opponent, the ANC.

The ANC is openly striving, with patient diplomatic action throughout the international community, to be recognized as the only true representative of South Africa's people and as an alternative government in exile.

It is trying to achieve these objectives by systematically undermining the legitimacy of the South African government and to isolate this country in all the areas of the international community.

It began with sports boycotts, then cultural and scientific boycotts and thereafter an international arms boycott. Now the international community is openly talking about economic boycotts. Each time the challenge is so gradual that South Africa is never enticed to take timely countermeasures.

Yet the ANC is not in a position to take the initiative. For its success it is dependent on international reaction to South Africa's actions. Already a kind of symbiosis has become evident between South Africa and the ANC: the ANC commits acts of terrorism which induce South Africa to retaliate. This leads to international condemnation which the ANC uses for enhancing its picture as an alternative government for South Africa.

Will the ANC be nearly as effective if this cycle is broken and South Africa concentrates more on its long term goals?

7964

CSO: 3401/187

SOUTH AFRICA

CONTACT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA FOUNDATION, ANC SUSPECTED

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 5

[Article: "Big Money Interests Ever Closer to ANC: Sorour Admits Contact"]

[Text] While the ANC is holding a 10-day congress in Tanzania, contact that the South Africa Foundation has had with the ANC in London has aroused considerable interest.

The South Africa Foundation is regarded as a mouthpiece for influential South African businessmen.

The London contact was confirmed to DIE AFRIKANER by Professor Fred du Plessis, the chairman of Sanlam, who is president of the South Africa Foundation.

In Johannesburg, Mr J. de L. Sorour, the director-general of the South Africa Foundation, denied news report that a representative of the foundation was involved in discussions with the ANC. There was only "informal contact" on various occasions, Mr Sorour says.

Professor du Plessis added to this that the contact consisted merely of "little listening conversations" to hear what the ANC had to say. It had no political significance.

According to informed sources there were only four important points on the agenda at the ANC congress:

-- How to restore the ANC's support in the black townships, where the American-controlled United Democratic Front [UDF] has stolen the ANC's thunder and occupies the leading position of authority.

-- whether the violent arm of the ANC, the Umkhonto we Sizwe, will be allowed to extend its bomb attacks to white civilian targets.

-- whether the ANC should expand its contact with the South Africa Foundation, a liaison body for South Africa's big capital interests, to a full-scale discussion.

-- How the organization should react to the expected offer to negotiate from Mr P.W. Botha, the state president.

Sources say that the ANC believes that it must now actively compete with the UDF for the support of the Blacks in the black townships. The ANC must outbid the UDF and prepare now for big political strikes. They also anticipate that the ANC, which faces a continuing money shortage, will use blackmail in its talks with the South Africa Foundation, which speaks for the big South African capital interests, and will ask for donations in exchange for promises of moderation on the strike front.

The leader of the restless "Young Turks" in the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, evidently believes that the extension of urban terrorism to white civilian targets will not frighten the South African government away from negotiations, but will rather hasten them. The more terrorism expands, the more Mr Botha has to gain from negotiations, the argument goes.

The sources further report that there is also a faction in the ANC that takes the position that there should be closer cooperation with the Black National Forum, with its 200 affiliations, which advocates a strongly socialistic policy. The National Forum would be the body to obtain constitutional concessions from the government. The ANC's influence in the National Forum must be markedly increased to realize this goal, it is said.

In the meantime the foundation's quarterly, SOUTH AFRICA INTERNATIONAL, is taking an increasingly pro-ANC and even pro-SWAPO stance. In its most recent issue the communist "Kliptown Manifesto" of 1955, which under the title "Freedom Charter" is today still accepted by the ANC as its fundamental program, is published in full. Until recently this document was officially prohibited reading material, which could only be quoted with the permission of the minister of justice.

In its previous issue the periodical published a long SWAPO propaganda piece that was so one-sided that the director-in-chief of the office of the administrator-general in Windhoek, Mr Sean Cleary, was obliged to refute it in a lengthy letter.

In political circles the question is asked whether the foundation is really only busy "conversing" with the terrorist organization on behalf of the big business interests, and whether it is breaking ground for the minister of external affairs, Mr Pik Botha, who is known for his preference for a "political solution" to the terrorist problem.

If Mr Botha is innocent and South Africa's big capital interests have now gone over to their own policy of rapprochement with the external enemy, the South Africa Foundation will increasingly be implicated as an extreme left pressure group, it is thought. The position of the financial interests represented in the South Africa Foundation will also necessarily be affected.

12906
CSO: 3401/258

SOUTH AFRICA

FREE MARKET POLICY OF RESERVE BANK CRITICIZED

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 16

[Article: "De Kock Leads SA into Further Depression"]

[Text] The Reserve Bank's free market policy impoverishes South Africa, hinders growth and is unsuccessful in combatting inflation.

That is the reaction of independent economists to the final report of the De Kock commission on financial policy.

Mr Adam Jacob, a Volkskas economist, disputes the claim of the Reserve Bank's Dr Gerhard de Kock that the inflation of the past quarter century was chiefly owing to an excessive money supply.

In Mr Jacobs' opinion there were many other factors. Productivity, which also influences inflation, declined continually. One of the reasons was the continuing struggle to narrow the "wage gap" between white and non-white wages and salaries without the non-Whites' productivity equalling that of the Whites.

Neither was increasing productivity simply a task for the private entrepreneur, Mr Jacobs said. The examples of Japan and Germany show how inflation can be kept in check by government action to improve cost control in industry. It has nothing to do with "socialism"--neither of those two countries has a socialist government. A degree of central planning is unavoidable to keep growth and inflation in a reasonable balance, Mr Jacobs says. To simply abandon the country's economy to the financial free market distorts the fundamental forces in the economy.

Injudicious government spending also contributed to inflation, says Mr Jacobs. The government devoted large sums to the decentralization of industries. But at the same time the state

rendered those expenditures unproductive through regulations that had precisely the effect of encouraging centralization, such as by railway tariffs and 90 percent subsidies for non-white housing in the cities.

Professor C. Rogers of Unisa [University of South Africa] says that no clear principle or even continuous line of policy can be detected in the Reserve Bank's actions. Today they follow one economic theory, tomorrow another.

Military economists say that the high military expenditures could have been considerably lower if South Africa had completed its intervention in Angola 10 years ago and put UNITA in power. The withdrawal from Angola and the long-drawn-out war that South Africa pursued thereafter were the cause of much government overspending for which the financial authorities had no solution.

The war on the Angolan border distorted the economy and an appropriate low-profile war economy should have been adopted. Even with a war of low intensity a free-market financial policy is entirely unsuitable and betrays a lack of expertise on the part of the financial authorities.

Dr Johan Cloete, Barclays' chief economist, says that it is the generally recognized duty of a central bank to intervene in the economy to promote financial stability. If Dr De Kock now advocates entirely free money markets, he actually makes the Reserve Bank superfluous.

Dr Cloete is greatly concerned about the abolition of exchange control for residents of the country, which will further encourage the flight of capital. South Africa is an underdeveloped country and needs much capital if it is to realize its potential. South African companies have already made substantial investments overseas. If it were only short-term capital, this might be accepted under certain circumstances, but that is not always the case. Many were long-term investments, and that without the rate of return in South Africa being so much lower. The opposite was the case.

There must therefore be other reasons. Diversification to reduce political risk is one. High taxes are another, as are the low level of productivity and continuing inflation.

The flight of capital that is allowed by the Reserve Bank also adversely affects the balance of payments. It has a limiting effect on the whole economy and deepens the depression, Dr Cloete says. He finds it incomprehensible that the chairman of the Reserve Bank should misread the country's capital needs to such an extent.

It is said that if capital can move freely in and out of the country, overseas financiers will be more inclined to invest money in South Africa. The partial deregulation 2 years ago made no difference at all, however, and there is no reason to assume that full deregulation will in fact make a difference. In any case private investment had for decades now played a very small role in South Africa's capital supply.

Most foreign investment was in the form of loans that are assumed by the state or by semi-governmental establishments, Dr Cloete says. To allow South African capital that could finance the state or semi-governmental corporation to flow abroad in these circumstances is not a sound policy, Dr Cloete says.

12906

CS0: 3401/257

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTS ON PARTIAL ABOLITION OF APARTHEID ON TRAINS

Racial Clashes Not Likely

Pretoria DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 12

[Editorial: "Open Trains"]

[Text] The road leading away from racial discrimination sometimes looks more difficult than it actually is.

The barriers are: prejudice, generally accepted concepts, wrong dispositions and (what is rather important) the observance of minority interests.

All these problems are now surfacing again with the decision by South African Transportation Services to open up its passenger services to all national groups, but with the reservation that certain exclusive facilities will still be kept for the Whites own use.

We agree that the change was necessary. In practice this can succeed in instances where this is essentially going to be a continuation of the present model of travel, with the difference that from now on other options will be open for the non-Whites. To be sure this has been practiced for sometime in some of our biggest cities' transportation systems and this has seldom caused racial frictions.

Originally there was also concern when sport, visits to hotels and attendance in other public facilities began to follow the same road. However, this practice proved that these fears were unfounded.

Two objections can be raised with respect to this most recent decision:

It is possible that there will arise a disorderly meeting of races at stations and in dining rooms. However, on the other hand, efficient facilities and fine service should discount this possibility. It is indeed improbable that the commuters who have up until now used the less expensive services, will now suddenly rush over to first class services in great numbers.

The non-White commuters will be complaining about the "protection" of Whites due to the fact that they can still travel in exclusive sections.

Actually this is a kind of protection; but this is not without valid considerations. This has to do with a group who, especially in the suburban commuter services, is far in the minority and therefore can be totally shoved aside.

Hendrickse Reacts Negatively

Pretoria BEELD In Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 20

[Editorial: "On the Right Track"]

[Text] The South African Transportation Service says that it expects no problems with the new regulation allowing passengers to travel in mixed or separate facilities. How will it be then if everyone will have the choice of how one wants to travel? This is no forced integration and at the same time no absolute segregation.

Choice ... this is the key word in so many aspects of the new dispensation. Local option is a concept with context. Travel by train, and immediately exercise the option on the spot as to whether you want to sit with your countrymen or separately.

Even Dr Andries Treurnicht apparently sees it this way, because it looks as if he is not finding fault with the new regulation.

Perhaps the train is symbolic of how the new South Africa is going to look. There will be a growing communality. Only the future will reveal to us how this process will develop. However, there will also be compartments of separation, because groups and people will want to exclude certain affairs for their own use and control.

In light of this it is regrettable that Rev Alan Hendrickse reacted rather negatively on the new regulation of the Transportation Service. After all this is a plan for managing with less regulation and allowing people to decide for themselves and at once what they want to do. There is now a free choice of spouse, a free choice of membership in public or private political parties ... Rev Hendrickse can at least see how the thinking is consistently developing.

Therefore, as far as we are concerned the decision about the trains is, let us say, right on track.

7964
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SOUTH AFRICA

RESEARCH ON BLACK COMMUTERS' DAILY TIME BUDGET

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Zenaide Vendeiro]

[Text]

A study on the effects of long journeys on black commuters in Pretoria found that some spent more time travelling to and from work than they did sleeping.

The study, which was made public at the Annual Transportation Convention in Pretoria today, compared the daily travel times and activities of 50 short-distance (10 to 15 km) and 50 long-distance (60 to 130 km) male commuters in the Pretoria area.

The short-distance commuters came from Mamelodi and the long-distance commuters from the developing areas of rural Bophuthatswana and kwaNdebele.

Researchers divided the commuters' daily time budget into four main activities: sleeping, working, commuting and free time.

The average time spent sleeping for the 100 commuters was exactly eight hours. Mamelodi commuters slept considerably longer (8 hrs 38 min) while long-distance commuters had less time for sleep (7 hrs 23 min), especially in Bophuthatswana's north-east where they averaged only 6 hrs 49 mins.

The average work day of the commuters (excluding the lunch break) was 7 hrs 54 mins.

The average time spent travelling each day varied from 1 hr 57 mins in Mamelodi to 7 hrs 19 mins in Bophuthatswana's north-east. This last group spent more time commuting than they did sleeping.

The commuters' free time ranged from 1 hr 55mins in Bophuthatswana's north-east to 5 hrs 30 mins in Mamelodi.

The study found the distance travelled to work each day had an overwhelming impact on the commuters' daily pattern of activities. Even sleep was affected.

Commuters from kwaNdebele, for example, did not participate in any personal business or social activities and only a minority undertook any personal activities or household chores.

The Bophuthatswana's north-east commuters were even worse off. Apart from a few commuters who listened to the radio, nobody had time for any personal business, social activities, personal activities or household chores. Most of these commuters simply came home in the evening, relaxed until supper was served, ate and went straight to bed.

The National Institute of Transport and Road Research researchers who conducted the study, Ms Liz Fourie and Ms Nesta Morris, concluded that "the very limited home life of most of the long-distance group suggests the implications of current and future residential and industrial location patterns should be carefully examined to avoid a further deterioration of the quality of life of commuters."

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMUTERS FORCED TO WALK

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 26 Jul 85 p 2

[Text]

LARGE numbers of commuters in Atteridgeville had to walk up to 3 kilometres to their respective homes on Wednesday night when Putco bus drivers refused to enter into the township for fear that they may be attacked and robbed.

And yesterday scores of commuters were left stranded and late for work when a buffer on a goods train broke between Mitchell Street and Cor-Del Fos Station near Pretoria West in the morning.

Commuters from work were requested to alight at the Kalafong

Hospital near the township's main entrance on the first day of a planned three day class boycott in the area. Putco bus drivers who had recently been attacked and robbed of cash feared similar attacks when they requested commuters to alight at the hospital. Scores of people walked up to 3 km to their respective homes in "Black Rock".

Large numbers of people were left stranded when trains were delayed in Atteridgeville yesterday morning. A spokesman for the South African Transport Services said

the delay was caused by a buffer on a goods train that broke near the Cor-Del Fos Station in the early hours of the morning.

"We cancelled six trains for an average of 73 minutes. But we did manage to arrange ten buses to ferry commuters to work," the spokesman said.

Scores of people rushed to the taxis while others were seen walking along Church Street on their way to work. The SATS spokesman at the time of going to Press, said everything was now back to normal.

CSO: 3400/858

SOUTH AFRICA

LACK OF UNITY AMONG PFP EXTREMISTS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 14

[Article by Dawie: "Can a Skyscraper Rise Up from Such a Cracked Foundation?"]

[Text] One of the most interesting features of South African politics is that far leftists as well as far rightists consist of a conglomeration of groups. There is, as it were, a diversity of extremist movements to pick and choose from.

Even such a party as the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) does not form a solid unit. It experiences tensions now and then, especially as regards national security, and then the ruptures reveal the various elements out of which it is made.

Taking Sides

Time and again, its more conservative wing clashes with the radicals, and although the fur flies, the differences are covered up each time, in order to keep up an appearance of unity. This is the foundation on which the leader, Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, now wants to build the largest political party in the history of South Africa.

Dr Slabbert maintains that he is not going to choose sides with either of the two groups in his party, and that he tries to approach every quarrel pragmatically. Still, most often he favors the radicals; and there are plenty of instances of this favoritism.

Dr Slabbert did not hesitate, for example, to take very strong action against Mr Japie Basson, but when Mr Graham McIntosh set off his stinkbomb several weeks ago, Dr Slabbert handled him with extreme forbearance. But if a member of the right wing had overstepped the bounds in this way, he would have been called to account directly.

Progressive Caucus

Recently there was the quarrel over Mr Horace van Rensburg's acceptance of an invitation from the government to go abroad to speak against disinvestment. It was said that Mr Colin Eglin had raised an objection in the Progressive caucus, at which Dr Slabbert had distributed a statement, after a leak made to the progressive newspapers by the leftists to the effect that Mr Van Rensburg had been hauled over the coals in the caucus.

Mr Eglin was evidently successful in thus assuring for himself a leading role within the left wing after he was given the boot at that time as leader-in-chief. His name crops up now and then, as it has again recently in Dr Slabbert's curious handling of the army's current activities.

Thinking It Over

After the Gaborone incident, Dr Slabbert issued a cautious statement. Something peculiar happened then, to make Mr Eglin no longer content with his leader's words, but rather desirous of jumping in with his own critical explanation.

Dr Slabbert thought it over for about ten days and then fell in with Mr Eglin. If anything can be inferred from his statement, it is that he rejects the army's assurances about Gaborone and joins forces with the chorus of denouncing voices.

We see here the course that he will follow in his struggles to recruit thousands of new members from among the groups of other colors and to make the PFP "the largest party." What would Mr Harry Schwarz and his kindred spirits think about that little tune?

The discord within the PFP has a historical origin. The old Progressive Party gained a great impetus when the reformers, under the leadership of Mr Schwarz of the United Party (VP) broke away, and the Progressive Reformist Party came into existence in 1975. After the disintegration of the VP, one more small group followed, and then the present PFP was founded, shortly before the election of 1977.

Not Accepted

It is these different mergers that lie at the root of the party's problems. The original Progressives (Mrs Helen Suzman, Mr Eglin, Mr Ray Swart and company) have never accepted the new recruits as true progressives.

There was, and indeed there still is, a difference in philosophical approaches, with the result that the lines of demarcation have not healed over, but are rather more sharply drawn as the years go by. Vehement disputes behind the scenes have sometimes bubbled up to the surface at conventions and in party group meetings.

Not Forgotten

One of the most surprising consequences of all this is that the leftists have succeeded in wresting the moderates out of the most influential positions in the party. A number of reformists such as Messrs Schwarz, Van Rensburg, Dave Dal-ling, Flippie Myburgh, Alf Widman and Reuben Sive have in the course of time been maneuvered out of the party's federal executive committee and other posts as well.

Don't think, however, that these grievances have been forgotten and buried. But such is the foundation on which Dr Slabbert now wants to build his skyscraper. We shall watch the construction with great interest.

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CSO: 3401/246

SOUTH AFRICA

SUICIDE SQUADS BADLY TRAINED, POSSIBLY VICTIMS OF RIGGED AMMUNITION

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 28 Jun 85 p 7

[Text] Military experts yesterday called the "suicide squads" of the ANC, which have been operating recently in West and East Cape Provinces and in the Transvaal, poorly trained "cannon fodder" of the ANC.

Furthermore, the terrorists--as was evident from the latest hand grenade fiasco in the East Rand--had possibly been furnished either with defective hand grenades or inadvertently with grenades that had rigged mechanisms.

A third possibility, that the security forces had "doctored up" the hand grenades after locating them and had then put them back in their hiding place, may also be regarded as an "entirely possible supposition," said a military expert.

"This would not be the first time that such a thing has been done. The Selous Scouts in what was then Rhodesia used this method with great success."

Seven Men

Eight alleged terrorists were killed the day before yesterday in the East Rand by means of hand grenades and a limpet mine. The right hands of six of the eight corpses had been ripped off.

According to reports, the police are investigating complaints of sabotage and terrorism lodged against seven men who are under police custody in a Johannesburg hospital, after what were termed extremely well-coordinated terrorist attacks. Houses of policemen and a substation at Evkom were attacked.

The ironic possibility also exists that the grenades that cost the lives of the alleged terrorists were never meant to be thrown, but that they were rigged. Such a grenade explodes immediately after the pin is pulled out.

Another possibility, according to one authority, is that the grenades and the limpet mine were part of a defective shipment, or that they had become defective because of water in the receptacles. The latter is "less likely."

"It sometimes happens that the pin is pulled out and that the grenade explodes after its normal delay time without the hammer-bolt that activates it first being released. This often happens when the hammer-bolt is set very close to the edge.

Large Part

The final possibility is that the poor training played a large part in the disaster. "It could be that the person did not grip the hammer-bolt tightly enough after he pulled out the pin."

The term "suicide squads" is probably related to the crash courses that ANC members undergo on weekends in Botswana, said Prof Mike Hough, head of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria.

They are intended to increase the numbers of attacks associated with the present riot situation and events such as the ANC conference, as well as the thirtieth commemoration of the freedom manifesto, held the day before yesterday."

Members of such poorly trained groups are "evidently ready to run higher risks. The chances that they may be caught or shot or that they will blow themselves up are much higher." They cannot be compared to the suicide squads of the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Shiites who highjacked Trans-World's Boeing aircraft.

"All revolutionary organizations are basically prepared to suffer high numbers of casualties." Although 90 percent of the fighters are wiped out, according to the doctrine of Mao Tse-Tung, the remaining 10 percent will be victorious.

"Every year SWAPO loses about a thousand of its personnel, and yet its numbers remain constant at about 8 000."

The intensified assault of the ANC has a direct connection with the new dispensation, says Prof Hough. "As soon as you begin to grant political rights to certain groups, the so-called freedom movement is compelled to look upon them as gun-fodder. Our goal is rather to encourage them to take part in the new system."

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CSO: 3401/246

SOUTH AFRICA

HENDRICKSE PRAISES ACTION BY POLICE

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 28 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Rev Allan Hendrickse, president of the ministerial council in the Council of Representatives, praised 159 colored policemen and women on the occasion of a graduation-day parade at the training college in Bishop Lavis, for their resistance to intimidation.

According to him there is now a campaign among the teachers and young people of the country, in which the latter are forced to take part in violence and bloodshed.

He criticized the English-language press in particular, because according to him it is trying to awaken fear in people, under the present climate of violence and terror.

As an example of this he cited headlines in the English-language press, claiming that Dr Allan Boesak, the president of the World Federation of Reformed Churches, had addressed an audience of 4 500 people on Monday evening at Uitenhage, concerning the freedom manifesto. According to Rev Hendrickse, there are only 1 000 seats in the hall in question.

Drill Exhibition

Rev Hendrickse was also full of praise for the 141 men and 18 women who were graduated at the colorful ceremony. He praised them because they had not bowed before the intimidation campaign which is now being carried on among the nation's young people.

Some 4 000 people attended the performances. Rev Hendrickse reviewed the parade. After his address there was a military parade, a drill exhibition and a calisthenics display.

The training college was founded in 1968 and has already had 32 graduation ceremonies. This is only the fourth time that women were among the graduates.

The top students are Constable C.P. Everton, 22, of Mitchell's Plain and Constable C.A. Constable, 19, of Queenstown.

The minimum requirement for admission is the Matric [examination]. There is currently a waiting list of about 200 for admission to the program.

SOUTH AFRICA

SAAF EXERCISE WILL BE HELD

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 7 Aug 85 p 9

[Text]

A COMBINED training exercise of fighter and bomber squadrons called Exercise Golden Eagle will be held from Thursday, August 8 to Monday August 12, chief of the SA Air Force, Lt Gen DJ Earp announced yesterday.

The aim of the exercise is to test the effectiveness of the command air control, air space control, logistical and communication systems in order to evaluate the preparedness of the SA Air Force.

To maintain flight safety, a Special Restricted Airspace (SRA) has been established and will maintain flight safety as well as co-ordinate military and civil air traffic in the western side of the Northern Transvaal.

The SRA will be surrounded by a boundary extending clockwise from a point where the Johannesburg CTA meets the western edge of airway A405.

It will extend westwards along the arc of the CTA boundary to where the extended arc meets

the Hartebeespoortdam/Rustenburg road and then westwards along the road via Rustenberg and Zeerust to Lobatse on the Botswana border.

From there, it will be northwards along the Botswana border to a point which meets the 29 degrees east meridian, then southwards along the meridian to Potgietersrust (PR) beacon and southwards along the western edge of airway A405 to the beginning where it meets the arc of the Johannesburg CTA.

The SRA has been proclaimed in terms of Act 79 of the Defence Act and is required for high intensity military exercises. All aircraft entering within this area are requested to establish radio contact.

Below flight level 200, control will be provided on frequency 120,2MHz. Above flight level 200, it will be on 126,7MHz.

The knowledge of all aircraft movements within the area is required to ensure the safety of civil aviation.

CSO: 3400/858

SOUTH AFRICA

SECURITY POLICE ACCUSED OF BEING IMPLICATED IN DIRTY-TRICKS TACTIC

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 1 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

MEMBERS of the security police were implicated in a "dirty tricks" campaign against Dr Allan Boesak, patron of the United Democratic Front and a leading churchman, the SA Media Council has ruled.

Dismissing a police complaint against *The Star*, the council said it had found that two senior security police colonels had admitted certain unnamed security policemen had distributed a pamphlet and tape recording alleging Boesak was having an affair with Di Scott, an official of the SA Council of Churches.

It also found the colonels had said that, if their admission were published, they would deny having made it.

The complaint was brought by the SA Police against *The Star* for reports it published earlier this year.

The council findings, published in Johannesburg yesterday, stated: "Certain members of the security police, whose identities are not clear from the evidence, were implicated in the distribution of the pamphlet and tape recording to *The Star* and possibly to other newspapers.

"Col (C S) Scholtz and Col (P L) Du Toit had, during their interview with Mr (Mike) Cohen and Miss (Chris) Steyn (both reporters) on January 9, admitted that the security police were involved in the distribution of the pamphlet and tape recording and said that if this admission were published they would deny it.

"Consequently, the complaint by the SAP to the Media Council against *The Star* must be rejected."

The seven-member council com-

plaints committee, chaired by Judge L de V van Winsen, found the investigation did not call for a ruling on the alleged extra-marital affair between Boesak and Scott.

The report in *The Star* on January 11, that gave rise to the complaint, was headlined: Police spies expose Boesak's love affair. Dirty tricks campaign against leading churchman.

The police had complained to the council that "the allegations in regard to the admissions of the two colonels of the security police, that they actively participated in a smear campaign against Boesak and Scott, are false, devoid of any truth and consequently the report is not an honest, accurate and objective report of the news events.

"Alternatively, the allegations were based on a deliberate, alternatively negligent, twisting or misrepresentation of the interview that was held between the two colonels and the reporters of *The Star*, mentioned in their report.

"Through publishing the aforementioned false, alternatively twisted, allegations or misrepresentations, *The Star* in an improper and unjustified manner tried to present evidence that the security police were involved in and/or accessory to, improper and reprehensible behaviour."

The council held that, as in the case of any civil or criminal hearing, the onus was on the complainant to prove its case.

The six who heard the complaint with the judge were public representatives: D Bloomberg, Gert Hugo and Professor S A Strauss; and

media members Harald Pakendorf, Tertius Myburgh and I Krause.

Hugo, in an addendum to the findings, said he could not accept security police information formed the source for the pamphlet, nor that the evidence justified the deduction that security police were involved in the distribution of the pamphlet and tape recording.

However, he said, he did not believe the police had proved their case and, "taking the source of the news report into account ... the interview with the colonels", the editor of *The Star* had acted reasonably in using the report.

Prof Strauss said that, while he agreed with the findings, reference to the security police involvement with the pamphlet and tape should be changed from "distribution" to "delivered".

He said that while the pamphlet and tape recording at first "lay" around it was only when *The Star* published the information about the alleged affair that the information was "disseminated".

In its findings the council remarked: "In passing it must be noted that it seems strange that, despite the slashing attack on the security police in the report of January 11, the security police saw fit, after a conference of group heads at head office in Pretoria, to let a simple denial suffice.

"No investigation into the validity of the allegations was launched by head office at the Johannesburg branch. From Col Scholtz's testimony it also is evident that nothing was done by the Johannesburg branch."

SOUTH AFRICA

CP, HNP ALTERNATE COOPERATION, COMPETITION

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 28 Jun 85 p 16

[Text] It is truly an amusing situation that has now come to exist in far-rightist politics. In the parliamentary by-elections in Vryburg and Springs, the Conservative Party (CP) and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) are fighting one another, while they plan to cooperate with each other in three other by-elections--which will probably all be held on the same day! Did you ever!

The most recent tug-of-war over seats between the two far-rightist parties came as no surprise. It is only a continuation of the numbers of bitter altercations that have taken place, however, since Dr Andries Treurnicht and his followers split away from the NP in 1982 and founded the CP.

At the root of the quarrels lies Dr Treurnicht's eagerness to swallow the HNP whole and become the sole standard-bearer of the far-rightists. In opposition, Mr Marais consistently and determinedly fought back, because he considered Dr Treurnicht and the CP as intruders on his battlefield.

For Mr Marais it has mainly been a losing battle thus far. Although from the outset he made one concession after the other to the CP, it got him nowhere. His initial demand that the HNP and the CP divide the seats up equally was rejected out of hand by the CP. Later, after the two parties had opposed one another in various by-elections, an agreement was reached that chiefly favored the CP.

But even that was not enough for Dr Treurnicht and his party. Earlier this year the CP unilaterally broke the election agreement with the HNP, in the case of Newton Park. Protests from the HNP concerning the "reprehensible indifference" and "betrayal" of the CP fell upon deaf ears.

Now the fat is once more in the fire because the CP sees no prospect of giving Vryburg to the HNP--a seat that the HNP has already repeatedly contested. Even the movement to have the two parties merge is secondary to the insatiable hunger of the CP for seats.

It is scant consolation to Mr Marais that the CP has offhandedly taken over large slices of HNP policy-making from him. In practice it helps him less in his struggle for existence.

The question may rightly be asked: What can the far-rightists have to offer the country if their own house is still dominated by internal jealousy and spitefulness?

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CSO: 3401/249

SOUTH AFRICA

PFP EXPECTING LARGE INCREASE IN MEMBERSHIP

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 22 Jun 85 p 10

[Article by Dawie: "Progressives' Great Haste Suspect: What Do they Have Up Their Sleeve?"]

[Text] The haste with which the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) is jumping in to recruit members from among the other population groups is suspect. Does it wish to boast of numbers, or what is really its intention with the plan, which is going to require millions of rands?

This party was born out of a political past in which liberalist elements incessantly played with public opinion in order to team up groups of other colors against the Whites in general and against the National Party (NP) in particular. Are there some among them who think that their hour of victory has now come?

Open Doors

Each party will have to consider very carefully the question of opening up [membership ranks], whether it wants to do this and how it is going to handle it under the present system of group representation. It is such a delicate matter that the congresses in any case cannot afford to overlook it.

The PFP leaves no doubt about the fact that it wants to throw wide open the doors, in the sense of the more the better. To make this possible, it plans to collect 10 million rands by the end of the year--a large slice to cut off these days. But it shows the zeal of the PFP and the scale on which it wants to undertake the recruitment campaign.

Takeover

Should the party have thoroughly considered all the implications, including the implications for itself? Let us take a look at how the party may be affected.

Suppose that large numbers of certain boycott groups within the brown, black and Indian communities decide to become members of the PFP--and it appears that there will be no obstacle in their path. Suppose that in due time they are close enough to send the majority of delegates to the PFP congress, what number of activities will they be able to start?

Dr Van Zyl Slabbert has already admitted that he does not care whom congress chooses as a leader. But there are more serious implications. The PFP will be subjected to a possible takeover by a group that is setting a completely new course.

Trash Can

They will be able to decide that the boycott position of the PFP with respect to the new dispensation was correct at the outset, and that the white PFP members have to withdraw from the House. This will mean that other groups then decide about what a white group must do with its parliamentary representation.

Or is the PFP taking part so reluctantly in the activities of the House and the parliamentary system that it does not care whether or not they miscarry?

Such a congress will also be able to change the policy and the principles of the PFP. After all, that is what a congress is for. The issues on which Dr Slabbert quite recently made it clear that he will not bow to the will of a national convention, such as the right to vote, can then be thrown right out the window into the trash can.

Balance of Power

Are these only theoretical specters, or are they practical possibilities?

For the PFP, the recruitment of members is, of course, a case of completely different objectives. Its true nature is revealed in a Progressive English-language newspaper, which published a report before its proper time, stating that the PFP will be making a "major bid" to gain control of parliament.

According to this report, the PFP, in competition with the existing parties, is going to try to gain the majority of members in the colored as well as the Indian house of congress. And along with this is reborn that old dream of a balance of power in the House: there is allegedly a strong rightist swing in white politics--which is going to let the Conservative Party take so many seats away from the NP that the government will in due time need the cooperation of the Progressive representatives if it is to retain the reins of government.

Thus: the Progressives manage the colored and Indian chambers and dictate what happens in the House. This then gives them effective control.

One further deduction that can be made is that if they gain a voice in just one of the other houses, they will use it to try to disrupt the whole new dispensation, because they can make it impossible to reach consensus among the three houses.

No Hope

With a plan such as the one expounded in the English-language paper, the PFP reverts to the old ideal of using colored groups to realize designs that it could never accomplish with white support alone. Moreover, the report concedes that the PFP has no hope of getting its hands on the government in the House at any time in the foreseeable future.

All these things are only possible if the PFP gets large numbers of Coloreds to support it. The opposite is also possible, of course: that the PFP will find that the Coloreds are not at all anxious to become Progressives and want to have nothing to do with the PFP.

8117

CSO: 3401/247

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW NP LEADER IN OFS EXPECTED TO PROMOTE INDIANS' RIGHTS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 24 Jun 85 p 8

[Text] After his unanimous election as the new NP leader in OFS [Orange Free State], Mr Kobie Coetsee brought out in his inaugural address the fact that he wants to further expand the spirit of reform and realism of his immediate predecessors, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch and the late Dr Nak van der Merwe.

It is significant that he has used this particular occasion to raise the delicate question of the rights of Asians in the OFS and ask whether that province should not be brought into line with the rest of the republic in this respect.

It is good that the people of OFS themselves are taking the leadership in this. As minister of justice, Mr Coetsee had announced in the House at the beginning of the year that the question was being referred to an investigation committee. It is to be hoped that this committee will swiftly conclude its task and recommend that the measures taken in the OFS will be brought into agreement with the rest of the country.

Mr Coetsee knows how galling it is for a group with members in the nation's highest legislative body to see their right to reside in the OFS and in parts of North Natal restricted. He was there in the Council of Delegates each time the Indian MPs labeled it as "offensive, humiliating and painful" and asked that the legislation in question be repealed.

This is also very likely one of the reasons why the percentage of votes in the first election for the Council of Delegates was so disappointingly low. In the light of that and other measures, many Indians were suspicious of the government's intentions as regards the new dispensation, and skeptical over whether participation in it could ever yield the desired results.

Far rightists will try to make as much political capital as possible out of the repeal of the above-mentioned legislation. For that matter, they are already doing this. They may perhaps prey upon a handful of votes, but they cannot turn aside the inevitability of the reform process.

8117

CSO: 3401/247

SOUTH AFRICA

REACTION TO OPENING SECTIONS OF TRAINS FOR COLOREDS

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 14

[Text] As might have been expected, there has been a mixed reaction to the decision of the South African Transport Services to open train carriages in part to everyone and to remove certain station signs that refer to Coloreds.

On the one hand, the decision is being criticized for not having gone far enough, since public transportation and facilities should be accessible to all population groups. On the other hand, the far rightists in particular are "not enthusiastic" about the new arrangement, which they believe to infringe upon the privacy of separate communities.

It is inevitably a delicate matter for which no simple and generally acceptable solution exists, inasmuch as people have such strong and divergent views about it.

Long before the new dispensation was implemented, in fact, it was a fairly regular practice to open up more and more public and other conveniences. Recently there have been increasing protestations, including some from members of the tricameral parliament, that the government should take another look at the possibility of providing for train passengers who want to travel together.

The arrangement now in place keeps step with the changing circumstances of the nation and does not introduce any new principle. There has been no separation by races now for decades on the South African Airways, and in October of last year, the dining cars on trains were opened up to all first- and second-class passengers. No serious problems have arisen with either of these arrangements.

While severely discriminatory measures in public services are no longer acceptable, it remains true that there are people who prefer to stay with their own group. Provision is made for them by reserving certain carriages for Whites only.

Until attitudes in the country show more adaptability to change, the new solution seems to be in line with the view expressed by the state president at the end of the parliamentary session, namely that the government does not want to force people who do not wish to, to sit together, nor to keep apart those who want to be together.

SOUTH AFRICA

DPSC CLAIMS INACCURACIES IN NUMBER OF DETENTIONS

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 1 Aug 85 p 12

[Text]

THE Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC) this week claimed that according to information it received on the number of people detained since the state of emergency was declared it has reason to believe that the official police list is incomplete and inaccurate.

These statistics must be treated with extreme caution. The numbers are rising rapidly — about 200 per day. The Police Public Relations Department releases information which is usually 24, and sometimes 36 hours out of date. For example, reports of heavy police activity have been received from the Vaal area, with some reports of about 100 detentions, yet these statistics reflect only 25 for that area," the DPSC points out.

The organisation says another example is Alexandra township which has apparently suffered many detentions, yet its magisterial district, Randburg, reflects only eight detentions — some Alexandra detainees are, however, to be found in the Johannesburg statistics. After the third police report, the Eastern Cape accounted for 60 percent and the Transvaal 40 percent of the detentions.

A spokesman for the Police Directorate in Pretoria on Tuesday said the police do not respond to any statement made by the DPSC and that they would not comment on any of the issues the organisation raises.

According to the DPSC after the third police report the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal accounted for 788 detainees. Port Elizabeth has the highest figure in the country, at 15,4 percent with the Congress of South African Students (Cosas), civic, youth groups and unionists featuring. Uitenhage had eight percent where the entire voluntary group who assisted the Black Sash after the Langa shootings had been detained.

Rural towns

A feature of this region, according to the DPSC, is the high number of detentions in small rural towns, such as Jansenville, Graaff Reinet, Alexandra and Somerset East. These share the characteris-

tic of having civic associations affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF). Fort Beaufort is a small town with an educational institution and a lively civic association called Organ of Peace, also a UDF affiliate — this has borne the brunt of detentions here.

In the Transvaal, Johannesburg, covering Soweto and, partly, Alexandra, has had 14,7 percent of detentions. Cosas, Soweto Youth Congress (Soyco) and the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) have suffered particularly badly. The East Rand accounts for 17,6 percent of detainees, and again, the civics, youth and student organisations are hardest hit, and trade unionists feature here, in small numbers.

The DPSC said its statistics of the organisation to which detainees belong, reflects the difficulty of obtaining information. "We were only able to obtain information on the organisations to which 222 detainees belong, only 28 percent of the total. We have calculated our statistics from the base of 222 in this category," the organisation added.

The statistics reveal that the majority of detainees fall into the category of youth — 56 percent, with Cosas being the main target, 22,7 percent. The various youth congresses have suffered badly, with Soyco, KwaThema Youth Congress (Kwayo), Alexandra Youth Congress (Ayco) and Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (Peyco) in the vanguard.

Cosas a target

A spokesman for the DPSC said: "We would like to draw attention to the fate of our own organisation. The DPSC, Detainees Support Committee (Descom) and other branches of the detainees aid movement have lost nine members, and we have received reports that the entire membership of our sister organisation, the Vaal Information Service, has been detained. We do not include them in these statistics, as the police have only recorded the detention of one member, Thami Zando, so far."

Broadly, the DPSC analysis shows that the police are engaged in a concerted attempt to crush the UDF, affiliated organisations and, presumably, the UDF itself. Cosas is a particular target. Of the organisation identified, 83 percent are UDF affiliates. It is also singularly remarkable that so far, not one member of the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) has been identified among the detainees (though this may be due to lack of information). The SOWETAN knows a number of Azapo members who have been detained since the declaration was made on July 20.

Another feature observed is the way in which the State is moving against entire organisations, taking their rank and file supporters, as well as activists. The vast majority of detainees are in this category; which partly accounts for the difficulty in identifying many of the detainees.

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK BUSINESSMEN REFUSE TO SUPPORT PEOPLE'S SHOW

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 1 Aug 85 p 16

[Text]

BLACK businessmen will not come out in full support of the People's Show currently running at the new national showgrounds in Crown Mines because whites are reluctant to buy from them.

This was said by Mr Ben Sibeko, chairman of the Greater Soweto Chamber of Commerce.

He added that it was best for black traders and manufacturers to stick to their cocoon, as it would be frustrating for them to trade in the same area with whites, because their goods would not be bought by white consumers.

Mr Sibeko was react-

ing to an article published last week in The SOWETAN, where multi-millionaire Mr Tony Factor, has appealed to black manufacturers and traders to make use of the Peoples' Show as a vehicle to utilise their skills.

Mr Sibeko said: "If these people do not come to our manufacturers in the townships, to show that they genuinely support us, what will make them buy from us if we are at the show?"

"To make it worse, the R320 a month rent for each stall is too much for our people. The show runs only on Saturdays and our people do not have R320 to pay for

only four days," he said.

The Peoples' Show has been going on for about a month and black participation has remained at 18 percent. Despite free buses organised to ferry enthusiasts from different parts of Soweto and the massive advertising given to the show, the number of people attending is not as large as expected.

Public relations officer, Mr Russel Gault, said R1,6m has already been invested in the project and more than 400 of the 700 stalls have been let.

"The emphasis is on getting black people into business and to show them how to go about it," he said.

CSO: 3400/857

SOUTH AFRICA

PFP LEADER SPELLS OUT AIMS OF PARTY

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 1 Aug 85 p 24

[Letter to the editor by Dr van Zyl Slabbert]

[Text]

Mr Bruce Stevens, in his letter of July 22, under the heading "PFP Now in Quagmire of Consensus Politics", encourages members of the PFP to resign if certain circumstances prevail and to "make their presence felt in groups like the Black Sash, the UDF and the ECC who are working for change from outside parliament".

To add substance to his appeal, Mr Stevens cites (a) our past participation in Parliament where, "despite our valiant role as a party of opposition to Government", (thank you so much), we now simply "enhance the credibility of an institution which deserves to be discredited"; (b) my own "early jingoistic comments on the Botswana raid", and (c) me doing the Government's "dirty work, by publicly attacking the End Conscription Campaign (ECC)". For those who may seriously be considering Mr Stevens' plea, may I offer the following observations:

(a) The issue of participation/non-participation: This is an old, old argument in the politics of South Africa. To support an extra-Parliamentary organisation, ie ECC, Black Sash or UDF, does not automatically mean that one is against participation in Parliament, unless the extra-Parliamentary organisation makes participation or non-participation a pre-condition for membership of the group. If it does, IT chooses to elevate this issue to a matter of principle and not one of strategy, and obviously one cannot be a member of the PFP and a member

of such an organisation at the same time.

After much reflection I urged the PFP to participate in the tricameral Parliament at the November 1983 Congress. We had just come through a bruising referendum campaign in which we tried to highlight the shortcomings of the new Constitution which have now become so glaringly apparent. I realised that the new Constitution, if anything, was worse than the old one, but the fundamental question to be faced was — "Can it still be used to promote constitutional change and socio-economic reform?" I believed and still do, that it was worth a try.

The defining quality of constitutional change is that it can only come about through a constitution, no matter how poor, inadequate or unjust that constitution happens to be. Of course history may prove that constitutional change was impossible in South Africa and that change came about through violent, revolutionary or military means, but I believe the PFP has to explore to the limit the possibility of promoting constitutional change. One cannot demand a perfect constitution before one participates to bring about constitutional change. If the constitution is perfect, such change is surely unnecessary.

The repeal of the Political Interference Act changed the circumstances under which we can participate, but certainly not the principle. It is no more or less appropriate for a white to

participate in terms of the above approach than it is for a so-called coloured person or Indian, although the history and practical circumstances of participation for members of these population groups do differ substantially than for whites. It is precisely because of these differences that the PFP Congress will have to apply its mind to the nature and problems of extended participation for itself as a party in Parliament.

Therefore, if Mr Bruce Stevens urges people not to participate as a matter of principle, he must subscribe to a theory of change which does not believe constitutional evolution is likely or even perhaps desirable. As far as the PFP is concerned, we believe it is worth trying, for both Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary groups to bring about pressure for constitutional change and socio-economic reform.

(b) My "jingoistic comments on the Botswana raid". I confess I am at a loss to know what Mr Stevens is referring to. I do know that I never condoned the raid and suspended judgment as to whether it was indeed a pre-emptive act or even a specific reprisal on the people who actually threw the bombs into the houses of two MPs in Cape Town.

I was phoned at 5.15 in the morning by the liaison officer of the SADF who gave me to understand in no uncertain terms that the people who threw the bombs had been dealt with.

Before I had read a newspaper or heard a broadcast the Press wanted to know what my "comment" was. Even then I said I was not prepared to condone or attack the raid because I did not have sufficient information. I supported the principle of pre-emptive action to prevent premeditated acts of violence, but was not in a position to state whether the Gaborone raid was such a case.

Later I released this statement:

"One of the most worrying developments of the recent session has undoubtedly been the political and international consequences of independent SADF actions into neighbouring territories. There is no doubt that the repercussions have been severely damaging for South Africa internationally as well as domestically.

"It is difficult to understand the timing, the necessity and the logic behind raids such as those of Cabinda

and Gaborone. The Official Opposition has refrained from making hasty judgments without having had an opportunity to test or decide on the validity of information made available to it from local sources and overseas.

"No country would hesitate to act pre-emptively should it have conclusive evidence that specific bases were busy planning imminent attacks of violence or terror within its borders. It is not clear at all whether either Cabinda or Gaborone are instances of this pre-emptive principle. The Gaborone raid in particular appears to be a clear act of reprisal to the Landers and Peters grenade attack. This may hold short-term advantages for the South African Government, but the long-term repercussions for the country as a whole would appear to be very serious indeed.

"Domestically it hardens attitudes into ones of violence and counter-violence and internationally leads to our increasing isolation. No-one would deny that those responsible for the Landers and Peters bombing should be sought out and apprehended as quickly as possible and brought to justice, and if clear evidence exists for such persons the Government should act quickly and decisively, but this is not the same as arbitrarily extracting vengeance for a despicable bomb attack on public representatives, particularly if it is subsequently shown that those killed were not related to such an attack.

"The counter propaganda against South Africa and the increasing hostility between the races inside South Africa eventually outweigh the short-term advantages of demonstrating the Government's ability to strike back indiscriminately whenever such acts of violence occur inside our borders.

"In retrospect this is a very worrying development that has come out of this session of Parliament and I believe it is in the interests of us all to apply our minds to the problem of combating terrorism and violence which we all believe should be ripped out of our society.

"Nothing brutalises us more than the steady drift into siege in which violence becomes the most dominant mode of addressing the problems of change and stability."

Apart from the fact that I reasonably assume Mr Stevens, with

me, would abhor and condemn acts of violence, such as throwing a bomb into someone else's bedroom, and that he would support pre-emptive action if prior knowledge of such acts became available, it would be instructive, both for his potential converts as well as myself, if he could point out what exactly he considers as "jingoistic" in what I have written here.

(c) The EEC campaign and my doing "the Government's dirty work by publicly attacking them". This arose out of a debate that I participated in on the invitation of the ECC to discuss the topic: "SADF — shield of the Nation or Defender of Apartheid". I made one bad mistake that evening. I did not have a written or prepared speech like my opponent Dr David Webster. This enabled EEC Focus to publish in its June Volume: "Dr Slabbert also commented that the call (my italics) to end conscription was "dangerously romantic, extraordinarily naive and counter-productive".

To my knowledge I never said that, nor would I now. I thought it was a debate, not a lecture or a policy speech, and therefore took notes. What I did say was that the reasons for ending conscription put forward by Dr Webster and in the literature that had been sent to me were "romantic", etc. I still believe they are and that is what I debated on that evening. I certainly could not have meant "the call" to end conscription because I had given evidence to the Commission under General Jannie Geldenhuys to that

effect and stated it unequivocally during the Defence debate in Parliament.

As for "publicly attacking" EEC, I think Mr Stevens is being precious and squeamish. That evening I was called "a collaborator", "propping up the system", "willing to encourage others to fight for apartheid", and other such things which the trendy Left say to add spice to their "rap" sessions on campus.

But I must point out a very important difference between the ECC and the PFP — the former is an organisation supporting a single-issue campaign (conscription), the latter is a political party with a policy and principles that have to be applied to issues ranging from a new constitution for South Africa, to health, welfare, economics, sport, etc. Members of a political party support its principles and policy and judge its performance against them. Members of a single-issue campaign feel strongly about that issue. Therefore it can attract people who have a wide variety and even divergent or contradictory reasons for supporting that issue, and groups within the campaign may even try to hijack the movement to fit into its own reasons for supporting the issue. For example, some may believe you can only be serious about ending conscription if you do not participate in Parliamentary politics. I obviously disagree.

I hope these few points help to clarify some of the issues on which Mr Stevens made his plea.

SOUTH AFRICA

COUNCIL DELEGATES POWER TO LENASIA

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 1 Aug 85 p 9

[Article by Stuart Flitton]

[Text]

Johannesburg City Council this week delegated further powers to the coloured and Lenasia management committees in what has been seen as preparation for multiracial regional services councils (RSCs).

The management committees may now:

- Temporarily close streets and public places.
- Consider applications for the erection of advertising boards and waive related by-laws which they consider to be unreasonable.
- Provide and maintain municipal buildings, sports facilities, cemeteries and crematoria.
- After consultation with the City Treasurer, accept tenders for work up to R250 000 each.
- Buy works of art for display in municipal buildings.
- After consultation with relevant council department heads, determine "through roads", "yield" and "stop" streets.
- Prohibit or restrict public parking.
- Provide parking meters with tariffs fixed by the council.
- Provide traffic lights in places recommended by the head of the council Traffic and Security Department.
- Determine polling hours.
- Make recommendations on the administration and enforcement of the 1979 Town Planning Scheme and council by-laws relating to public health, pollution, and the control and removal of refuse.

The council previously delegated to the management committees the power to draw up budgets for certain of their affairs and grant applications in terms of the Town Planning Scheme.

Mr Francois Oberholzer, chairman of the council management committee, said the composition and demarcation of the RSCs were still to be decided by central government.

He said he would have discussions with council members before making recommendations about demarcation.

Mr Oberholzer said the philosophy behind the RSCs was to share wealth with the less affluent communities.

"It is unfortunate the RSCs have to be introduced during a recession.

"Black communities are crying out for something to be done about their quality of life," Mr Oberholzer said.

Mr Sam Moss, leader of the Progressive Federal Party in the council, said peace in urban areas depended on the success of RSCs.

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

EIGHT-POINT LIST OF MAJOR REASONS BEHIND RIOTS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Jul 85 p 24

[Article by Martin Spring]

[Text]

The recession, the worst we have experienced in half a century, seriously worsens, even if only temporarily, what is a more fundamental long-term problem.

● Neglect of the urban blacks. Even many of us who tended to support the broad thrust of Government policies over the years recognised that they failed to address in an intelligent way the problem of political rights for this dynamic community, which for many good reasons could not be resolved within the context of separate development.

Even practical, relatively non-political matters like housing, transport and community facilities have only been tackled with any vigour in recent years, and even now without sufficient vigour.

● Neglect of the police. One of the painful ironies about this "police state" of ours is that the police force has never been accorded the status it needs to attract enough men of the calibre we need to handle properly our complex problems of crime and civil peace.

● The emergence of a new and vigorous black political leadership operating through legal movements.

● Escalating activity by ANC agents. It is not just a coincidence that violence within the townships has been directed almost entirely at destroying and terrorising moderates who are actual or potential community leaders.

● Dilatoriness by the authorities in suppressing violence. One can understand some of the good reasons for this, such as unwillingness to do things that could further harm our international image.

But continuing violence in the townships is the worst kind of publicity. And weakness is a dangerous stimulant of further violence in an African environment, whatever the nature of the political system.

Unfortunately there are no simple answers, no quick fixes, for the problems of civil disorder.

Restoring peace is the first priority. Then we must show much more vigour in tackling the fundamental, long-term causes.

Many people are confused about the state of emergency and the events that led up to it.

That is not surprising.

Its announcement, made months too late, was handled with the usual leadenfootedness that dismays the Government's friends and heartens its enemies.

The events that led up to it are a matter of personal interpretation, though unfortunately most of those doing the interpreting tell only part of the story rather than the whole of it, as they are blinkered by their own political prejudices.

Here is my eight-point list of probable major causes of the riots:

● The population explosion. A quarter-million young blacks pour

on to the labour market every year, and there is no way that jobs can ever be provided for more than a fraction of them.

No wonder they are angry and frustrated at a society that offers them no future in a material sense.

The black community still has to learn that it is doomed to eternal poverty until it curbs its birthrate. Whites still have to learn how costly it is to them to allow this national issue to be neglected.

● The education explosion. Black schools and universities have largely become factories for the mass production of revolutionaries at the expense of the white taxpayer.

This is not surprising. Teachers everywhere tend to be radical and to be opinion-formers.

What is reprehensible is that the authorities have allowed the educational system to be shaped in such a way that it is failing to train young blacks in the technical and commercial skills which would assure them of jobs and good personal prospects even in an economy with a labour surplus.

Once again, this failure can only mean frustration and anger.

● No jobs. This is partly the consequence of the huge surplus of wrongly educated youngsters. But there are other causes.

One is the trend towards lower and lower rates of economic growth. The reasons for that are complex, but they include a high-tax, high-inflation environment which is hostile to growth.

Another cause is a deadly combination of artificially raised wages, officially favoured trade unionism, and tax privileges for capital investment, which stymies job creation.

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER OPINION OF GOVERNMENT DECLINED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Jul 85 p 9

[Text]

English-speaking South Africans have a higher regard for the Government while Afrikaner opinion of it has declined, according to a nationwide opinion poll conducted by *Rapport*, the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper.

Of those questioned:

- 33,5 percent replied that their opinion of the Government had remained unchanged (that they already had a high regard for the Government was evidenced by their replies).

- 31,6 percent said their opinion of the Government had increased (4,4 percent said it had "greatly increased").

- 32,6 percent said their opinion had decreased (11,2 percent said their opinion had "greatly decreased").

The poll also found that 40 percent of English speakers had a high opinion of the Government while a surprising 42 percent of Afrikaners had a low estimation.

Of those with a low opinion, about 36 percent were Conservative Party supporters, 21 percent National Party supporters, and nine percent were Progressive Federal Party supporters.

SOUTH AFRICA

CHANNELS FOR BLACK PROTEST GRADUALLY CLOSED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 30 Jul 85 p 25

[Text]

The state of emergency, now in its second week, has added a new dimension to protest politics and other demonstrations in the black community.

Up to only 10 days ago, holding protest marches and other forms of political assembly was tough enough, but only an order signed by a magistrate could prevent events organised by political bodies or for political purposes.

At the weekend, the Divisional Commissioner of Soweto Police did not make representations to the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg to outlaw celebrations planned to mark the birthday of Mr Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned leader of the banned African National Congress.

Brigadier J C Coetzee simply invoked the new powers vested in the police in terms of the emergency regulations, and signed orders banning the celebrations in wide areas of Johannesburg and Roodepoort because he believed public peace would be endangered by the festivities.

But even before the state of emergency was declared, demonstrations and protest marches were still a dicey business. Often police would break up such gatherings and charge participants under the Riotous Assemblies Act.

A few weeks ago a number of trade unionists were arrested and charged after a march from the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court, where another unionist had earlier been cleared of

charges related to last year's work boycotts.

Two days later, scores of armed policemen stood outside the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and faced a throng of people inside the building and on its steps.

The people had been holding a protest service inside Khotso House — outdoor meetings, unless of a bona fide sports or religious nature, have been outlawed since 1976 — and wanted to disperse but said they feared police action.

In the same week 2 000 supporters of the ultra right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) crowded in a hall not far from the Central Police Station in Pretoria, where they listened to a fiery address by the group's leader before approving a motion of full confidence in the police for the way the unrest was being handled.

PLEDGE

After the meeting, about 1 000 people left the hall and marched to the police station where they submitted a letter intended for the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, promising him support and pledging to help maintain "law and order" if it became necessary.

Not a single policeman disrupted the march, and the SAP Directorate for Public Relations said no action was taken against the AWB marchers because their procession was only noticed when they reached the police station.

Black spokesmen said there seemed to be an apparent disparity in the way their protests were treated by the police. Police were always evident outside the venues where black groups wanted to hold meetings but not a single policeman was anywhere near the hall where the AWB held its meeting.

They also noted that earlier this year hundreds of Natal farmers blocked traffic in Maritzburg when they drove tractors in protest along a main road there.

Not a single policeman disrupted that tractor procession whereas black demonstrations were often halted even if there was no violence.

But one group which seems to enjoy unmolested protests is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha. Members have demonstrated several times but none has ever been charged with disturbing the public peace.

By and large, channels for protest have been gradually closing during the last few years. The emergency has added a new dimension.

CSO: 3400/849

28 August 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

FARMERS COMPLAIN ABOUT HEAVY-HANDEDNESS OF AGRICULTURE MINISTER

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 9

[Article by Piet Petoors ("Talks Farming"): "Farmers under Yoke of Tyrant?"]

[Text] What is democracy? Is it to hold an election once every 5 or 7 years and invest the government which is put into power with responsibility for everything? Or is it to give the various sectors in society -- businesses or provinces -- a say in their own affairs?

Today's ministerial dictatorship in agricultural makes one realize that a formal democracy can be rather undemocratic; that only a participatory democracy where important decisions are made by due dictates of the parties concerned can provide the sole guarantee for expert government. And the more the Minister of Agriculture acts like a Roman proconsul in a conquered province, the stronger the pressure for a democratic agricultural system will become.

According to the chairman of the National Marketing Board, Mr R.P.G. Kotze, this body of officials must handle about 115 submissions by 21 agricultural management boards a month, and the board must make a recommendation to the minister about these. The minister must approve, disapprove or modify each management board decision according to the recommendation of the board of officials. The minister must thus accept that each member possesses more expertise on the affairs of three to five management boards than the management boards themselves. Under these circumstances it is an impossible task for the National Marketing Board to properly coordinate the 21 product boards.

In terms of the Marketing Law, one of the Board's principal duties is to coordinate grain and meat prices, as well as meat and milk prices. They have totally failed in this. They were not even able to make a plan to simultaneously announce the most important prices.

How many big companies have failed because they belonged to a conglomerate whose management appointed a super-manager over every few companies to look over the manager's shoulders? Is the weak management method in business administration suddenly a good method if it is applied at the expense of the producer and the taxpayer in agricultural administration? Added to this are the political considerations with which the Minister saddles his National

Marketing Board and which in many cases make an objective handling of a marketing matter impossible. The movement of the management board system toward ministerial autocracy since Mr Hendrik Schoeman's amendment can only result in the principle of independent business responsibility, upon which the Marketing Law is based, having already been damaged. The Minister's autocratic action in corn matters has carried this undemocratic inclination to an extreme. And don't think it's over now. The interesting part is yet to come.

The Jacobs Committee - the Minister of Agriculture's own committee -- recommended after "long and careful consideration," as the phrase goes, that a two-market system should be introduced for corn, separating the domestic market for corn from the foreign market and assigning every corn farmer a marketing quota for the domestic market. Nampo [expansion unknown] subsequently thrashed out the matter thoroughly at two congresses and adopted the proposal by a great majority.

But no, that was not sufficient for the Minister. According to a report in the official pamphlet of the Department of Agriculture, the National Marketing Board is going to investigate the whole matter again from the beginning, whereby the opinions of the corn business itself will be only one part of a large amount of input. The Director of Marketing Administration is now asking all interested parties for remonstrances. The dictates of any farmer, whether banana or chicory farmer, will get the same rights as those of the corn farmer at the farmers meetings which are possibly going to be convened to hear the farmers' opinions.

The feed industry, which has arisen and grown in 10 years of artificially low corn prices and which will naturally benefit if the two-market system with its higher domestic prices is not going to be applied, will seize the opportunity to persuade the minister to arbitrarily reject the corn plan, no matter what the corn farmer himself wants.

The Marketing Law, upon which agriculture has pinned its hopes for decades to protect its existence, has become a weapon against agriculture in the hands of Hendrik Shoeman and Greyling Wentzel. The Management Board is decaying through ministerial dictatorship, administrative disarray and intervention by capital interests.

What now? An idea which is gaining more and more ground is that the National Marketing Board should be replaced by an elected agricultural authority. The minister should no longer interfere at all in the sensitive mechanism. The minister can even withdraw still further from the administration of agriculture. Agricultural research has been falling into disrepair for 10 years already. The minister has tried innumerable times to prevent the Management Boards and cooperatives from doing agricultural research or from giving technical guidance to farmers independently. At the same time the Agricultural Department has not succeeded in keeping its own advisers and researchers because the Civil Service did not want to pay the current salaries. This farce has already been investigated for years now by a top-secret committee, the Committee for Investigating Agricultural Services (Kolb Committee), which will now apparently at last come out with its long-awaited report.

More and more voices are now coming out for transferring the service functions of the Department of Agriculture -- economic services, guidance, research, soil protection, veterinary science -- to the South African Agricultural Union. Farmers may choose to manage and finance these services themselves with levies, rather than receive them gratis along with the slaps of their dictator minister.

13084

CSO: 3401/260

SOUTH AFRICA

WHITES OPPOSE SALE OF FARM TO COLORED MAN

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 16

[Article: "Farmers Against Farm for Colored Man"]

[Text] Farmers in the vicinity of Hlobane, in the Vryburg district, are strongly opposed to the possibility of a colored neighbor.

Farmers were recently informed that a farm in the vicinity, Sterkstroom, will be sold to a colored man. The farmers' union of Hlobane then consulted adjacent property owners about the matter. The Natal Agricultural Union had previously already approached the farmers' union in question about its position in the affair.

The Colored will not be able to buy the farm until a permit under the Group Areas Act is issued to him.

Farmers in the neighborhood told DIE AFRIKANER that all the farmers are strongly opposed to the sale of the farm to a non-White. It is understood that the Hlobane farmers' union has also already taken a decision to oppose a request for a permit. An interview with the local MP [member of parliament], Mr Jurie Mentz, will apparently be requested.

A Natal member of the Council of Deputies, Mr John Iyman, recently submitted a private bill under which agricultural land in South Africa must be open to all races. To accomplish this, certain provisions of the Group Areas Act will have to be repealed.

Apparently, however, the bill will only be debated in the next session.

12906
CSO: 3401/257

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

INFLUX NO LONGER CONTROLLED--Dr Chris Jooste, director of Sabra [South African Bureau of Racial Affairs], said that for all practical purposes control over the influx of Blacks to white regions no longer exists. Dr. Jooste was commenting on an announcement by the Government that leasehold rights have been granted to 24,092 Blacks from the squatters camp at Kruispad in the Cape Peninsula. Dr. Jooste said the Government has rejected the principle of a white region. He stated that the Government actually no longer makes a distinction between white and black regions, and so there is no need to control the influx of Blacks. [Text] [Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 26 Jun 85 p 1] 13084

NUCLEAR PHYSICS RESEARCH CENTERS--Johannesburg: Evidence that the nuclear physics research unit at the University of Witwatersrand is a first-rate center is mainly due to its director, Prof Friedel Sellschop. Such were the sentiments of the president of the CSIR [Council for Scientific and Industrial Research], Dr Chris Garbers, yesterday when the unit was officially renamed the Wits/CSIR Schonland Research Center for Nuclear Science. Second only to the Molecular Research Center of the University of Cape Town, this center is the only one in South Africa that has been singled out as a center of truly first-rate excellence. The director of the unit has played a decisive role in this achievement. Factors that are especially pertinent include the director's international prestige as a scientist in his own right, the extent to which he has raised his center up to international standing in terms of research in the field, and the way in which the leadership and organizational powers of the director have attracted to the center both personnel and students of the highest caliber, as well as distinguished international scientists. The change in the name of the center honors Sir Basil Schonland, founder and director of the Bernard Price Institute at Wits and founder and chairman of the board of CSIR. Sir Basil Schonland was one of South Africa's most outstanding scientists and a world leader in the field of lightning research. [Text] [Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 19 Jun 85 p 2] 8117

CSO: 3401/185

UGANDA

TWO CO-OPERATIVE UNIONS MERGE

Kampala THE PEOPLE in English 15 Jul 85 p 10

[Text]

BUNYORO District Growers' Co-operative Union and Kitara Co-operative Union have been merged into one union called Bunyoro-Kitara Co-operative Union Limited following prolonged feuds between the two unions since the creation of Kitara Union.

According to a circular from the office of the Minister for Co-operatives and Marketing dated May 28, addressed to Secretary Managers of the above unions, the Minister directed that the two unions be amalgamated to form a new union called Bunyoro-Kitara Co-operative Union Limited.

"Through the new organisation", the Minister stated in the circular, "my Ministry will seek to overcome the feuds that have gone on for a very long time between the co-operators in Masindi and those in Hoima."

The Minister further pointed out that for the past two years, operations of the two unions have been detrimental to the interests of the farmers in the two districts, adding that the solution to the problem was the merger of the two.

Bunyoro Growers' Co-operative Union, based in Masindi, was the overall organization before the formation of Kitara Co-operative Union, based in

Hoima.

The union, which came into effect on June 1st this year, took over all the assets and liabilities of the two unions, according to the Minister's directive. The new union was urged to absorb as many employees of the two unions as possible.

At a special general meeting of Bunyoro Growers' Co-operative Union, held in Masindi at the beginning of this month to consider the merger, the members commended the government's move to amalgamate the two unions.

They noted that the government was in order in trying to maintain large and more economically viable cooperative unions and protect the interests of the farmers. They added that the move was a positive step towards accelerated economic development.

The Masindi co-operators further observed that the directive to amalgamate Bunyoro Growers' Co-operative Union, Mr Kitalikyawe said the interests of the farmers were paramount and should be protected. He regretted the suffering the farmers experienced as a result of feuds between the two sister unions.

UGANDA

BIG AIRLINE LOSSES

Kampala THE PEOPLE in English 15 Jul 85 p 10

[Text]

UGANDA Airlines Corporation sustained a net loss of 113.314 million shillings fiscal year 1982 according to the Audited Annual Accounts of the Airlines just released.

This staggering loss is more than double that for the year 1981 and 1980 where the Airlines recorded losses of 45.845 and 44.777 million shillings respectively.

The operations of the Airlines were very much affected by the economic measures which came into effect such as foreign exchange rates fluctuations which greatly increased the airlines expenses for fuel, maintainance, insurance and outside handling.

The Corporation made these losses mainly because the fares and rates of the airlines were not revised to match with the increas-

ing foreign exchange rates which came into effect.

Uganda airlines Corporation is a fully government owned parastatal organisation established by Decree No. 15 of 1976 as amended in March 1979.

The airlines operates within East Africa, to Europe and to the Middle East. During the year 1982 the Airline was operating two Boeing 707 aircrafts, two Fokker Friendships and one King Air.

The Boeing operated international and regional services while Fokkers operated both regional and domestic air services. However, one of the Fokkers crashed in August 1982 and did not resume service until 1983. The King Air operated charter services only.

CSO: 3400/835

UGANDA

BRIEFS

EADB, INDIANS FINANCE HOTEL--A 12b (22 million US dollars) loan agreement between Apollo Hotel Corporation and East African Development Bank (EADB) for joint financing of rehabilitation of Apollo Hotel has been signed in Kampala. The Minister of State in the President's Office, holding the portfolio of the Minister for Tourism and Wildlife Mr. Cris Rwakasisi, signed on behalf of the Corporation, while Resident Manager of EADB in Uganda, Mr. Emmanuel Wampamwandha and Secretary/Director of Services in the Bank, Mr. David Mulira signed on behalf of the Bank. The ceremony took place last Friday in Kampala. Talking before the signing of the loan agreement, Mr. Rwakasisi said that such a magnificent building should not be turned into a "white elephant". He commended the EADB's response to participate in the renovation of the hotel. The cost involved in rehabilitating Apollo Hotel, which totals about 13.2b/- (22 million dollars), will be jointly sponsored by the EADB (2 million US dollars), Uganda Development Bank (UDB) (5 million dollars), Exim Bank of India (12 million dollars) and the Uganda government will contribute bridging finances. An agreement between Apollo Hotel Corporation and Oberoi Company of India for management contract was signed at the end of last year. The rehabilitation of Apollo Hotel is expected to begin soon after tenders have been awarded. The work is expected to take between 14 and 18 months. Apollo Hotel is the largest hotel in the country with a capacity of 300 beds. [Text]
[Kampala THE PEOPLE in English 15 Jul 85 p 3]

CSO: 3400/835

ZIMBABWE

SITUATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE RECOUNTED

Paris LIBERATION in French 8, 9 Jul 85

[8 Jul 85 pp 27-28]

[Article by Pierre Haski: "Mugabe's Zimbabwe; Tender Shoots of Independence"]

[Text] In Zimbabwe and elsewhere the drought will soon have lasted 3 years. Here, though, there has been no exodus, no famine. Why not? An astute mix of status-quo for white farmers, with stepped-up growth for the black rural zones. The losers? Landless peasants who were looking for the imminent dawn of an era of land redistribution. That casts a shadow on hopes for agriculture's promised priority in the new scheme of things: in 5 years, only 35,000 families have been resettled on what used to be "white land."

Betty Shoniwa poses proudly for the camera, beaming in front of a stand of corn taller than she is. This old African woman's crop will nearly match the per hectare yields of the area's white farmers, because this year she, too, had fertilizer and pesticides. That victory has won her acclaim in the press, and admiring visits from touring agricultural experts.

Betty Shoniwa's prize corn crop is something of a miracle. This farm woman, still shy of visitors, lives in Mondoro, a "communal farm zone" some 80 kilometers from Zimbabwe's capital at Harare. Until independence Mondoro was "tribal trust land," a reservation grossly overpopulated, without access to market outlets, and had the unenviable distinction of being the main battleground in the guerrilla war against the white rebels fighting to hang onto what used to be Rhodesia.

Things were simpler before independence: some 5,000 white farmers, known as "commercial," using very sophisticated and highly productive methods, worked the same amount of land as several hundred thousand black farmers struggling to survive. Robert Mugabe, the guerrilla victor who won the election, made a pledge: he would develop the black sector without adversely affecting the white sector, which is the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy.

There were two constraints: the compromise agreement signed at independence forbade the government to seize lands, even idle lands, and obliged it to buy at going prices; on the other hand, shortly after independence, Zimbabwe, like a good share of Africa, was hit by a cycle of drought that has lasted 3 years.

Last year, while the country was enduring its third year of drought, Zimbabwe reaped a harvest that astonished everybody by adding up to a modest surplus for export. That bumper crop was one in which the so-called "communal" farmers, meaning the blacks, played a considerable part: 40 percent of the maize, or ten times what they could send to market before independence. This year, with the return of the rains and the prospect of a record 2-million-ton corn crop, will be a repeat performance.

The formula for success? First, for the white sector, nothing, or almost nothing will change. "The prime minister has told us that he will respect our farmers' capitalist traditions," was the neat answer I got from George Laurie, president of the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), the "labor union" for the 4,100 white farmers. That is Mugabe's gamble, and for good reason: agriculture is the prime source of Zimbabwe's export earnings, the main source of jobs with 25 percent of the nation's total work force, and it has kept Zimbabwe self-sufficient in food for more than 20 years. To fuss with it would be suicide for the new masters of the country, already inclined toward prudence by the counterexamples of Angola and Mozambique, where the exodus of the colonials brought agriculture to disaster.

To win the confidence of the white farmers, who feared they would be made to pay, in this new Zimbabwe, for their stubbornness in clinging to the old Rhodesia, Mugabe managed to managed to wangle the collaboration of one man: Dennis Norman, president of the CFU during the civil war and a big farmer himself. Norman became agriculture minister when independence came, and he is still in that post, to the universal satisfaction. "Norman's appointment had a very salutary effect," admits his successor at the CFU, George Laurie. "He makes a very good minister and we accept the fact that he is minister to all the farmers, not just the whites."

The upshot: the white farmers produce today just as they used to... being careful to seek more social contact with the black farm workers... and keeping their splendid houses in one of the loveliest countrysides in the world. They are not all that far removed from the "Rhodesian way of life" for which they had fought so fiercely!

On the black side, the practice has very little to do with the scientific socialism officially professed by the party in office, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), but it is bearing fruit. The government is trying first of all to put an end to the economic marginalization of the black rural zones, and to bring them into the market economy. It has done this by abolishing the purchase-price discrimination that once prevailed, by opening new farm marketing centers closer to the communal farms, by making credit available to black small farmers and by providing them with a technical infrastructure they had never experienced before.

In line with that policy, AGRITEX, a government agency for farm advice and extension work, including cadre training, was reorganized in 1981, and now works only with and for the black farmers, although it used to divide its attentions 50-50 between blacks and whites. There is already an AGRITEX expert for every 850 communal farmers, a record figure in Africa, and it will reach one for every 600 in the very near future. AGRITEX has just placed an order for 1,000 all-terrain motorcycles for its agents... The agricultural lending bank in 1984-85 granted loans to 95,000 small farmers, as compared with a scant 3,000 prior to independence. The loans are used to buy fertilizer and equipment, and they have certainly had an impact on production.

"What is remarkable," says John Hayward, a white who runs AGRITEX "is that the best of the communal farmers are already getting yields comparable with those of the neighboring big commercial farmers." Getting the black farmers out of subsistence farming and into market farming will involve no ideology. Accordingly, Betty Shoniwa, our model farm wife, works on a site called "Khowa Pakuru," meaning "get a better field," on which AGRITEX is cooperating with the Swiss multinational Ciba-Geigy firm, which provides fertilizer, pesticides, and technical advice with a view to expanding its market. This results in some astonishing spectacles: at a farmers' meeting, with Ciba's Swiss director looking on, ZANU's traditional slogans gave way to "Up With Farm Production" and "Down With Hunger!" with fists raised and chanting in rhythm, along with the Swiss visitor!

The result is spectacular. "I have never seen rural zones in Africa undergoing such rapid growth, much less after 3 years of drought. It's quite astonishing," says a Danish agricultural expert with much experience on this continent. In the "growth centers" selected by the government all over the country, they are building markets, bringing in electricity and telephones. Stores are being opened by the local people, and schools and clinics are popping up in large numbers.

There is, of course, another side to this coin. The war of liberation was initially waged over the issue of land. It was shocking and inadmissible that the 5,000 white farmers held as much land as the 900,000 black ones. In a country where only 8 percent of the land is arable, and where population growth is among the fastest in Africa, the problem is acute. Since independence, the government launched into a vast program of buying back farms from white owners for redistribution to blacks. In short order, though, it became clear that there was not enough money, even with financial aid from the former British colony.

In all, over 5 years, only 35,000 families have been resettled on what used to be "white" land, thanks to financial aid from the British, the Dutch, the BEC, and the African Development Bank. A mere drop in a teeming sea of over-population. The government had promised to provide land to 163,000 families within 3 years: less than a quarter of that promise has been kept in 5 years.

The problem is not only money, but trained staff and coordination. Once again laying ideology aside, the government wants to slam the door on land redistribution. After flirting with collectivization, today it favors individual plots over the creation of state farms or cooperatives, and gives

first place to skilled farmers rather than to the poorest of the poor. That is a choice certain to guarantee production, but one that is obviously not going to please everybody.

"The redistribution already under way has yet to have an impact on the overpopulation of communal lands," says one agricultural expert. "There are too many people on poor land. They are steadily encroaching on pasture land, and there is no room for the cattle. One solution is land redistribution, the other is to develop small industries locally.

The discontent and disappointment are the greater in that much of the large white farm holdings lie idle. When the country achieved independence, a spontaneous movement to occupy idle lands developed. Thousands of landless peasants were squatting on white-owned farmlands creating a potentially explosive situation. Robert Mugabe opted for "legality," and hence in favor of the whites.

"The squatter issue had us worried in 1980-81," admits George Laurie, president of the white farmers' union. "It is still going on in some pockets, but it is no longer an important problem. The government has been extremely cooperative..." That is an attitude that makes more politicized Zimbabweans see red. They are angry at Mugabe's agreeing "to pay for lands that were stolen from the people in the last century," by the first colonists who arrived with Cecil Rhodes.

Despite such gnashing of teeth, despite the disappointments and frustrations at the untouched power of the 4,000 white farmers, 5 years into independence Mugabe still has the full support of the Shona peasants, who constitute a majority of the 7 million Zimbabweans. They know they have him to thank for bringing peace to the rural areas literally ravaged by the war for liberation, and for making a start at improving their living standards. This is a far cry from the dreams some people may have had, of simply confiscating and distributing the great white domains on the morning after independence. With the return of the rains and of bountiful harvests, the peasants now are quite a bit better off than others.

This conscious decision to keep hands off the economic heritage of colonial Rhodesia insofar as possible is to be seen at the level of the overall economy. Mugabe's promise, made when he took office, not to nationalize, not to disturb the highly capitalist order of things, applies as well to industry and to the mines. The few government takeovers that have occurred, as in the Wankie coal mines, were friendly, and the former owner of the mines, the South Africans in the Anglo-American Corporation, who became minority shareholders but still manage the mines, were delighted!

A visit to Anglo-American's home office in Harare is edifying. At the portal of the old building, a plaque lists the companies owned by the South African conglomerate in Zimbabwe: 65 names from all sectors of the economy, from mines to agriculture, from industry to services. In all, 26,000 on the payroll, making it the biggest employer in the private sector. At Anglo, smiles are de rigueur: "We have harmonious relations with the government," says a company spokesman. It listens to us, we meet with ministers on a

regular basis. They are very open. They see us as a major provider of jobs and an important source of hard currency, for the greater good of the country. Anglo-Zimbabwe is wholly run by Zimbabweans, without interference from headquarters in Johannesburg. The government has no objections to the presence here of big companies like ours."

If the Anglo-American Corporation has been hurting these past 2 years, it is primarily because of the drought, the strong American dollar, and the decline in chromium prices. "We shall be showing a profit again this year," says the spokesman. The confidence is unshaken: Anglo is investing this year in gold mines and agriculture, "in anything that pays, creates jobs, and brings in hard currency."

For a giant company like this, the transition to independence was painless. Africanization has come about, and again, the process was gentle: "Whites make up only 1 percent the group's shareholders," says the spokesman.. who is white. "We have corporate CEOs directors of mines, and accountants who are black." Anglo can offer good salaries, and has welcomed the cream of the Zimbabwean black graduates who had waited for the time of independence on American, Canadian, or British university campuses.

That gentle transition provides an astonishing sight: a visitor landing here today gets the impression that he has been transported into pre-independence Salisbury. It is all there, from the tidily manicured lawns to the prodigality of street lighting, right down to the prisoners in white ducks who cut the tall grass along the roads with machetes, under the surveillance of one armed guard.

In the residential neighborhoods once set apart for whites, it gradually dawns on you that the black women who used to push white babies in their prams are walking their own here: this is where they live, rather than work. The explosion of a black middle class living in all-out English style, that has moved easily into the place of its former masters is unquestionably one of the most spectacular of the changes.

The gentle transition that also creates the urban poor, denizens of the old "townships" -- modestly re-titled "high density population zones" -- these are the truly forgotten ones in these first years of independence. The war? They did not suffer enough for peace to seem priceless to them, as it does to the peasants; and at the economic level, they are the first to be hurt by inflation and the paucity of jobs. For them, independence has a pretty bitter taste.

[9 Jul 95 pp 24-25]

[Article by Pierre Haski: "Mugabe's Zimbabwe; Sharp Thorns of Independence"]

[Text] With the war for independence won, it was time to recycle the armed forces and send the ex-guerrillas home. Some of them have set up cooperatives, most of them are jobless, penniless, forgotten. They are bitter indeed, although the system skillfully juggles political conflicts, and ethnic ones as well.

Their name is a program in itself: Instant Muscle! "Just ask us, we'll do it," says the pamphlet handed out by this uncommon company, a cooperative formed in Harare by nationalist veterans of the guerrilla wars. They stand ready to clean swimming pools, move household furniture, repair machinery, dig wells -- nothing fazes them, and their prices are the lowest in the Zimbabwean capital for this kind of work...

Joseph Mutandiri is the young president of Instant Muscle. After a few years of rudimentary schooling, he explains, "I joined the revolution" in 1976, at age 14. For 4 years, Joseph fought in the ranks of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), headed by Robert Mugabe, who, in April 1980, became prime minister of the newly independent country.

After independence, Joseph Mutandiri got a demobilization bonus of 4,400 Zimbabwe dollars (around 25,000 francs), and did a tour of training school for mechanics in Scandinavia. Back home, "there was no work for us because we didn't have the necessary diplomas. Along with other veteran comrades who had practically no money, we got the idea of forming a cooperative. Each of us put \$2.50 in a kitty, and we were in business." After a few months, we were still hard pressed for money: the wages the 15 of us drew from the cooperative were laughable and never paid on time, "not enough to live on," says Joseph. And the government offered no help at all. The plight of Joseph Mutandiri and his combat-veteran comrades in Instant Muscle is far from unique. Five years after independence, the ex-freedom-fighters are the forgotten men. An official in the information department whom I asked for information about them replied casually, "You're looking for trouble." There are no combat veterans' administrations in Zimbabwe, no ex-guerrilla associations or clubs: it is a delicate subject.

With the advent of independence, Mugabe had to handle an explosive situation: there were three rival armies in the field: that of the old Ian Smith regime, which was 80 percent black but whose officers were white, the Prime Minister's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), recruited primarily from the majority ethnic group, the Shona, and the Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army (ZIPRA), headed by the old nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, and largely made up of Ndebeles (20 percent of the population). All in all, far too many men, far too many weapons, and far too many conflicting interests.

It is unquestionably one of Mugabe's major achievements to have integrated these three armies with a minimum of friction, more than once coming to the very brink of civil war. A master plan for demobilization was put into place, with the aid of British advisers. In all, 35,763 people were gradually demobilized. What became of them? According to information released a few months ago to Parliament by the government, 4,700 went back to their studies, 2,900 are getting technical training, 4,383 are busy with self-supporting endeavors, 1,579 are free-lance workers, and 2,041 have salaried positions. The remaining 19,160, or more than half, are unemployed. They have no resources since, as the government points out, "The number of veterans whose monthly demobilization allotments are running out is rising every month."

When they were demobilized, the ex-guerrilla fighters elected to get either \$4,440 dollars in a lump sum, or monthly payments of \$185 for 2 years. When that ran out, there was nothing, except for those with service-connected disability. That situation gave rise to a great deal of bitterness among the guerrilla veterans of all groups, who find it hard to understand why or how they have gradually slipped down the oubliette.

"They never asked to see our diplomas when we applied to join the guerrilla ranks," growls one veteran who is having a hard time finding a niche for himself in Zimbabwe's highly competitive society. Most veterans were very young when they hit the road out of Mozambique or Zambia to join the "war of liberation, so naturally they have neither the diplomas nor the experience employers -- most of them white -- demand of new hires these days.

Right now though, there seems to be a way out for these forgotten men: forming cooperatives -- farm, commercial, or industrial -- with encouragement from a private group known as the Zimbabwe

Project (ZP), founded during the war in 1978 to help the hundreds of thousands of Rhodesian refugees in the neighboring countries. Heading ZP is Judith Acton, daughter of Garfield Todd, a fierce opponent of Ian Smith, who today is a senator appointed by Mugabe himself. In June of 1981, Zimbabwe Project changed its approach, and now operates mainly with foreign funding (churches or non-governmental organizations in Europe and America).

"We have very little Zimbabwean funding," says one ZP official, "because the private sector (i.e.: white. Ed.) feels that helping the veterans to get back on their feet would mean admitting the righteousness of the cause for which they fought." The operation is not without pitfalls. "Three of every five cooperatives started by veterans are on the brink of failure because of their lack of management experience and qualifications."

There are 250 cooperatives in Zimbabwe now, as compared with a maximum of three at the time of independence. The environment is not at all salubrious for them, though, and that is a paradox under a government that loudly declares its fealty to scientific socialism.

Some of them do pretty well, even so. The example of All Are One, a trading cooperative near Bulawayo, second-largest city in the country, is remarkable in this connection. The All Are One supermarket proudly dominates downtown

Sekousile, the new low-cost housing neighborhood. A.M. Chibaya, president of the co-op, poses, chest out, in front of the store while a truck unloads sacks of flour. Clearly, he savors his success.

The founders of this cooperative are among the oldest political prisoners in the country. Captured during one of the very first guerrilla actions, the "Sinoia Campaign," in 1968, they were sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. That "life" sentence came to an end on Independence Day. They were held in Kami prison -- "the Zimbabwe Bastille," says Chibaya -- a camp classified as "maximum security." "We used to work at our own education in camp. Those who knew something taught it to the rest. That was how we prepared ourselves for the day of liberation: we all wanted to have a part in Zimbabwe's development. We wanted to be productive on a collective basis and, when we were demobilized, we decided to put our ideas into practice."

With that steely determination, the co-op members first opened a little shop, and then, thanks to a rare government subsidy, they expanded. It is hard to imagine guerrilla veterans who barely escaped the hangman's noose standing behind the cash register or cutting meat at the butcher's counter, or keeping the co-op's books. All Are One has limitless ambitions: it wants to build a second story with a discotheque and a beauty shop, and it has just bought a farm so it can sell fresh produce direct to the consumer. This is one of the few examples of success amid a fairly widespread pattern of failure.

At the Simukai farm, not far from the capital at Harara, there was a hint of tension in the air as I arrived. Tomorrow is election day to choose the bureau of this farm cooperative founded by combat veterans. "The people here are more concerned about democracy than about production," laments the vice president, once I have persuaded him to talk to me. The 80 members of the co-op bought this land from a white farmer in 1983. [It was] 1,760 hectares, a fine piece of property that, in the old days, produced tobacco, among other crops. The barns where the precious leaves were dried are no longer used. "We have sent one of our people away to learn about tobacco growing and we are thinking about getting into it again in 1987," says the vice president. Until then, they will make do with maize and soybeans, and raise some pigs. Co-op members draw a salary of \$30 per month, less than the current minimum wage. Thus far there have been no dropouts and morale is still high. "We have even managed to establish cordial relations with our white neighbors and with the black farmers in the area."

Along with the ex-guerrilla fighters trying to make it, there are thousands of their ex-comrades who are alone, cast out, pushed aside, who have lost all hope. The government occasionally announces, with much fanfare and publicity, the promotion of veterans accepted by the police or the fire department. The fact remains, though, that the fate of the men who risked their lives to bring Zimbabwe to birth is a source of unrest. There are even those who say flatly that the situation was deliberately created. As if, once in power, the political leaders of the nation could not rest until they got rid of those

who had made them kings, the rank-and-file combat veterans. "They were determined to crush the strength the guerrilla veterans represent, as the most highly politicized fringe of the population," charges a "left-wing" opponent of the Mugabe regime.

In Zimbabwe's army today," our informant goes on, "there are no more political commissars, and it is forbidden to talk politics. They've made it a British style army." Only two army units still retain a political background: the 5th and 6th brigades. The 5th brigade, trained by North Korean advisers, covered itself with glory by its bare-handed repression of the disturbances in Matabeleland, in the southwestern part of the country. As for the 6th brigade, it consists of young idlers from the cities whipped into regiments: "They're nothing but Tonton Macoutes," asserts our "dissident."

It is the whole matter of the system set up by Robert Mugabe that is at issue now. Last year, the ruling party, ZANU, held its second congress, the first since independence, and ruled unequivocally for the socialist path, with explicit reference to Marxism Leninism. In practice, of course, there is a very long way to go (see yesterday's article), and there is nothing to indicate that socialism is a clear-cut goal in the minds of the country's leaders. "At best, Mugabe is a Fabian-Society socialist (that was an English progressive group that was the forerunner of the Labour Party. Ed.), but he is no Marxist," says a Zimbabwean intellectual who is irked at the jargon the government affects. "I seriously doubt," he adds, "that you could find more than two or three high-level leaders in ZANU's executive who are ideologically sound and committed."

Says another critic: "There is a lot of confusion among certain ministers who talk about coexistence between socialism and capitalism. Most of them have absolutely no background in socialist practice.

The definitions of socialism you will encounter in Harare may surprise you. Maurice Nyagumbo, once head of ZANU, now minister of state for political affairs, told me that, in his view, socialism simply meant not letting the leaders of the state get rich. Mugabe himself defines it as a very long-term goal, in an ironically unintended formula appearing on the front page of the local daily paper, THE HERALD: "Socialism Won't Hurt the Economy." The prime minister was explaining that day to a group of white farmers that his party would try to implement its policy "without, if we can help it, disturbing the economy. You can't introduce socialism overnight..."

It is true that activists within the very hegemonistic ruling party bother less and less with political lines, and more and more over ethnic or clan-related barriers. While ZANU's top leadership is resolutely Shona, the dominant ethnic group -- with some exceptions like the very mischievous Enos Nkala --, it is among sub-groups of Shonas that the interest groups are born. Everybody knows now that this or that minister has built himself a political fortress among the Karangas, that another is "the Manicas' man," and so forth.

It is up to Robert Mugabe, an exceptionally clever man whose competence is unanimously recognized, to arbitrate among the various groups that squabble over influence in his wake. Regional groups, networks of old friends who did

time in prison together, or shared a Catholic education, not to mention, sometimes, even so, some ideological bonds. It is a task made the more distasteful because occasionally it stumbles on some sordid financial interests, since corruption is far from unknown in Zimbabwe. Even in the army, where the letting of certain weapons contracts (those Brazilian machineguns, for example) has meant fortunes for men who once were the embodiment of the struggle for the country's liberation.

To those who find it hard to swallow Mugabe's "pragmatic" decisions, the path of opposition is strait. "Even those who feel today that things are not moving fast enough, agree with the decision to preserve, at any price, the production apparatus when independence was won, so as to avoid the horrible example of Mozambique," says one academic.

Joshua Nkomo, leader of the ZAPU, frustrated by his defeat in the 1980 elections and disgruntled at being downgraded to regional leader of Matabeleland, toyed for a while with the notion of "leftist" opposition. His military leader, assuredly more ideologically oriented than he, still languishes in prison, while the handful or so of guerrilla veterans loyal to him have survived the mop-up raids into Southwestern Zimbabwe (see LIBERATION, 4 Mar 85).

Confident that he can hold his stronghold in Matabeleland, Joshua Nkomo is left with no choice but to block formation of the single party Mugabe is calling for, and then to sit helplessly by while the ZANU advance-men encroach on his turf. These, though, are mini-quarrels, especially since Zimbabwe right now is eagerly looking forward to an all-time bumper harvest and a steady upswing in its economy. On a continent in the grip of dire tribulations, Mugabe's is no mean performance. It leaves him in a position to dismiss his critics with a nonchalant wave of his hand.

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